tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post3632678385407264195..comments2023-05-20T07:46:10.187-07:00Comments on ex-apologist: Reply to William Lane Craigexapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comBlogger13125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-17960138050878271392013-08-06T12:32:14.286-07:002013-08-06T12:32:14.286-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06709307498161291125noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-5529338253255297982012-03-08T12:19:46.056-08:002012-03-08T12:19:46.056-08:00Hi Bogdan,
Thanks. According to my epistemically ...Hi Bogdan,<br /><br />Thanks. According to my epistemically possible hypothesis, there is just one basic kind of stuff -- matter-engergy, say --, whereas the theistic hypothesis postulates two basic kinds of stuff (immaterial stuff and material stuff). My hypothesis is therefore more qualitatively parsimonious than the latter hypothesis.<br /><br />Furthermore, my hypothesis doesn't attribute more to the hypothetical stuff than is strictly required to explain the data of the contingency of things composed of matter-energy: to explain the data of contingent dependent beings, one need only postulate an independent being. One need not go beyond this and postulate that the independent being exists in all possible worlds.<br /><br />In at least these ways, then, I take my hypothesis to be less metaphysically extravagant and "modally extreme" than the Anselmian theistic hypothesis.<br /><br />Best,<br />EAexapologisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-64992390887391835222012-03-07T23:09:10.379-08:002012-03-07T23:09:10.379-08:00EA,
I find your take on the Argument from Continge...EA,<br />I find your take on the Argument from Contingency luring. However, I do have a query.<br />You said: "For as my epistemically possible being points out, there are less metaphysically extravagant, modally extreme candidates that can end the terminus of explanation in a satisfactory manner"<br /><br />Please explain to me why postulating one being that exists and is indestructible in all possible worlds is more extravagant (modally extreme) than postulating more entities that exist and are indestructible only in some possible worlds.<br /><br />Best,<br />BogdanBogdanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15449119709471870254noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-70951980781808928262011-05-01T10:40:45.342-07:002011-05-01T10:40:45.342-07:00Hi Aaron,
If you're right, then it would be a...Hi Aaron,<br /><br />If you're right, then it would be a <i>tour de force</i> against Swinburne's conception of God(!). But in any case, I'm not sure I see why such a being's factual necessity would collapse into metaphysical necessity. It seems to me that there could be possible worlds at which a factually necessary being could fail to exist. However, it would of course be true that no worlds <i>counterfactual</i> to the worlds containing a factually necessary being lack such a being.exapologisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-69448352249649483322011-04-20T09:24:46.250-07:002011-04-20T09:24:46.250-07:00I fear that there might be a hidden incoherence in...I fear that there might be a hidden incoherence in the notion of a merely factually necessary physical universe. God is deciding which of two worlds to actualize. A world with a factually necessary physical universe and one with a factually contingent physical world. Now, of course, it is clearly impossible for God to actualize (i.e. cause to exist) the world with the factually necessary physical world. More to the point, if the factually necessary world already exists (it would have to right, in order to be factually necessary?) then no possible worlds could exclude this universe. Hence, factual necessity collapses (or perhaps expands) into metaphysical necessity.Dr. Rizzhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11973445460497414539noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-26260234243782792092011-03-10T20:40:12.533-08:002011-03-10T20:40:12.533-08:00You bet: not all researchers are M-Theorists (alth...You bet: not all researchers are M-Theorists (although I understand it's the most popular view among them. See, e.g., p. 14 of <a href="http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8441/" rel="nofollow">this</a> paper). I'm not sure I see the relevance of the point, though.exapologisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-34235814926770242552011-03-06T18:43:58.124-08:002011-03-06T18:43:58.124-08:00Ex,
I'm no scientist but Penrose is on record...Ex,<br /><br />I'm no scientist but Penrose is on record as stating that M-Theory isn't even a theory. He has a new book comming out called "Cycles Of Time" where he argues for a pre-big bang universe but clearly he's strongly against M-Theory.Johnhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18342042981695750691noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-43982508224655940802011-03-06T17:55:47.340-08:002011-03-06T17:55:47.340-08:00Hey Cole,
Careful: a theory can function as a leg...Hey Cole,<br /><br />Careful: a theory can function as a legitimate explanation even if it lacks prior support. So, for example, a theory can accrue support if it embodies various explanatory virtues, such as simplicity, explanatory scope, explanatory power, etc. (If they couldn't, then Craig's abductive argument for the resurrection of Jesus would be ruled out from the get-go). And (e.g.) the multiverse-friendly M-Theory embodies such explanatory virtues. So, for example, it has great explanatory scope and power, as it unifies the multiple interpretations of string theory, and holds out the prospect of unifying General Relativity Theory and quantum mechanics.exapologisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-28496329554727563612011-03-04T11:34:26.390-08:002011-03-04T11:34:26.390-08:00Hey Ex,
I know that's what Penrose is trying ...Hey Ex,<br /><br />I know that's what Penrose is trying to say but he admits it's very sketchy. There is no evidence for these other universes prior to ours. Unless I missed it.Johnhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18342042981695750691noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-42956109983807158142011-03-04T10:19:04.981-08:002011-03-04T10:19:04.981-08:00Hi Cole,
I guess I don't see how this helps a...Hi Cole,<br /><br />I guess I don't see how this helps anything. If the universe didn't have an absolute beginning, such that physical causal antecedents aren't precluded as the cause of our universe, then it's epistemically possible that our universe had physical causal antecedents. The same goes for any other universe. And if that's right, the appeal to an immaterial creator is undercut.<br /><br />To come at the point from a slightly different direction: even if any <i>particular</i> universe requires a beginning, it doesn't follow that the there couldn't be a beginningless <i>series</i> of finite universes, each one given birth from the one that came before it.<br /><br />Perhaps, though, you have in mind Craig's point about the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem? If so, please see the last few paragraphs of my post, as well as footnotes [8]-[10].exapologisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-27846679074839244262011-03-03T16:14:49.226-08:002011-03-03T16:14:49.226-08:00Ex,
Craig has admitted in "On Guard" th...Ex,<br /><br />Craig has admitted in "On Guard" that:<br /><br />"The beginning may or may not have a beginning point. But theories that do not have a pointlike beginning still have a finite past. The universe has not existed forever, according to such theories, but came into existence, even if it didn't do so at a sharply defined point".<br /><br />Page 91Johnhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18342042981695750691noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-53081916754790069962011-02-23T17:55:51.087-08:002011-02-23T17:55:51.087-08:00Hi Wes,
Yeah, probably.
-EAHi Wes,<br /><br />Yeah, probably.<br /><br />-EAexapologisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-59360367571202294322011-02-19T18:58:55.258-08:002011-02-19T18:58:55.258-08:00Do you think you'll post send him a copy of th...Do you think you'll post send him a copy of this?Weshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10212971606135991995noreply@blogger.com