tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post6343918814672213744..comments2023-05-20T07:46:10.187-07:00Comments on ex-apologist: Naturalism and Necessary Beings (Very, Very Rough Draft)exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-16671469706256969752012-05-22T14:00:46.688-07:002012-05-22T14:00:46.688-07:00Ah, you beat me to the punch! I've briefly dis...<i>Ah, you beat me to the punch! I've briefly discussed this sort of response before (e.g., here, here, and here), but I was going to explore a slightly more extended response to Craig's version of the Leibnizian cosmological argument in the next post.</i><br /><br />Hi, Ex. By all means please do write that post. I'll look forward to it. And I'm not sure I count as beating you to the punch when -- as I now see -- you've got posts on this topic going back three years! Thanks for the kind words.Steve Maitzenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13486753888846357635noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-90465720774271135572012-05-22T13:19:41.680-07:002012-05-22T13:19:41.680-07:00Hi, Steve.
I'd like to challenge the assumpti...Hi, Steve.<br /><br /><i>I'd like to challenge the assumption that some kind of necessity is required in the first place in order to meet any reasonable explanatory demand. Suppose that the chain of explanations goes on forever (as, in fact, I think it must), with each contingent being explained in terms of earlier ones. What's missing? What's not to like?</i><br /><br />Ah, you beat me to the punch! I've briefly discussed this sort of response before (e.g., <a href="http://exapologist.blogspot.com/2008/12/humes-criticisms-of-cosmological.html" rel="nofollow">here</a>, <a href="http://exapologist.blogspot.com/2008/05/notes-on-peter-van-inwagens-criticisms_24.html" rel="nofollow">here</a>, and <a href="http://exapologist.blogspot.com/2008/11/craig-on-leibnizian-cosmological.html" rel="nofollow">here</a>), but I was going to explore a slightly more extended response to Craig's version of the Leibnizian cosmological argument in the next post. <br /><br />I'm also inclined to think your criticism of the cosmological argument is correct -- nice work!exapologisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-36148208631322963832012-05-22T10:12:27.926-07:002012-05-22T10:12:27.926-07:00I don't want to take Ex's project too far ...I don't want to take Ex's project too far afield, but I'd like to challenge the assumption that some kind of necessity is required in the first place in order to meet any reasonable explanatory demand. Suppose that the chain of explanations goes on forever (as, in fact, I think it must), with each contingent being explained in terms of earlier ones. What's missing? What's not to like? The usual answer, and the one offered by Hume's Demea and by Rowe: "You've not explained why there are any contingent beings <i>at all</i>, even granting that there's no first one." Here I suspect that language has run off the rails: the objector is trying to treat the label "contingent being" as a genuine sortal (or kind) term, rather than what <a href="http://www.amiethomasson.org/papers%20to%20link/Answerable%20and%20unanswerable%20questions%20proofs.pdf" rel="nofollow">Amie Thomasson</a> calls "a covering term." I say a bit more about this worry <a href="http://philosophy.acadiau.ca/tl_files/sites/philosophy/resources/documents/Maitzen_SAWTA.pdf" rel="nofollow">in this article</a>. Cheers.Steve Maitzenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13486753888846357635noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-6938010302406162152012-05-21T22:04:15.757-07:002012-05-21T22:04:15.757-07:00Hi John,
Thanks for your helpful comments. I revi...Hi John,<br /><br />Thanks for your helpful comments. I revised my post in an attempt to address your second comment. Re: your first comment/question: yes, that's exactly what I intended with that qualification. I'm fine with metaphysically necessary abstracta, as are many non-theistic philosophers, as you know. However (and here I only have anecdotal evidence), it seems that less are comfortable with the notion of metaphysically necessary concreta. <br /><br />Best,<br />EAexapologisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-48403569312400455052012-05-21T15:03:03.333-07:002012-05-21T15:03:03.333-07:00This is an interesting series. I've been think...This is an interesting series. I've been thinking about metaphysical necessity and theism/atheism nexus myself recently, but in the moral context. I don't really have any substantive comments right now, but two things did occur to me. The first a question; the second an observation.<br /><br />The question is this: You say in the intro that "more carefully" the concern is that the naturalist would be committed to the existence of one metaphysically necessary <i>concrete</i> being. Forgive my uncertainty about the terminology, but is this taken to distinguish the commitment from a commitment to metaphysically abstract entities (like logical and, perhaps, moral truths)? As I recall, you like the idea of broad metaphysical naturalism which would - correct me if I'm wrong - accept metaphysically necessary abstract truths. Is this right? <br /><br />The observation has to do with the whole conceivability-possibility inference, which fascinates me, (in general) though I'm strictly a dilettante in that arena of philosophical argumentation. You say Craig better hope that the inference he calls upon is unsuccessful because God's non-existence is conceivable too (after reasonable reflection yadda yadda yadda...). But isn't that something that Craig will just reject outright by appealing to something like the ontological argument? <br /><br />I might be way off, and I don't think your obliged to look into that in the paper (I presume) your writing, but I think it might raise some concerns if Craig is to be your dialectical partner throughout this particular philosophical dance.John Danaherhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06761686258507859309noreply@blogger.com