tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-318357202024-03-23T11:17:55.687-07:00ex-apologista philosophy of religion blogexapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comBlogger1689125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-57033742797125700722024-03-09T12:11:00.000-08:002024-03-09T12:11:06.436-08:00Ricki Bliss's Cambridge Element on Grounding, Fundamentality, and Ultimate Explanations<p> ...is <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/grounding-fundamentality-and-ultimate-explanations/5A764C010257859BB30AA9BE1B950324">now out</a>, and available for free download for a limited time. Required reading.</p><div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-7947886748086692862023-12-26T23:31:00.000-08:002023-12-26T23:31:51.787-08:00Schmid's Excellent New Paper on the Kalam Cosmological Argument<p style="text-align: justify;">Schmid, Joseph C. "<a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHBPP-3?fbclid=IwAR2mQ5xfb6ROjAZtdkaeG7CguG_ZbYG2NW6-NVNLx0PVczWxzGCfYqBQJzg">Benardete paradoxes, patchwork principles, and the infinite past</a>", <i>Synthese</i>, forthcoming.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Abstract: Benardete paradoxes involve a beginningless set each member of which satisfies some predicate just in case no earlier member satisfies it. Such paradoxes have been wielded on behalf of arguments for the impossibility of an infinite past. These arguments often deploy patchwork principles in support of their key linking premise. Here I argue that patchwork principles fail to justify this key premise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Happy reading!</p><div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-63448588406790569672023-12-26T23:29:00.000-08:002023-12-26T23:29:29.541-08:00Launonen's Nice Forthcoming Paper Critiquing the Evidential Force of Everyday Religious Experiences<p style="text-align: justify;">Launonen, Lari. "<a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/LAUHGS">Hearing God speak? Debunking arguments and everyday religious experiences</a>", <i>International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion</i>, forthcoming.<br /></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Abstract: Against claims that cognitive science of religion undercuts belief in God, many defenders of theistic belief have invoked the Religious Reasons Reply: science cannot undercut belief in God if one has good independent reasons to believe. However, it is unclear whether this response helps salvage the god beliefs of most people. This paper considers four questions: (1) What reasons do Christians have for believing in God? (2) What kinds of beliefs about God can the reasons support? (3) Are the reasons rationalizations? (4) Can cognitive science undercut the reasons? Many Christians invoke everyday religious experiences (EREs)—such as experiences of divine presence, guidance, and communication—as reasons to believe. Unlike another popular reason to believe in God (the appearance of design and beauty in nature), EREs can support beliefs about a relational God who is present to me, who guides my life, and who speaks to me. EREs are not rationalizations since they seem to cause and sustain such beliefs. Nonetheless, EREs like experiences of hearing God speak are problematic reasons to believe. ‘Soft’ voice-hearing experiences are easily undercut. ‘Hard’ experiences of an external, audible voice are probably underpinned by similar cognitive processes as audio-verbal hallucinations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Happy reading!</p><div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-59746885032277136662023-12-26T22:50:00.000-08:002023-12-26T23:36:59.061-08:00Two Important Recent Papers on Cosmological Arguments from Alexandre Billon<p style="text-align: justify;">"<a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/BILAIE-2">Are infinite explanations self-explanatory?</a>", <i>Erkenntnis</i> 88 (5): 1935-1954. 2021.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Abstract: Consider an infinite series whose items are each explained by their immediate successor. Does such an infinite explanation explain the whole series or does it leave something to be explained? Hume arguably claimed that it does fully explain the whole series. Leibniz, however, designed a very telling objection against this claim, an objection involving an infinite series of book copies. In this paper, I argue that the Humean claim can, in certain cases, be saved from the Leibnizian “infinite book copies” objection, and that this provides an interesting way to defuse some cosmological arguments for the existence of God and to give a non-theistic but complete explanation of the Universe. In the course of my argumentation, I also show that circular explanations can be “self-explanatory” as well: explaining two items by each other can explain the couple of items tout court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"<a href="In a previous article on cosmological arguments, I have put forward a few examples of complete infinite and circular explanations, and argued that complete non-wellfounded explanations such as these might explain the present state of the world better than their well-founded theistic counterparts (Billon, 2021). Although my aim was broader, the examples I gave there implied merely causal explanations. In this article, I would like to do three things: • Specify some general informative conditions for complete and incomplete non-wellfounded causal explanations that can be used to assess candidate explanations and to generate new examples of complete non-wellfounded explanations. • Show that these conditions, which concern chains of causal explanations, easily generalize to chains of metaphysical, grounding explanations and even to chains involving other “determination relations” such as supervenience. • Apply these general conditions to the recent debates against the existence of nonwellfounded chains of grounds and show, with a couple of precise examples, that the latter can be complete, and that just like in the case of causal explanations, non-wellfoundedness can in fact be an aset rather than a liability.">A recipe for complete non-wellfounded explanations"</a>, <i>Dialectica,</i> forthcoming.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Abstract:In a previous article on cosmological arguments, I have put forward a few examples of complete infinite and circular explanations, and argued that complete non-wellfounded explanations such as these might explain the present state of the world better than their well-founded theistic counterparts (Billon, 2021). Although my aim was broader, the examples I gave there implied merely causal explanations. In this article, I would like to do three things: • Specify some general informative conditions for complete and incomplete non-wellfounded causal explanations that can be used to assess candidate explanations and to generate new examples of complete non-wellfounded explanations. • Show that these conditions, which concern chains of causal explanations, easily generalize to chains of metaphysical, grounding explanations and even to chains involving other “determination relations” such as supervenience. • Apply these general conditions to the recent debates against the existence of nonwellfounded chains of grounds and show, with a couple of precise examples, that the latter can be complete, and that just like in the case of causal explanations, non-wellfoundedness can in fact be an aset rather than a liability.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Happy reading!</p><div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-40074669610505642892023-12-10T12:33:00.000-08:002023-12-10T12:33:26.702-08:00New Podcast Interview: Goff on the Purpose of the Universe<p>Carrie Figdor interviews <a href="https://philipgoffphilosophy.com/">Philip Goff</a> on his terrific new book, <i><a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/why-the-purpose-of-the-universe-9780198883760?cc=us&lang=en&">Why? The Purpose of the Universe</a></i>, on <i><a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/new-books-in-philosophy/id426208821?i=1000638075851">New Books in Philosophy</a></i>.</p><div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-4988476666402295642023-10-22T12:46:00.002-07:002023-10-22T12:47:18.970-07:00Schmid's Fantastic New Paper on the Grim Reaper Paradox<p style="text-align: justify;">Schmid, Joseph C. "<a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHTEI-19?fbclid=IwAR2rZew3FNQLdkMirDJcQET0eY2WBjeiY6J20bhY8uireGa2W8MTELWRuHw">The End is Near: Grim Reapers and Endless Futures</a>", <i>Mind</i> (forthcoming).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Abstract: José Benardete developed a famous paradox involving a beginningless set of items each member of which satisfies some predicate just in case no earlier member satisfies it. The Grim Reaper version of this paradox has recently been employed in favor of various finitist metaphysical theses, ranging from temporal finitism to causal finitism to the discrete nature of time. Here, I examine a new challenge to these finitist arguments—namely, the challenge of implying that the future cannot be endless. In particular, I develop future-oriented Benardete paradoxes and examine their epistemic symmetry with past-oriented paradoxes.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Readers of this blog will of course know of Schmid's <a href="https://www.josephschmid.com/research/">other excellent work</a> in metaphysics, philosophy of religion, and philosophy of time, with special focus on issues related to persistence, infinity and infinitary paradoxes, modality, models of God, and arguments for and against God’s existence. I highly recommend all of his work. </p><div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-10345967015284873532023-09-30T15:37:00.004-07:002023-09-30T15:37:29.302-07:00Tooley's New Defense of Morriston's Humean Argument from Evil<p style="text-align: justify;">Tooley, Michael. "<a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/TOOWMS">Wes Morriston’s ‘Skeptical Demonism’ Argument from Evil and Timothy Perrine’s Response</a>", <i>Sophia</i> (forthcoming). </p><p></p><div style="text-align: justify;">Abstract:</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Wes Morriston has argued that given the mixture of goods and evils found in the world, the probability of God’s existence is much less than the probability of a creator who is indifferent to good and evil. One of my goals here is, first, to show how, by bringing in the concept of dispositions, Morriston’s argument can be expressed in a rigorous, step-by-step fashion, and then, second, to show how one can connect the extent to which different events are surprising to conclusions concerning the probabilities of those events. My second goal is to evaluate two important objections to Morriston’s argument advanced by Timothy Perrine in his article, ‘Skeptical Theism and Morriston’s Humean Argument from Evil.’ Perrine’s first objection involves comparing how probable the evils in the world are if God exists with the probability if there is a deity who is indifferent to good and evil, and Perrine argues that given the version of skeptical theism that he and Stephen Wykstra have defended, the probability given theism is greater than the probability given an indifferent deity. Perrine’s second objection focuses instead on the probability of the mixture of goods and evils found in the world, and here he argues that there is no way of assigning a probability to that, either given the God-hypothesis or given the indifferent deity hypothesis, and therefore no way of comparing the probabilities of those two hypotheses. I then set out arguments that show that neither of Perrine’s objections is sound.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Happy reading!</div><p></p><div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-80535480650085692492023-09-29T10:18:00.007-07:002023-09-29T10:19:12.555-07:00Climenhaga & Rubio's Fantastic New Paper on Molinism<p style="text-align: justify;">Nevin Climenhaga and Daniel Rubio's new paper, "<a href="https://philpapers.org/archive/CLIMEO.pdf">Molinism: Explaining our Freedom Away</a>" (<i>Mind</i> 131 (522): 459-485. 2022) is a must read. Here's the abstract:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Molinists hold that there are contingently true counterfactuals about what agents
would do if put in specific circumstances, that God knows these prior to creation,
and that God uses this knowledge in choosing how to create. In this essay we
critique Molinism, arguing that if these theses were true, agents would not be
free. Consider Eve’s sinning upon being tempted by a serpent. We argue that if
Molinism is true, then there is some set of facts that fully explains both Eve’s action
and everything else Eve does that influences that action; and that if this is the case,
Eve does not act freely. The first premise of this argument follows from the explanatory relations the Molinist is committed to, and the second premise follows
from libertarian intuitions about free will.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">And here's the conclusion to further whet your appetite:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"Molinists seek to reconcile a strong doctrine of providence with libertarian human freedom. We have argued that this reconciliation cannot succeed. If there are true CCFs that guide God’s providential choice of what circumstances to put us in, then that choice and those CCFs, together with any common influences on them and our actions, determine what we will do. We must give up either robust human freedom or robust divine providence: there is no middle ground."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Happy reading!</p><div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-52030271133256192642023-08-19T19:20:00.004-07:002023-08-19T19:35:28.592-07:00Luis Oliveira's Recent Work on Skeptical Theism<p>"<a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/OLISTA-5">Skeptical Theism: A Panoramic Overview, Part I</a>", <i>Philosophy Compass. </i>First published: 16 August 2023. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12947</p><p>"<a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/OLISTA-6">Skeptical Theism: A Panoramic Overview, Part II</a>", <i>Philosophy Compass. </i>First published: 18 August 2023. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12946</p><p>"<a href="https://philpapers.org/archive/OLIGAG.pdf">God and Gratuitous Evil: Between the Rock and the Hard Place</a>", <i>International Journal for Philosophy of Religion</i>. Published online 21 July 2023. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-023-09883-0</p><div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-642996334730145612023-07-26T13:59:00.003-07:002023-07-26T13:59:25.626-07:00Three New Objections to the Fine-Tuning Argument for Theism<div style="text-align: justify;"><i>First objection</i>: <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lvefraab8hwkw47/The%20Problem%20of%20Creation%20Ex%20Nihilo_Ontology%20of%20Divinity%20Volume%20Chapter%20Draft.pdf?dl=0">Nothing can create concrete objects <i>ex nihilo</i></a>. So the posterior probability of the fine-tuning of the universe of concrete objects on the hypothesis that the god of classical theism both (i) designed it and (ii) ultimately created it <i>ex nihilo</i> is nil. But according to classical theism, for any world <i>W </i>containing concrete objects, God ultimately created the concrete objects in <i>W ex nihilo</i>. Therefore, classical theism entails that God ultimately creates <i>ex nihilo</i> any world containing concrete objects he designs. Therefore, the posterior probability of fine-tuning on the hypothesis of classical theism is nil.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Second objection: </i>The evidence for fine-tuning confirms both demiurgism and panentheism over theism, and in this way is good evidence against theism. This is because the intuitive and empirical evidence against creation <i>ex nihilo</i> creates a strong drag on theism’s prior probability not suffered by demiurgism and panentheism, and so they lap the former in terms of posterior probability. <i>A fortiori</i>, the posterior probability of the inclusive disjunction of demiurgism and panentheism is considerably higher than that of theism given the evidence of fine-tuning.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><div><br /></div></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Third objection</i>: <span>There are final causes in</span><span> </span><span>God's nature</span><span> </span><span>that are ontologically prior to his intelligent agency. For example, God's intellect and will work together to perform various functions, such as designing and creating things. God's life is also meaningful and purposeful according to classical theism. On classical theism, therefore,</span><span> </span><span>fi</span><span>nal causes are built into God's nature without a prior cause</span><span>. But if that's right, then classical theism entails the existence of final causes at the metaphysical ground floor that God cannot create. And if that's right, then</span><span> theism </span><span>e</span><span>ntails that non-conscious teleology is a more fundamental feature of reality than teleology caused by intelligence. And if that's right, </span><span>then we'd expect base-level teleology in the universe that's not caused by God on the hypothesis of theism. Therefore, absent a <i>further</i> reason for thinking cosmic fine-tuning isn't expected unless caused by a divine fine-tuner, cosmic fine-tuning doesn't confirm theism vis-a-vis naturalism.</span></div><div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-73389174265424819632023-07-21T11:03:00.008-07:002023-07-21T11:03:47.220-07:00New Paper on the Problem(s) of Divine Manipulation for Christian Theism<p style="text-align: justify;">Aku, Visala. "<a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/VISTPO-4">The Problems of Divine Manipulation</a>", <i>Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie</i> 65:2 (July 2023).</p><div style="text-align: justify;">Abstract: Many Christian theologians believe in the existence of cases of divine hardening and divine election, where God either actively contributes to human evil or preordains it. God seems to act like a manipulator, who first covertly incites or determines people’s evil actions and then condemns those actions and punishes the wrongdoers. I raise three questions regarding such cases: (1) how can humans be responsible for wrongdoings that are determined by God via either direct involvement or predestination; (2) is God justified in using covert manipulation to achieve his goals; (3) how can God judge human evil, if God predestines them or actively incites humans to commit evils? The article outlines two cases of supposed divine manipulation, discusses the general nature of manipulation and then examines each question outlined above. The argument is that the problems surrounding divine manipulation present significant challenges to especially those Christian theists that subscribe to divine determinism.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-47897328920999967502023-07-10T18:12:00.020-07:002023-07-17T16:24:21.598-07:00Structural Evil<div style="text-align: justify;">Rough draft: First pass.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Consider the following two lists of evils:</div><div><blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">List A</div><div style="text-align: justify;">1. The suffering and death of a fawn caused by a forest fire due to a relatively rare natural event.</div><div style="text-align: justify;">2. The death of an explorer by a volcano in a remote and unoccupied region.</div><div style="text-align: justify;">3. The suffering caused by an extremely rare birth defect.</div><div style="text-align: justify;">4. A death from being hit by a relatively small meteor fragment.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">List B</div><div style="text-align: justify;">5. The suffering caused by the mechanisms of pleasure and pain to condition the behavior of sentient creatures.</div><div style="text-align: justify;">6. Suffering caused by predation.</div><div style="text-align: justify;">7. The suffering caused by innate mechanisms in the cognitive architecture of humans that <a href="https://exapologist.blogspot.com/2022/07/fantastic-recent-empirically-informed.html">naturally and reliably cause out-group hostility and genocide</a>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;">8. The suffering caused by sickness and death due to microbes in many natural bodies of water.</div></blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">The traditional distinction between moral and natural evil treats all instances of evil on both lists as roughly the same, viz., as just a bunch of instances of natural evil. This is bad. For intuitively, the evils on List B are relevantly different from those on List A, and in a way that is significant. In particular, natural evils on List A seem like <i>one-offs</i> in the normal course of things, while those on List B are <i>a constitutive part</i> of the normal course of things. To put it in terms of a popular idiom: List-A evils are bugs in the system of nature, while List-B evils are features. I therefore propose that we mark the distinction between the two types of evil with some labels. Call evils of the sort on List B <i>structural evils</i>, and call evils List A <i>non-structural evils</i>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">As a first approximation, structural evils are characterized by at least the following three features:</div><blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">1. They are a species of natural evil.</div><div style="text-align: justify;">2. They are caused by structural features of the universe or a specific portion thereof.</div><div style="text-align: justify;">3. If left to run their course, such features either (a) reliably produce suffering/harm in human or non-human creatures or (b) significantly raise the probability of suffering/harm.</div></blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">The structural/non-structural evil distinction holds out the promise of an advance in the problem of evil debate. For discussion of the problem of evil not infrequently focuses on non-structural evils. But these can seem like one-off evils, in which case one might naturally infer that they are foreseen but unintended evils in a universe that generally runs in a way that supports the well-being of its creatures. By contrast, it's intuitive that structural evils are such that, if God exists, then they are foreseen and intended, thereby eliciting a natural presumption of depraved indifference or actual malice. As such, they seem to be a much more formidable category of evil to account for on the hypothesis of theism. </div></div><div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-89767291800362581902023-07-10T13:31:00.006-07:002023-07-10T13:31:50.793-07:00Alter's New Book Defending Russellian Monism<p style="text-align: justify;">Torin Alter's new book, <i>The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism (</i>Oxford University Press, 2023) is <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-matter-of-consciousness-9780198840459?cc=us&lang=en&">now out</a>. For an overview, listen to <a href="https://newbooksnetwork.com/the-matter-of-consciousness">this nice podcast interview</a> with Alter (by Carrie Figdor) on <i>New Books in Philosophy</i>.</p><div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-41169036052837941832023-06-29T15:56:00.004-07:002023-06-29T20:41:31.736-07:00Cawdron on Theism and Dissociative Identity Disorder<p style="text-align: justify;"> Cawdron, Harvey.<a href="https://bdd.rdplf.org/index.php/theologica/article/view/64093"> "Divided Minds and Divine Judgement"</a>, <i>TheoLogica</i> 7:1 (2023).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"></p><blockquote style="text-align: justify;">Abstract: In this paper, I shall argue that Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), a disorder in which seemingly independent identities (alters) arise within the same individual, can have considerable consequences in Christian theology. I shall focus on traditional Christian understandings of the afterlife. I shall begin by outlining DID, and shall argue that in some DID cases, alters appear to be different persons according to some definitions of personhood in Christian theology. I shall then illustrate the difficulty this raises for two influential ideas in the Christian tradition: the heaven and hell understanding of the afterlife, and the idea of the resurrection of the body. Finally, I shall consider some objections to the problem, and shall highlight which responses are the most plausible.</blockquote><p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Happy reading!</p><div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-73493528666281162552023-06-29T14:21:00.006-07:002023-06-29T15:49:46.221-07:00Cawdron's New Paper on Agentive Cosmopsychism and the Problem of Evil<p style="text-align: justify;"> Cawdron, Harvey. <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11841-023-00965-0">"Cosmopsychism and the Problem of Evil"</a>, <i>Sophia</i> (2023).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"></p><blockquote style="text-align: justify;">Abstract: Cosmopsychism, the idea that the universe is conscious, is experiencing something of a revival as an explanation of consciousness in philosophy of mind and is also making inroads into philosophy of religion. In the latter field, it has been used to formulate models of certain forms of theism, such as pantheism and panentheism, and has also been proposed as a rival to the classical theism of the Abrahamic faiths. It has been claimed by Philip Goff that a certain form of cosmopsychism, namely agentive cosmopsychism, poses a threat to classical theism because it can explain features of the universe like fine-tuning without having to deal with the problem of evil. This is because, unlike the classical theist, the cosmopsychist can deny at least one of the divine attributes motivating the problem of evil, namely omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence. In this paper, I shall consider which of the divine attributes the cosmopsychist should focus on when responding to the problem of evil and shall conclude that the rejection of omnibenevolence is the most satisfactory option.</blockquote><p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Yet another nice example of a rival hypothesis with greater explanatory power than theism. (For what it's worth, I defend a <i>non-agentive</i> version of cosmopsychism as a rival hypothesis to theism <a href="https://www.amazon.com/God-Best-Explanation-Things-Dialogue/dp/3030237540/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=">here</a>.) Happy reading!</p><div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-40183936170734242282023-06-23T12:25:00.005-07:002023-06-23T12:59:39.849-07:00New Paper on Fine-Tuning as Evidence for Other Universes<p style="text-align: justify;">Saad, Bradford. "<a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/SAAFSM-2">Fine-Tuning Should Make Us More Confident That Other Universes Exist</a>", <i>American Philosophical Quarterly</i> (forthcoming).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"></p><blockquote style="text-align: justify;">Abstract: This paper defends the view that discovering that our universe is fine-tuned should make us more confident that other universes exist. My defense exploits a distinction between ideal and non-ideal evidential support. I use that distinction in concert with a simple model to disarm the most influential objection—the this-universe objection—to the view that fine-tuning supports the existence of other universes. However, the simple model fails to capture some important features of our epistemic situation with respect to fine-tuning. To capture these features, I introduce a more sophisticated model. I then use the more sophisticated model to show that, even once those complicating factors are taken into account, fine-tuning should boost our confidence in the existence of other universes.</blockquote><p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Happy Reading!</p><div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-76029060759032729952023-06-19T17:36:00.002-07:002023-06-20T13:39:21.251-07:00Constitutive Luck: A New Problem for God's Nature<p style="text-align: justify;">Rusavuk, Andre Leo. "<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11841-023-00960-5?fbclid=IwAR3q30b15yFramxSw_qm90aFYtEf2i4rZz5WoJ8J_GPAykf4vq9FLetPakk">The Luckiest of All Possible Beings: Divine Perfections and Constitutive Luck</a>", <i>Sophia </i>(2023).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Abstract: Many theists conceive of God as a perfect being, i.e., as that than which none greater is metaphysically possible. On this grand view of God, it seems plausible to think that such a supreme and maximally great being would not be subject to luck of any sort. Given the divine perfections, God is completely insulated from luck. However, I argue that the opposite is true: precisely because God is perfect, he is subject to a kind of luck called constitutive luck. In this paper, first I provide an analysis of luck and then explain the concept of constitutive luck. I proceed to defend constitutive luck from charges of incoherence and examine a different approach to make sense of this luck. Furthermore, I distinguish between two kinds of constitutive luck and argue that even if God isn’t subject to one kind, evading the second kind is unsuccessful. I offer two ways that God is constitutively lucky and reach a surprising conclusion: a perfect being is the luckiest of all possible beings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Happy reading!</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><br /></p><div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-53772925021180199612023-06-19T17:26:00.007-07:002023-06-19T21:15:58.911-07:00Luke Tucker's New Defense of the Moral Paralysis Objection to Skeptical Theism<p style="text-align: justify;">Tucker, Luke. <a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/TUCRTA-2">"Reconsidering the alien doctor analogy: A challenge to skeptical theism"</a>, <i>International Journal for Philosophy of Religion</i> (forthcoming).</p><div style="text-align: justify;"></div><blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">Abstract: The claim that skeptical theism induces moral paralysis or aporia (known as the moral paralysis objection) has been extensively discussed. In this context, Stephen Maitzen has introduced the Alien Doctor Analogy, an intriguing case that he employs to advance the moral paralysis objection. Michael Rea, however, has criticized the analogy for portraying the skeptical theist uncharitably. In this essay, I argue that Maitzen and Rea are both incorrect: the Alien Doctor Analogy is flawed indeed, but because it portrays the skeptical theist too charitably. I modify the analogy to remedy this flaw. I then use the analogy to advance an original version of the moral paralysis objection. Specifically, I contend that skeptical theists, whenever they encounter apparently gratuitous evil that they could prevent, should be convinced by what I call the “God-Knows-Best Argument,” which always concludes that they should refrain from intervening. Thus, skeptical theism does induce moral paralysis.</div></blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">Happy reading!</div><div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-3224802163049459762023-06-19T17:22:00.008-07:002023-06-19T17:28:11.819-07:00Tooley's Reply to Miller on the Problem of Evil<p style="text-align: justify;">Tooley, Michael. "<a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/TOOCMA-2">Calum Miller's attempted refutation of Michael Tooley's evidential argument from evil</a>", <i>Religious Studies</i> (A "FirstView" article) (2022). 1-18.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"></p><blockquote style="text-align: justify;">Abstract: In his article, ‘What's Wrong with Tooley's Argument from Evil?’, Calum Miller's goal was to show that the evidential argument from evil that I have advanced is unsound, and in support of that claim, Miller set out three main objections. First, he argued that I had failed to recognize that the actual occurrence of an event can by itself, at least in principle, constitute good evidence that it was not morally wrong for God to allow events of the kind in question. Miller's second objection was then that, in attempting to show that it is unlikely that God exists, I had failed to consider either positive arguments in support of the existence of God or possible theodicies, and thus that I was unjustified in drawing any conclusions concerning the probability that theism is true in the light of the total evidence available. Miller's third and final objection was that one of the approaches to logical probability that I employed – namely, that based upon a structure-description equiprobability principle, rather than a state-description equiprobability principle – was unsound since it has clearly unacceptable implications. In response, I argue that all three of Miller's objections are unsound. The third objection, however, is nevertheless important since it shows that my type of argument from evil cannot be based merely on the evils found in the world. One must also consider good states of affairs, and their relations to bad ones. I show, however, that that deficiency can be addressed in a completely satisfactory manner.</blockquote><p></p><div style="text-align: justify;">Happy reading!</div><div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-77912004021699621762023-05-18T09:54:00.006-07:002023-05-18T10:02:43.649-07:00Bryan Frances' New Problem of Evil<p style="text-align: justify;">In <a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/FRAHMS-4">this new paper</a>, Bryan Frances raises a new form of the problem of evil, which he dubs <i>the Problem of Absurd Evil</i>. Here's the abstract:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"></p><blockquote style="text-align: justify;">Isn’t there something like an amount and density of horrific suffering whose discovery would make it irrational to think God exists? Use your imagination to think of worlds that are much, much, much worse than you think Earth is when it comes to horrific suffering. Isn’t there some conceivable scenario which, if you were in it, would make you say “Ok, ok. God doesn’t exist, at least in the way we thought God was. We were wrong about that”? Pursuing this question leads to what I call the Problem of Absurd Evil.</blockquote><p></p><div>Happy reading!</div><div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-27529010828418020932023-05-05T15:00:00.002-07:002023-05-05T15:03:13.077-07:00Goff's Forthcoming Book Defending an Alternative to Both Theism and Atheism<p></p><div style="text-align: justify;">Details <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/why-the-purpose-of-the-universe-9780198883760?lang=en&cc=jp">here</a>. Yet another alternative to theism that rivals or exceeds theism's explanatory power, and yet another sign of health in philosophy of religion, as it continues to unmoor itself from theism.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Here's the blurb to whet your appetite:</div><p></p><p style="text-align: justify;"></p><blockquote><p style="text-align: justify;">Why are we here? What's the point of existence? Most of us have wondered about these questions. For some, God represents an answer. For those who are unsatisfied by traditional religion, and also by the lack of an answer to these questions in atheism, Philip Goff offers a way between the two. Through an exploration of contemporary cosmology, as well as cutting-edge philosophical research on the nature of consciousness, he argues for cosmic purpose: the idea that the universe is directed towards certain goals, such as the emergence of intelligent life.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In contrast to religious thinkers, Goff argues that the traditional God is a bad explanation of cosmic purpose. He explores a range of alternative possibilities for accounting for cosmic purpose: perhaps our universe was created by an evil or morally indifferent designer, or a designer with limited abilities. Perhaps we live in a computer simulation. Maybe cosmic purpose is rooted not in a conscious mind but in natural tendencies towards the good, or laws of nature with purposes built into them. Or maybe the universe is itself a conscious mind which directs itself towards certain goals. Goff scrutinizes these options with analytic rigour, opening up a new avenue of philosophical enquiry into the middle ground between God and atheism. The final chapter outlines a way of living in hope that cosmic purpose is still unfolding, involving political engagement and a non-literalist interpretation of traditional religion.</p></blockquote><p style="text-align: justify;"></p><div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-72760538168792174842023-05-05T09:53:00.004-07:002023-05-05T13:00:18.291-07:00God, Purpose, and Reality<p> ...is the title of John Bishop and Ken Perszyk's <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/god-purpose-and-reality-9780192864116?cc=us&lang=en#">new book </a>defending a new, non-personal rival to classical theism, viz., <i>euteleological theism</i>. We therefore have yet another new view of ultimate reality that aims to have equal or greater explanatory power than classical theism.</p><div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-18118796134698834702023-03-22T01:03:00.008-07:002023-03-22T18:51:26.873-07:00The Argument from Necessitarian Accounts of Laws of Nature<p style="text-align: justify;">Necessitarianism about the laws of nature is a fairly popular view in contemporary analytic philosophy (Cf. Shoemaker, Swoyer, Bird, Fales, Ellis, Bigelow et al.). According to such accounts, the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. One popular type of account of necessitarianism about the laws of nature is <i><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Natures-Metaphysics-Properties-Alexander-Bird/dp/0199573115">dispositional essentialism</a></i>. According to this sort of account, physical individuals and stuffs have their dispositional properties essentially, so that (for example) salt (or at the very least, least salt-in-alpha, i.e., the stuff that plays the salt role in the actual world) is essentially and thus necessarily such that it dissolves in water. Similarly, matter-energy (or at the very least, matter-in-alpha) is essentially and thus necessarily such that the conservation laws hold. But if so, then it appears that God can't violate the laws of nature, which puts constraints on God's relation to the physical world. For example, it implies that he can't intervene in the world in such a way as to violate the laws of physics, or that (if some of the conservation laws are properly spelled out in terms of conserved quantities of matter-energy), <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Divine-Intervention-Metaphysical-Epistemological-Philosophy/dp/0415875900">can't create or sustain the universe</a>. But such claims are incompatible with orthodox monotheism. Therefore, to the extent that one is persuaded by necessitarianism about the laws of nature, one thereby has reason to think orthodox monotheism is false.</p><div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-51698152286182978182023-03-20T21:32:00.007-07:002023-03-20T22:28:10.082-07:00Today, White Evangelical Protestants comprise Only 13.6% of AmericansFrom the <i><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/03/19/poll-religion-christian-white/?fbclid=IwAR0F_mWGN8ZXYKSutKUCshKqDNqCoQrYPjWUm07700TR31MELb2OIWM0pbo">Washington Post</a>. </i>Source with details <a href="https://www.prri.org/spotlight/prri-2022-american-values-atlas-religious-affiliation-updates-and-trends/">here</a>. Note also that twice as many Americans (26.8%) are religiously unaffiliated.<div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31835720.post-54580316591599870252023-03-17T17:18:00.001-07:002023-03-17T17:35:11.255-07:00Koons' Nice Paper on Why Theists Should Oppose Criminalizing Sin<p style="text-align: justify;">Koons, Jeremy. "<a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/KOOTAT-3">Theism and the criminalization of sin</a>", European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10:1 (2018).</p><p style="text-align: justify;"></p><blockquote style="text-align: justify;">Abstract: The free will theodicy places significant value on free will: free will is of such substantial value, that God’s gift of free will to humans was justified, even though this gift foreseeably results in the most monstrous of evils. I will argue that when a state criminalizes sin, it can restrict or eliminate citizens’ exercise of metaphysical free will with respect to choosing to partake in or refrain from these activities. Given the value placed on free will in the free will theodicy, theists who endorse this theodicy should thus oppose the criminalization of what I will call Millian sins —that is, actions which are immoral, but which do not directly harm another person. In other words, such theists should oppose legal moralism.</blockquote><p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Happy reading!</p><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="blogger-post-footer">Exapologist</div>exapologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09915579495149582531noreply@blogger.com