tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post5546970271137591406..comments2023-05-20T07:46:10.187-07:00Comments on ex-apologist: PSR, PvI, and the Multiverseexapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-20385803041300146822015-12-25T10:53:38.910-08:002015-12-25T10:53:38.910-08:00This is similar to a view I've argued for in T...This is similar to a view I've argued for in Theism and Plenitude, but not on the assumption of a multiverse. Lewis's pluriverse is not a multiverse. Other universes exist for Lewis (other worlds exist) only on an unrestricted use of 'exists' and none of those other worlds/universes is actual. Multiverse theorists maintain on the other hand that the other universes actually exist. Instead of having God actualize a universe or a multiverse, you have God actualize a pluriverse--all of metaphysical space. This requires the rejection of counterpart theory for God--you don't have a different God existing in each world--but rather you have God exist <i>from the standpoint of</i> each world while <i>existing in</i> no possible world at all. You still get necessitarianism, since God's creation (all worlds and all possibilia) exists necessarily under unrestricted quantification, but you also get contingency preserved, under restricted quantification. Necessitarianism is thus compatible with contingency. The bonus is that the principle of plenitude is also satisfied.Mike Almeidahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12001511002085064198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-49374256179384206982015-12-06T15:43:42.796-08:002015-12-06T15:43:42.796-08:00Hi, Steve.
I'm inclined to think the option y...Hi, Steve.<br /><br />I'm inclined to think the option you sketch above (and flesh out in some of your recent work) is another live epistemic possibility. More trouble for the PvI objection to PSR!<br /><br />Best,<br />EAexapologisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-49759846444689535922015-12-05T05:51:13.587-08:002015-12-05T05:51:13.587-08:00Ex: Nice post. How about a fifth option?
(v) Hold...Ex: Nice post. How about a fifth option?<br /><br />(v) Hold on to PSR but deny that it entails that everything exists or occurs of metaphysical necessity.<br /><br />Given any state of the universe S1, PSR entails that S1 is necessitated by some other state of the universe S2 ("some other state" because no state of the universe necessitates itself). S2, in turn, is necessitated by some state of the universe S3. And so on <i>ad infinitum</i>. No state of the universe is thereby made metaphysically necessary, full stop, only metaphysically necessary <i>given</i> some other state. Contingency preserved: <i>any</i> state of the universe would have been different had some other state been different.<br /><br />This explanation entails an infinitely old universe (fine by me and better than the alternative), or else the past states of the universe "telescope" into a finite period of time, as Quentin Smith has suggested.<br /><br />"But why are there are any states of the universe at all?" As I've argued elsewhere, that question is either ill-posed or else answered by invoking any state of the universe. Nothing is left inexplicable.Steve Maitzenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13486753888846357635noreply@blogger.com