tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post7160045965245134804..comments2023-05-20T07:46:10.187-07:00Comments on ex-apologist: More on Howard-Snyder's New Paper on the Logical Problem of Evilexapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-73541960448994320692013-03-12T07:47:56.983-07:002013-03-12T07:47:56.983-07:00Thanks EA, and thanks Angra.Thanks EA, and thanks Angra.Bobcathttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04797941051438316014noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-7104175721709229342013-03-11T20:35:43.435-07:002013-03-11T20:35:43.435-07:00Hi, Bobcat
Regarding what an atheist might do (or...Hi, Bobcat<br /><br />Regarding what an atheist might do (or generally a non-theist who denies the existence of the specific kind of entity the LPoE is against), as long as she accepts at least libertarian free will, that there are essences, and counterfactuals of freedom of the kind Plantinga proposes (plus perhaps some other hypotheses), she shouldn't rest on the LPoE as long as she also accepts Howard-Snyder's arguments. <br /><br />However, an atheist might be, say, a compatibilist, and accept Howard-Snyder's argument under the assumption (made just for the sake of the argument) that libertarianism is true (plus perhaps other assumptions she doesn't actually accept). <br />In cases like that, it seems to me that accepting H-S's argument under those conditions should not significantly affect the atheist's assessment of the LPoE, as long as she assigns a sufficiently low probability to the assumptions she's granting for the sake of the argument. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-64116824969968235982013-03-11T15:48:45.300-07:002013-03-11T15:48:45.300-07:00Hi Bobcat,
A draft of Pruss's paper can be fo...Hi Bobcat,<br /><br />A draft of Pruss's paper can be found <a href="https://bearspace.baylor.edu/Alexander_Pruss/www/papers/AgainstPFWD.html" rel="nofollow">here</a>.<br /><br />Best!<br />EAexapologisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-535619909633270952013-03-11T15:44:17.504-07:002013-03-11T15:44:17.504-07:00Hi exapologist,
I see the links to the papers by ...Hi exapologist,<br /><br />I see the links to the papers by Rasmussen and Schellenberg, but where is the paper/post by Pruss?<br /><br />RobBobcathttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04797941051438316014noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-56202829267347111322013-03-11T10:45:52.692-07:002013-03-11T10:45:52.692-07:00Hi Bobcat,
Plantinga's "O Felix Culpa&qu...Hi Bobcat,<br /><br />Plantinga's "O Felix Culpa" is an interesting piece, but the line of reasoning you mention seems to have some dialectical deficiencies with respect to the point at issue (to which you nicely gesture).<br /><br />About the upshot of Howard-Snyder's argument: No you're right: it doesn't justify that God and evil are <i>not</i> compossible; it just undercuts Plantinga's case that they <i>are</i> compossible. Perhaps it's worth noting, though, that the papers by Rasmussen, Pruss, Schellenberg, et al. I mentioned in my subsequent post argue for the stronger claim.<br />exapologisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-62154676349169694462013-03-11T09:20:26.854-07:002013-03-11T09:20:26.854-07:00Hi exapologist,
I haven't read any of the pap...Hi exapologist,<br /><br />I haven't read any of the papers you've linked to (just your post on the subject), but I have a couple of thoughts. <br /><br />First, in "Supralapsarianism or O Felix Culpa", Plantinga gives an argument for why he thinks TWD is true. If I recall the argument correctly, it goes like this: for a possible world to be good enough for God to actualize, it has to meet two conditions: (1) God has to exist in it; and (2) it has to have an incarnation and an atonement. Now, if God necessarily exists, then every possible world meets (1). On the other hand, the only possible worlds that satisfy (2) are those worlds that have a fall, for the reason that an incarnation and atonement is necessary is if there is a fall. But any world with a fall is also a world where all the rational, finite creatures (save for beings like angels, but we'll leave them aside, and save for whatever rational, finite creature God incarnates in) suffer original sin, which means they all are guilty for at least one wrong thing. So, TWD is true of the creatures in any world good enough for God to realize. Obviously, one can disagree with (to say the least) (2), but I'm just pointing out that Plantinga has argued for TWD to some extent. <br /><br />Second, and I think more important for your post, you write: <br /><br />"In short, FWD succeeds in showing the compossibility of God and evil only if <>TWD is true. But <>TWD is true only if Interworld Plenitude is true and Intraworld Plenitude is false. But we have no reason to prefer one of these two pictures of the distribution of the counterfactuals of freedom to creaturely essences over the other, in which case we have no reason to think <>TWD is true. And if that's right, Plantinga's FWD fails to show the compossibility of God and evil."<br /><br />It seems to me right that if we don't know whether Interworld or Intraworld Plentitude are true, then we have no reason to think that FWD is true. And from that it follows to show that the FWD fails to show the compossibility of God and evil. But on the other hand, it also seems to me that for the logical PoE to work, we need to know whether Interworld or Intraworld Plentitude are true. But as you said above, we don't know that. So it seems to me that, even if we don't know whether the FWD works, we also don't know whether the logical PoE works, in which case the atheist can't rest on it. <br /><br />(BTW, this reminds me of a response PvI gave to Plantinga's modal ontological argument. In <i>The Nature of Necessity</i>, Plantinga argues that, since we don't know whether a greatest conceivable being (GCB) is possible or impossible, it's reasonable to believe that it is possible, and so it's reasonable to think that the modal ontological argument works. But in review of that work, PvI points out, rightly, it seems to me, that if you don't know whether a GCB is possible, then you can't reasonably believe an argument that depends on the possibility of the GCB for its conclusion to work. That seems to me structurally similar to the criticism I'm making of the argument in your post.)Bobcathttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04797941051438316014noreply@blogger.com