I'm still really busy, but an objection occurred to me regarding Craig's recent defense of the Leibnizian cosmological argument, and I'd like to get some feedback to see whether I'm on to something. If I am, then I'd like to add the point to a paper I'm working on. Here is a first pass at the criticism. Feel free to have at it while I'm away!
*ROUGH DRAFT* On another occasion, I argued that Craig has so far failed to justify a seemingly crucial claim in his revived Leibnizian cosmological argument, viz.,
PQFE: It’s possible that the fundamental constituents of material reality (quarks, say) fail to exist.
Here is a more worrisome objection. Even if Craig were to justify PQFE, it wouldn't help him infer
QNEG: The fundamental constituents of reality (quarks, say) have a necessary being as their explanatory ground.
Indeed, I will demonstrate the stronger claim that even if Craig were to justify PQFE, it would fail to provide evidence that would …
I'm pretty busy at the moment, so in lieu of a new post, here's an old (2007) post I've been thinking about lately and have been meaning to revise.
Now play nice and stay out of the liquor cabinet while I'm away.
A number of contemporary Christian philosophers think there's a good argument for God in the phenomenon of consciousness, including Richard Swinburne, Robert M. Adams, J.P. Moreland, and Victor Reppert. There are at least two forms of the argument.
The first argument postulates God as the best explanation of the mere existence of consciousness. This argument has various forms: some are Cartesian conceivability arguments for substance dualism, where the theist then posits God as the best explanation of the existence of souls. But more modest versions refrain from inferences to substance dualism and just focus on the fact that consciousness is extremely difficult to make sense of if the natural world is all there is. For conscious…