Factually Necessary Beings, Modal Epistemology, and the Leibnizian Cosmological Argument
Hi gang,
I'm still really busy, but an objection occurred to me regarding Craig's recent defense of the Leibnizian cosmological argument, and I'd like to get some feedback to see whether I'm on to something. If I am, then I'd like to add the point to a paper I'm working on. Here is a first pass at the criticism. Feel free to have at it while I'm away!
Best,
EA
*ROUGH DRAFT*
On another occasion, I argued that Craig has so far failed to justify a seemingly crucial claim in his revived Leibnizian cosmological argument, viz.,
PQFE: It’s possible that the fundamental constituents of material reality (quarks, say) fail to exist.
Here is a more worrisome objection. Even if Craig were to justify PQFE, it wouldn't help him infer
QNEG: The fundamental constituents of reality (quarks, say) have a necessary being as their explanatory ground.
Indeed, I will demonstrate the stronger claim that even if Craig were to justify PQFE, it would fail to provide evidence that would even slightly favor QNEG over at least one epistemically possible naturalistic rival hypothesis.
Preliminaries:
The Leibnizian cosmological argument is often presented in a way that suggests that there are only two possible sorts of beings:
(i) contingent, dependent beings
(ii) necessary, independent beings
If one could justify such a categorization, then one could properly conclude that all contingent beings are dependent, in which case one will have gone a considerable distance toward justifying the inference to a necessary, independent being as their explanatory ground.
However, this categorization of beings is dubious, for two reasons. First, necessary dependent beings seem epistemically possible. Indeed, Christian philosophers often take the second person of the trinity to be just such a being. On the sort of account I have in mind, God the father is a necessary being, and he necessarily and eternally wills the existence of the Son as an act of essence. On this account, then, the Son exists in all possible worlds, and is thus a necessary being. However, despite this, his existence is dependent on the causal activity of at least one other being, viz., the Father. Therefore, on this account, God the Son is a necessary yet dependent being.
Second, contingent independent beings seem epistemically possible. Indeed, if Richard Swinburne is right, the first person of the trinity is just such a being. For on his account, God the father is a merely factually necessary being. Thus, God the father is a being that fails to exist in at least some possible worlds. However, he is an existentially independent, free-standing being who is everlasting and indestructible at all the worlds in which he does exist. Therefore, on Swinburne's account, God the Father is a contingent yet independent being.
In light of the preceding, then, it appears that the previous categorization of types of beings is inadequate, and that a more neutral way of carving up epistemically possible space would look like this:
(i) contingent, dependent beings
(ii) contingent, independent beings
(iii) necessary, dependent beings
(iv) necessary, independent beings
One implication of this categorization will prove important for our purposes: one can’t automatically infer “dependent” from “contingent” without further argument.
So that’s the setup. Here’s the punch line: It’s epistemically possible that the fundamental constituents of matter (quarks, say) are contingent yet independent beings. But if so, then it's epistemically possible that such beings fail to exist in at least some metaphysically possible worlds, and yet they lack an explanation for their existence beyond the de facto lack of things that can annihilate them in the actual world and the relevant counterfactual worlds. And if that's right, then even if Craig's account of conceivability is a good guide to metaphysical possibility, and even if we can properly conceive of the non-existence of quarks, such modal evidence fails to justify the claim that quarks are dependent beings requiring a necessary being for their explanatory ground. For while such conceivability evidence is just what one would expect if quarks were contingent dependent beings, it’s also just what one would expect if quarks were contingent independent beings. But while the former is a theistic hypothesis, the latter is a naturalistic hypothesis. But if so, then the evidence from conceivability doesn't favor the theistic hypothesis over the naturalistic hypothesis.
I'm still really busy, but an objection occurred to me regarding Craig's recent defense of the Leibnizian cosmological argument, and I'd like to get some feedback to see whether I'm on to something. If I am, then I'd like to add the point to a paper I'm working on. Here is a first pass at the criticism. Feel free to have at it while I'm away!
Best,
EA
*ROUGH DRAFT*
On another occasion, I argued that Craig has so far failed to justify a seemingly crucial claim in his revived Leibnizian cosmological argument, viz.,
PQFE: It’s possible that the fundamental constituents of material reality (quarks, say) fail to exist.
Here is a more worrisome objection. Even if Craig were to justify PQFE, it wouldn't help him infer
QNEG: The fundamental constituents of reality (quarks, say) have a necessary being as their explanatory ground.
Indeed, I will demonstrate the stronger claim that even if Craig were to justify PQFE, it would fail to provide evidence that would even slightly favor QNEG over at least one epistemically possible naturalistic rival hypothesis.
Preliminaries:
The Leibnizian cosmological argument is often presented in a way that suggests that there are only two possible sorts of beings:
(i) contingent, dependent beings
(ii) necessary, independent beings
If one could justify such a categorization, then one could properly conclude that all contingent beings are dependent, in which case one will have gone a considerable distance toward justifying the inference to a necessary, independent being as their explanatory ground.
However, this categorization of beings is dubious, for two reasons. First, necessary dependent beings seem epistemically possible. Indeed, Christian philosophers often take the second person of the trinity to be just such a being. On the sort of account I have in mind, God the father is a necessary being, and he necessarily and eternally wills the existence of the Son as an act of essence. On this account, then, the Son exists in all possible worlds, and is thus a necessary being. However, despite this, his existence is dependent on the causal activity of at least one other being, viz., the Father. Therefore, on this account, God the Son is a necessary yet dependent being.
Second, contingent independent beings seem epistemically possible. Indeed, if Richard Swinburne is right, the first person of the trinity is just such a being. For on his account, God the father is a merely factually necessary being. Thus, God the father is a being that fails to exist in at least some possible worlds. However, he is an existentially independent, free-standing being who is everlasting and indestructible at all the worlds in which he does exist. Therefore, on Swinburne's account, God the Father is a contingent yet independent being.
In light of the preceding, then, it appears that the previous categorization of types of beings is inadequate, and that a more neutral way of carving up epistemically possible space would look like this:
(i) contingent, dependent beings
(ii) contingent, independent beings
(iii) necessary, dependent beings
(iv) necessary, independent beings
One implication of this categorization will prove important for our purposes: one can’t automatically infer “dependent” from “contingent” without further argument.
So that’s the setup. Here’s the punch line: It’s epistemically possible that the fundamental constituents of matter (quarks, say) are contingent yet independent beings. But if so, then it's epistemically possible that such beings fail to exist in at least some metaphysically possible worlds, and yet they lack an explanation for their existence beyond the de facto lack of things that can annihilate them in the actual world and the relevant counterfactual worlds. And if that's right, then even if Craig's account of conceivability is a good guide to metaphysical possibility, and even if we can properly conceive of the non-existence of quarks, such modal evidence fails to justify the claim that quarks are dependent beings requiring a necessary being for their explanatory ground. For while such conceivability evidence is just what one would expect if quarks were contingent dependent beings, it’s also just what one would expect if quarks were contingent independent beings. But while the former is a theistic hypothesis, the latter is a naturalistic hypothesis. But if so, then the evidence from conceivability doesn't favor the theistic hypothesis over the naturalistic hypothesis.
Liberal Naturalism and Theistic Arguments from Consciousness
Hi gang,
I'm pretty busy at the moment, so in lieu of a new post, here's an old (2007) post I've been thinking about lately and have been meaning to revise.
Now play nice and stay out of the liquor cabinet while I'm away.
-EA
*ROUGH DRAFT*
A number of contemporary Christian philosophers think there's a good argument for God in the phenomenon of consciousness, including Richard Swinburne, Robert M. Adams, J.P. Moreland, and Victor Reppert. There are at least two forms of the argument.
The first argument postulates God as the best explanation of the mere existence of consciousness. This argument has various forms: some are Cartesian conceivability arguments for substance dualism, where the theist then posits God as the best explanation of the existence of souls. But more modest versions refrain from inferences to substance dualism and just focus on the fact that consciousness is extremely difficult to make sense of if the natural world is all there is. For consciousness has properties (esp. phenomenal states) that don't seem reducible to the properties of physical objects. Therefore, since consciousness can't be accounted for purely in terms of the contents of the physical world, it must have a cause in terms of something beyond it, and the best candidate for such a cause is a god. Call this the Soul-Stuff Argument.
The second argument postulates God's activity as the best explanation for why our conscious states are correlated in a law-like way with certain brain states. The idea is that it's at least initially puzzling why one set of brain states actualizes experiences of, say, the color red, rather than some other set of brain states. For if the natural world is all there is, then the conscious states about the color red are identical to or otherwise reducible to physical states in the brain. But if so, then there should be no mystery regarding such correlations. For when it comes to every other scientific phenomenon in the natural world, once one discovers the underlying physical basis of the phenomenon, there is no residual mystery as to why that physical state gives rise to this phenomenon. So, for example, once you learn the scientific account of heat as molecular motion, it's no longer mysterious how heat, as opposed to cold, is caused by molecular motion. But things are different with respect to our experience of red and the other phenomenal states. For even after learning the scientific account about c-fibers firing in the brain, the mystery as to why that brain state gives rise to this experience of red remains. Therefore, if the law-like correlation between brain states and conscious states is to have a satisfactory explanation, it must be in terms of something beyond the naturalist's ontology. And as it turns out, God is the best explanation. The idea is that the only plausible way to account for contingent yet law-like correlations is via appeal to the intentional activity of a person. But since the law-like correlations are laws of nature, the appropriate sort of person posited is a god. Call this the Correlation Argument.
In effect, both arguments have the following five-step strategy. In Step One, they assert that the kinds of entities in the naturalist's ontology are limited to those describable in the language of chemistry and physics. In Step Two, they assert that if naturalism is true, then the relevant phenomena must be explained in terms of just those entities. In Step Three, they argue that certain phenomena (e.g., the existence of consciousness, and the correlation between certain conscious states and certain brain states) can't be explained in terms of just those entities alone. In Step Four, they assert that theism is the most plausible view with an ontology that's adequate to explain those phenomena. And in Step Five, they infer that theism is true (or probably true).
I think such theistic arguments from consciousness -- viz., the Soul-Stuff Argument and the Correlation Argument -- are both flawed, and that the flaw in each occurs at Step One, i.e., the assertion that the kinds of entities in the naturalist's ontology are limited to those describable in the language of chemistry and physics. This is because there is no good reason why the naturalist must accept the minimalist ontology foisted upon him by the theist. And if not, then the options for the naturalist aren't limited to
(i) Shoehorn all phenomena into a limited ontology of fundamental entities described by chemistry and physics.
or
(ii) Postulate a theistic ontology of souls (including a god).
For there is an epistemically possible third option, viz.,
(iii) postulate a version of naturalism with a more robust supervenience base.
Let me elaborate on this reply.
Recall the different versions of naturalism discussed in a previous post. Thus, there is Conservative Naturalism, which claims that the natural world can be exhaustively defined in terms of the language of contemporary chemistry and physics (or some revised account of chemistry and physics not too dissimilar from their current construals). By contrast, Moderate Naturalism allows abstract objects to be a part of the ontology of the natural world, and Liberal Naturalism goes further by postulating non-physical properties as base-level/non-derivative features of concrete objects.
In light of this account of the varieties of naturalism, we can state the underlying dubious assumption in both the Soul-Stuff Argument and the Correlation Argument: both assume that Naturalism entails Conservative Naturalism. That is, both arguments assume that if certain aspects of consciousness can't be accounted for in terms of the language of contemporary chemistry and physics, then we need to bring in such exotica as immaterial substances -- such as souls and God.
The reason why this is a dubious assumption is because, as indicated by the varieties of naturalism listed above, Naturalism doesn't entail Conservative Naturalism. But if not, then we have more options on the table before positing God if it turns out that some aspects of consciousness can't be accounted for in terms of the world described by the language of chemistry and physics. Thus, instead of the following false dichotomy of options implied by the Arguments From Consciousness:
I. CN: the world is composed of all and only things exhaustively desribed by the language of chemistry and physics.
II. T: the world is composed of two kinds of substances: purely phsyical substances and purely immaterial substances, and these two sorts of substances are distinct entities. Furthermore, the two sorts of substances are capable of interacting with one another. In addition, there are both finite and infinite immaterial substances -- human (and perhaps animal) souls and God -- and the infinite immaterial substance created the finite immaterial substances (and perhaps the material ones, too), and created them without pre-existing materials (i.e., out of nothing).
There are really three that are relevant, viz., (I), (II), and
III. LN: the world is composed of just one kind of substance, and its essence has both physical and phenomenological or proto-phenomenal (or at least representational or proto-representational) attributes (an alternative version of LN: the one kind of substance is neither physical nor mental, but but the physical and mental are composed of it).
But if so, then before the theist can legitimately infer God and finite immaterial substances as the best explanation of consciousness, he must not only rule out CN (Conservative Naturalism), but he must also rule out LN (Liberal Naturalism). But this has yet to be done; if not, then since both versions of the Argument From Consciousness -- the Soul-Stuff Argument and the Correlation Argument -- only rule out CN (at most) before inferring T, both are undercut.
Now I know you're thinking that LN is a weird view. But the problem is that theism is at least as weird as LN. But if so, then it seems that the Arguments from Consciousness discussed here are in trouble. For it's at least not clear what grounds could be offered that would favor T over LN. For LN appears to explain consciousness at least as well as T. To see this, let's see how each of the two arguments from consciousness fare in light of replies from the standpoint of LN:
I. The LN-based reply to the Soul-Stuff Argument: LN allows that the features of experience are not reducible to the physical aspects of natural objects, yet they are nonetheless reducible to the phenomenal (or perhaps proto-phenomenal) aspects of natural objects, and the latter are just as essential and ontologically fundamental to natural objects as the physical aspects. Thus, consciousness is reducible to the basic properties of natural objects postulated by Liberal Naturalists. But if so, then the key premise of The Soul-Stuff Argument is undercut.
II. The LN-based reply to the Correlation Argument: According to some versions of LN, such as Spinoza's version -- or more recently, David Chalmers' version -- natural objects have both physical and proto-phenomenal attributes as basic, fundamental constituents of their essence. Furthermore, the proto-phenomenal attributes are inherently representational, and they accurately represent the physical attributes. Think of the fundamental stuff of the universe as Shannon information (note to Dembski fans: not necessarily complex, specified Shannon information). Now information can be expressed in physical form or phenomenal (or proto-phenomenal) form; indeed, perhaps each form is just a different side of the same coin. If so, then it's not so mysterious why certain brain states are correlated with certain phenomenal states in a law-like way. For if the latter is just a sort of "mirror" or representation of the former, then it couldn't have been otherwise than that they are correlated. And if that's right, then LN explains the correlation between the physical and the mental, in which case the key premise of The Correlation Argument is undercut.
If what I have said above is on track, then even if you grant the phenomena highlighted by the Arguments From Consciousness -- i.e., the existence of phenomenal states, and their law-like correlation with certain brain states -- these points, by themselves, don't yet provide a cogent argument to God as the best explanation of such phenomena.
Let me belabor the point a bit more. Suppose we treat the phenomena of the Arguments From Consciousness as data, and suppose we treat CN, LN and T as hypotheses proposed to explain the data. Then we have:
Data:
D: The phenomena of (i) the mere existence of consciousness, and (ii) the apparently contingent yet law-like correlation between conscious states of one type and brain states of another type.
Hypotheses:
CN: The world is composed of all and only things exhaustively desribed by the language of chemistry and physics.
LN: The world is composed of just one kind of substance, and the base properties of its essence include both physical phenomenal or proto-phenomenal (or at least representational or proto-representational) attributes (an alternative version of LN: the one kind of substance is neither physical nor mental, but but the physical and mental are composed of it).
T: the world is composed of two distinct kinds of substances: purely physical substances and purely immaterial, mental substances (conscious minds). Furthermore, among the immaterial substances, some are finite, and one is infinite and eternal. In addition, the infinite, eternal immaterial substance created all the finite immaterial substance (and perhaps all the material substances, too), and it did so without using pre-existing materials.
Now the problem is that even if you think that P(CN/D) is extremely low, you don't thereby have reason to think that P(T/D) is greater than 1/2. For since you would expect D if LN were true about just as much as you would expect D if T were true, it looks as though T and LN are roughly equally probable; that is, P(LN/D) = P(T/D). But if so, then the Arguments from Consciousness, whether taken individually or collectively, don't make theism more likely than not.
Thus, it appears that LN poses a serious problem for theistic Arguments from Consciousness. For LN explains the phenomena at issue in both formulations of the argument at least as well as T. Therefore, even if LN is weird, it's no weirder than theism, with its view of the mind as a distinct immaterial substance that interacts with the brain, and its view of a god, which is an infinite, eternal, necessarily existent immaterial substance, and which creates all finite material and immaterial substances out of nothing. Indeed, the fact that LN doesn't suffer from the interaction problem that plagues substance dualist accounts of the mind (not to mention the hypothesis that God -- an immaterial substance -- interacts with the world) seems to give it a slight advantage over theism in explaining the phenomena in question. But if so, then the arguments from consciousness don't provide sufficient reason for accepting T. Therefore, since LN stands as a live and stubborn option between CN and T, the prospects for a successful argument for God from consciousness don't look very promising.
To sum up: Arguments From Consciousness point to the existence of consciousness and/or its contingent yet law-like correlation with certain brain states as a problem for naturalists. Their strategy is to get you to accept the very minimal ontology of Conservative Naturalism, and then say that if you can't shoehorn all the data into that ontology, then the most plausible way out is to adopt theism. Many naturalists attempt to tackle the argument head-on, accepting the stringent explanatory constraints of Conservative Naturalism, but then arguing that they can explain the relevant data within such constraints. My strategy is different and less burdensome: just advert to an epistemically possible version of naturalism with a suitably robust supervenience base. For Naturalism doesn't entail Conservative Naturalism, as (e.g.) Liberal Naturalism is another relevant and epistemically possible version of Naturalism. And since it appears that Liberal Naturalism explains the data at issue in arguments from Consciousness at least as well as theism, theistic arguments from consciousness are undercut.
I'm pretty busy at the moment, so in lieu of a new post, here's an old (2007) post I've been thinking about lately and have been meaning to revise.
Now play nice and stay out of the liquor cabinet while I'm away.
-EA
*ROUGH DRAFT*
A number of contemporary Christian philosophers think there's a good argument for God in the phenomenon of consciousness, including Richard Swinburne, Robert M. Adams, J.P. Moreland, and Victor Reppert. There are at least two forms of the argument.
The first argument postulates God as the best explanation of the mere existence of consciousness. This argument has various forms: some are Cartesian conceivability arguments for substance dualism, where the theist then posits God as the best explanation of the existence of souls. But more modest versions refrain from inferences to substance dualism and just focus on the fact that consciousness is extremely difficult to make sense of if the natural world is all there is. For consciousness has properties (esp. phenomenal states) that don't seem reducible to the properties of physical objects. Therefore, since consciousness can't be accounted for purely in terms of the contents of the physical world, it must have a cause in terms of something beyond it, and the best candidate for such a cause is a god. Call this the Soul-Stuff Argument.
The second argument postulates God's activity as the best explanation for why our conscious states are correlated in a law-like way with certain brain states. The idea is that it's at least initially puzzling why one set of brain states actualizes experiences of, say, the color red, rather than some other set of brain states. For if the natural world is all there is, then the conscious states about the color red are identical to or otherwise reducible to physical states in the brain. But if so, then there should be no mystery regarding such correlations. For when it comes to every other scientific phenomenon in the natural world, once one discovers the underlying physical basis of the phenomenon, there is no residual mystery as to why that physical state gives rise to this phenomenon. So, for example, once you learn the scientific account of heat as molecular motion, it's no longer mysterious how heat, as opposed to cold, is caused by molecular motion. But things are different with respect to our experience of red and the other phenomenal states. For even after learning the scientific account about c-fibers firing in the brain, the mystery as to why that brain state gives rise to this experience of red remains. Therefore, if the law-like correlation between brain states and conscious states is to have a satisfactory explanation, it must be in terms of something beyond the naturalist's ontology. And as it turns out, God is the best explanation. The idea is that the only plausible way to account for contingent yet law-like correlations is via appeal to the intentional activity of a person. But since the law-like correlations are laws of nature, the appropriate sort of person posited is a god. Call this the Correlation Argument.
In effect, both arguments have the following five-step strategy. In Step One, they assert that the kinds of entities in the naturalist's ontology are limited to those describable in the language of chemistry and physics. In Step Two, they assert that if naturalism is true, then the relevant phenomena must be explained in terms of just those entities. In Step Three, they argue that certain phenomena (e.g., the existence of consciousness, and the correlation between certain conscious states and certain brain states) can't be explained in terms of just those entities alone. In Step Four, they assert that theism is the most plausible view with an ontology that's adequate to explain those phenomena. And in Step Five, they infer that theism is true (or probably true).
I think such theistic arguments from consciousness -- viz., the Soul-Stuff Argument and the Correlation Argument -- are both flawed, and that the flaw in each occurs at Step One, i.e., the assertion that the kinds of entities in the naturalist's ontology are limited to those describable in the language of chemistry and physics. This is because there is no good reason why the naturalist must accept the minimalist ontology foisted upon him by the theist. And if not, then the options for the naturalist aren't limited to
(i) Shoehorn all phenomena into a limited ontology of fundamental entities described by chemistry and physics.
or
(ii) Postulate a theistic ontology of souls (including a god).
For there is an epistemically possible third option, viz.,
(iii) postulate a version of naturalism with a more robust supervenience base.
Let me elaborate on this reply.
Recall the different versions of naturalism discussed in a previous post. Thus, there is Conservative Naturalism, which claims that the natural world can be exhaustively defined in terms of the language of contemporary chemistry and physics (or some revised account of chemistry and physics not too dissimilar from their current construals). By contrast, Moderate Naturalism allows abstract objects to be a part of the ontology of the natural world, and Liberal Naturalism goes further by postulating non-physical properties as base-level/non-derivative features of concrete objects.
In light of this account of the varieties of naturalism, we can state the underlying dubious assumption in both the Soul-Stuff Argument and the Correlation Argument: both assume that Naturalism entails Conservative Naturalism. That is, both arguments assume that if certain aspects of consciousness can't be accounted for in terms of the language of contemporary chemistry and physics, then we need to bring in such exotica as immaterial substances -- such as souls and God.
The reason why this is a dubious assumption is because, as indicated by the varieties of naturalism listed above, Naturalism doesn't entail Conservative Naturalism. But if not, then we have more options on the table before positing God if it turns out that some aspects of consciousness can't be accounted for in terms of the world described by the language of chemistry and physics. Thus, instead of the following false dichotomy of options implied by the Arguments From Consciousness:
I. CN: the world is composed of all and only things exhaustively desribed by the language of chemistry and physics.
II. T: the world is composed of two kinds of substances: purely phsyical substances and purely immaterial substances, and these two sorts of substances are distinct entities. Furthermore, the two sorts of substances are capable of interacting with one another. In addition, there are both finite and infinite immaterial substances -- human (and perhaps animal) souls and God -- and the infinite immaterial substance created the finite immaterial substances (and perhaps the material ones, too), and created them without pre-existing materials (i.e., out of nothing).
There are really three that are relevant, viz., (I), (II), and
III. LN: the world is composed of just one kind of substance, and its essence has both physical and phenomenological or proto-phenomenal (or at least representational or proto-representational) attributes (an alternative version of LN: the one kind of substance is neither physical nor mental, but but the physical and mental are composed of it).
But if so, then before the theist can legitimately infer God and finite immaterial substances as the best explanation of consciousness, he must not only rule out CN (Conservative Naturalism), but he must also rule out LN (Liberal Naturalism). But this has yet to be done; if not, then since both versions of the Argument From Consciousness -- the Soul-Stuff Argument and the Correlation Argument -- only rule out CN (at most) before inferring T, both are undercut.
Now I know you're thinking that LN is a weird view. But the problem is that theism is at least as weird as LN. But if so, then it seems that the Arguments from Consciousness discussed here are in trouble. For it's at least not clear what grounds could be offered that would favor T over LN. For LN appears to explain consciousness at least as well as T. To see this, let's see how each of the two arguments from consciousness fare in light of replies from the standpoint of LN:
I. The LN-based reply to the Soul-Stuff Argument: LN allows that the features of experience are not reducible to the physical aspects of natural objects, yet they are nonetheless reducible to the phenomenal (or perhaps proto-phenomenal) aspects of natural objects, and the latter are just as essential and ontologically fundamental to natural objects as the physical aspects. Thus, consciousness is reducible to the basic properties of natural objects postulated by Liberal Naturalists. But if so, then the key premise of The Soul-Stuff Argument is undercut.
II. The LN-based reply to the Correlation Argument: According to some versions of LN, such as Spinoza's version -- or more recently, David Chalmers' version -- natural objects have both physical and proto-phenomenal attributes as basic, fundamental constituents of their essence. Furthermore, the proto-phenomenal attributes are inherently representational, and they accurately represent the physical attributes. Think of the fundamental stuff of the universe as Shannon information (note to Dembski fans: not necessarily complex, specified Shannon information). Now information can be expressed in physical form or phenomenal (or proto-phenomenal) form; indeed, perhaps each form is just a different side of the same coin. If so, then it's not so mysterious why certain brain states are correlated with certain phenomenal states in a law-like way. For if the latter is just a sort of "mirror" or representation of the former, then it couldn't have been otherwise than that they are correlated. And if that's right, then LN explains the correlation between the physical and the mental, in which case the key premise of The Correlation Argument is undercut.
If what I have said above is on track, then even if you grant the phenomena highlighted by the Arguments From Consciousness -- i.e., the existence of phenomenal states, and their law-like correlation with certain brain states -- these points, by themselves, don't yet provide a cogent argument to God as the best explanation of such phenomena.
Let me belabor the point a bit more. Suppose we treat the phenomena of the Arguments From Consciousness as data, and suppose we treat CN, LN and T as hypotheses proposed to explain the data. Then we have:
Data:
D: The phenomena of (i) the mere existence of consciousness, and (ii) the apparently contingent yet law-like correlation between conscious states of one type and brain states of another type.
Hypotheses:
CN: The world is composed of all and only things exhaustively desribed by the language of chemistry and physics.
LN: The world is composed of just one kind of substance, and the base properties of its essence include both physical phenomenal or proto-phenomenal (or at least representational or proto-representational) attributes (an alternative version of LN: the one kind of substance is neither physical nor mental, but but the physical and mental are composed of it).
T: the world is composed of two distinct kinds of substances: purely physical substances and purely immaterial, mental substances (conscious minds). Furthermore, among the immaterial substances, some are finite, and one is infinite and eternal. In addition, the infinite, eternal immaterial substance created all the finite immaterial substance (and perhaps all the material substances, too), and it did so without using pre-existing materials.
Now the problem is that even if you think that P(CN/D) is extremely low, you don't thereby have reason to think that P(T/D) is greater than 1/2. For since you would expect D if LN were true about just as much as you would expect D if T were true, it looks as though T and LN are roughly equally probable; that is, P(LN/D) = P(T/D). But if so, then the Arguments from Consciousness, whether taken individually or collectively, don't make theism more likely than not.
Thus, it appears that LN poses a serious problem for theistic Arguments from Consciousness. For LN explains the phenomena at issue in both formulations of the argument at least as well as T. Therefore, even if LN is weird, it's no weirder than theism, with its view of the mind as a distinct immaterial substance that interacts with the brain, and its view of a god, which is an infinite, eternal, necessarily existent immaterial substance, and which creates all finite material and immaterial substances out of nothing. Indeed, the fact that LN doesn't suffer from the interaction problem that plagues substance dualist accounts of the mind (not to mention the hypothesis that God -- an immaterial substance -- interacts with the world) seems to give it a slight advantage over theism in explaining the phenomena in question. But if so, then the arguments from consciousness don't provide sufficient reason for accepting T. Therefore, since LN stands as a live and stubborn option between CN and T, the prospects for a successful argument for God from consciousness don't look very promising.
To sum up: Arguments From Consciousness point to the existence of consciousness and/or its contingent yet law-like correlation with certain brain states as a problem for naturalists. Their strategy is to get you to accept the very minimal ontology of Conservative Naturalism, and then say that if you can't shoehorn all the data into that ontology, then the most plausible way out is to adopt theism. Many naturalists attempt to tackle the argument head-on, accepting the stringent explanatory constraints of Conservative Naturalism, but then arguing that they can explain the relevant data within such constraints. My strategy is different and less burdensome: just advert to an epistemically possible version of naturalism with a suitably robust supervenience base. For Naturalism doesn't entail Conservative Naturalism, as (e.g.) Liberal Naturalism is another relevant and epistemically possible version of Naturalism. And since it appears that Liberal Naturalism explains the data at issue in arguments from Consciousness at least as well as theism, theistic arguments from consciousness are undercut.
Lukeprog's Excellent Podcast
Hi gang,
If you didn't know already: lukeprog over at Common Sense Atheism has an excellent podcast called Conversations from the Pale Blue Dot, on which he regularly has discussions with excellent philosophers of religion (e.g., Graham Oppy, Wes Morriston, Richard Otte, Nick Trakakis). You can subscribe to his podcast on iTunes. Required listening!
If you didn't know already: lukeprog over at Common Sense Atheism has an excellent podcast called Conversations from the Pale Blue Dot, on which he regularly has discussions with excellent philosophers of religion (e.g., Graham Oppy, Wes Morriston, Richard Otte, Nick Trakakis). You can subscribe to his podcast on iTunes. Required listening!
Intrinsic Defeaters and the Plantinga-Quinn Debate
I've worked up some notes on a strand of the debate between Alvin Plantinga and Phillip Quinn in the 80s and 90s. My aim is to get clearer on their discussion of Plantinga's notion of an intrinsic defeater. As such, I focus on that strand of their exchanges, and not so much on their exchanges on modern and classical foundationalism.
Plantinga[1]: Belief in God is properly basic, i.e., it's rational or justified or warranted wholly apart from supporting arguments. For there is parity between universally accepted properly basic beliefs (e.g., perceptual beliefs and memory beliefs) on the one hand, and basic theistic beliefs on the other. Both sorts of beliefs are naturally and spontaneously "triggered" in a wide variety of circumstances. So, for example, one will naturally and spontaneously form the following beliefs under certain familiar circumstances:
-I see a tree. (upon having a perceptual experience as of a tree)
-I had breakfast this morning. (upon trying to recall what one had for breakfast)
-That person is angry. (upon looking at a particular person's face)
Similarly, one might naturally and spontaneously form the following theistic beliefs under certain familiar circumstances (at least they're familiar to certain sorts of theists):
-God is speaking to me. (upon reading the Bible)
-God has created all this. (upon looking at the starry heavens)
-God disapproves of what I have done. (upon doing something cheap, or wrong, or wicked)
-God forgives me. (upon asking God for forgiveness for the cheap, wrong, or wicked thing)
-God is to be thanked and praised. (when life is sweet and satisfying)
Those who deny that theistic beliefs can be properly basic are adherents of Clifford-style evidentialism, which in turn is grounded in either classical or modern foundationalism. But while such versions of foundationalism entail that belief in God cannot be properly basic, they are self-referentially incoherent: the classical and modern foundationalist theses themselves fail their own criteria of proper basicality; nor can they be properly deductively or inductively inferred from the beliefs they countenance as properly basic. Therefore, Clifford-style evidentialism is unmotivated; as such, it can't serve as a principled basis for ruling out theistic beliefs as being properly basic.
Quinn[2]: Even if belief in God is properly basic for some people (provincial aunt Mabel and pre-critical little brother Timmy), it's not properly basic for contemporary, intellectually sophisticated adult theists. For any basic justification or warrant such beliefs may have enjoyed has been defeated by their knowledge of contemporary objections to/defeaters for theism (the problem of evil, naturalistic accounts of theistic belief, etc.). Thus, to retain justified or warranted belief in God, sophisticated contemporary adult theists require good replies to such criticisms -- defeater-defeaters for the original defeaters for theistic belief. But then their theistic belief is at least partly based on propositional evidence, in which case it is no longer properly basic.
Plantinga[3]: Not necessarily. For this assumes that all defeaters are extrinsic defeaters -- other arguments or evidence. But in addition to extrinsic defeaters, there are also intrinsic defeaters. "When a basic belief P has more by way of warrant than a potential defeater q of p, then p is an intrinsic defeater of q -- an intrinsic defeater-defeater, we might say."[4]
Two examples:
(i) The purloined letter case: Suppose I have means, motive, and opportunity to steal an embarrassing letter that was in fact stolen from the office of my department chair. There is also very strong evidence against me (e.g., I've been known to steal in the past; a trustworthy colleague says he saw someone who looks like me enter the Dean's Office on the day of the incident, etc.). However, I have a clear and vivid memory of being alone in the woods all day on the day of the incident. In this case, I'm rational to retain my belief that I didn't steal the letter because of my memory, even without propositional evidence and argument that could defeat the reasons brought against me; My belief that I was alone in the woods all day on the day of the incident is thus an intrinsic defeater-defeater of the claim that I stole the letter.
(ii) The Moses and the burning bush case: Suppose Moses has an overwhelming and vivid perceptual, auditory, and (no doubt) mystical experience as of Yahweh speaking to him from a bush that appears to burn, and yet is not consumed. Now suppose Freud strolled by and explained to Moses how his belief about Yahweh is the result of neurotic wish fulfillment. In this case, Moses is rational in retaining his belief about Yahweh, even if he were at a loss as to how to show Freud that his experience was veridical and not illusory. Moses' basic belief about Yahweh is thus an intrinsic defeater-defeater of Freud's criticism.
Thus, properly basic beliefs enjoy a degree of warrant that's independent of propositional evidence and argument. And if the degree of warrant of a properly basic belief is greater than that of one of its potential defeaters, then it is an intrinsic defeater of that defeater: it remains properly basic and warranted even in the absence of a propositional argument against that defeater.
Similarly, if belief in God is properly basic for a given theistic believer, and the degree of basic warrant their belief enjoys is greater than that of a given objection to their belief, then their theistic belief is an intrinsic defeater of that defeater; it retains its properly basic status even apart from an argument offered in reply to the criticism to their belief. And if this applies to the contemporary intellectually sophisticated adult theist as well, then they, too, can have properly basic theistic belief.
Quinn[5]: First: while it's certainly true that at least some types of properly basic beliefs have the property of being intrinsic defeater-defeaters for certain sorts of defeaters, it doesn't follow that such types of properly basic beliefs have this property essentially. Rather, properly basic beliefs must meet certain conditions if they are to be intrinsic defeater-defeaters. For example:
(a) Such beliefs must be sufficiently clear (e.g., fuzzy memories, perceptions in dim lighting, etc., have a lower degree of warrant, and thus can be defeated by good evidence).
(b) One must not have decent evidence that the source of such a belief is unreliable (e.g., you have good evidence from your doctor that you have a certain sort of memory disorder that affects the reliability of the sort of belief at issue).
Second: from the fact that
1. some basic beliefs are intrinsic defeater-defeaters.
it doesn't follow that
2. Some theistic beliefs are intrinsic defeater-defeaters.
or even
3. Possibly, some theistic beliefs are intrinsic defeater-defeaters.
(3) may well be acceptable, though, on the grounds that the scenario seems at least possible and, prima facie, it seems as though it would be an intrinsic defeater-defeater for Freud's objection if it were to obtain. Unfortunately, justifying (3) is insufficient in this context. For this only provides reason to think that there is at least one possible world at which belief in God is properly basic for an intellectually sophisticated theist. But what is metaphysically possible doesn't even entail what is epistemically possible (i.e., what could be true of the actual world, given what we already know of it), let alone what is actual.
What about (2)? It'll prove helpful to distinguish several interpretations of (2) before evaluating it (ordered from strongest to weakest):
(2a) For most theists, some thestic beliefs are intrinsic defeater-defeaters.
(2b) For some theists, some theistic beliefs are intrinsic defeater-defeaters.
(2c) It's epistemically possible (i.e., it could turn out, for all we know, that the actual world is such that) for most theists, some thestic beliefs are intrinsic defeater-defeaters.
(2d) It's epistemically possible (i.e., it could turn out, for all we know, that the actual world is such that) for some theists, some thestic beliefs are intrinsic defeater-defeaters.
Which construal of (2) is Plantinga arguing for in his exchange with Quinn? Of course, the one that's of most interest to the typical Christian theist is (2a). For they care (or at any rate, they ought to care) about whether their faith is at least minimally rational. So if they lack both arguments for their faith and adequate responses to criticisms against their faith (or even knowledge that someone, somewhere, has adequate arguments for their faith and adequate responses to such criticisms), Plantinga's arguments will be cold comfort for the vast majority of them if the only conclusion warranted by his arguments is something weaker than (2a). In fact, in the last paragraph of his reply to Quinn, he offers a qualified endorsement of (2a): "I am therefore inclined to believe that belief in God is properly basic for most theists - even intellectually sophisticated adult theists." (The Foundations of Theism, p. 312. Italics mine.)
However, as Quinn argues in his rejoinder, Plantinga offers nothing in their exchange that could adequately support (2b), let alone (2a). To see this, recall Plantinga's two paradigm cases of intrinsic defeaters:
(i) The purloined letter case
(ii) The Moses and the burning bush case
In case (i), we have a clear, fresh memory that serves as an intrinsic defeater-defeater of evidence that one stole a letter out of the department chair’s office. Such a belief has a lot by way of psychological force, vivacity, and warrant. In case (ii) Moses has an overwhelming experience as of God speaking to him from a bush that appears to burn, and is yet not consumed by the flame. It, likewise, has a lot by way of psychological force, vivacity, and warrant. Thus, if you were to be the subject in either scenario, and you met conditions (a) and (b) mentioned earlier (clear, fresh, vivid experiences in normal conditions, and you had no decent evidence that your cognitive faculties are unreliable with respect to forming the relevant sort of belief), then such beliefs have such a high degree of force, vivacity, and warrant for you that they will overwhelm the force of virtually any argument one could offer.
The same is true of the uncontroversially properly basic beliefs Plantinga mentioned in the earlier paper, viz.:
-I see a tree. (upon having a perceptual experience as of a tree)
-I had breakfast this morning. (upon trying to recall what one had for breakfast)
-That person is angry. (upon looking at a particular person's face)
For these are clearly analogous to cases (i) and (ii) in terms of warrant, force, and vivacity. In effect, Plantinga has given a list of examples of (what epistemologists call) Moorean facts. As such, their force, vivacity, and warrant will trump just about any philosophical argument against them, even if one is unable to refute them.
However, the crucial issue is whether Plantinga's examples of the humdrum variety of properly basic theistic beliefs -- the sorts of cases that are applicable to the typical Christian believer (and not just Moses and, perhaps, a handful of other fortunate souls) -- are comparable to cases (i) and (ii) in terms of degree of warrant, force, and vivacity.
Well, are they? To help answer this question, let's review Plantinga's examples of what he takes to be the typical, humdrum triggering conditions of properly basic theistic belief for most theists:
-God is speaking to me. (upon reading the Bible)
-God has created all this. (upon looking at the starry heavens)
-God disapproves of what I have done. (upon doing something cheap, or wrong, or wicked)
-God forgives me. (upon asking God for forgiveness for the cheap, wrong, or wicked thing)
-God is to be thanked and praised. (when life is sweet and satisfying)
Reflecting on such cases as these in his own Christian life, Quinn finds that they don't have anywhere near the degree of force, vivacity, and warrant of, for example, that involved in the Moses and the Burning Bush case; i.e., they don't seem to be anything remotely like Moorean facts for him. And of course, very many Christians likewise testify of having, at most, "gentle nudges" with respect to the sorts of triggering conditions of belief Plantinga mentions. But if so, then the relatively weak force, vivacity, and warrant such beliefs enjoy will not be sufficient to function as intrinsic defeaters for the objections to the faith that intellectually sophisticated adult theists are aware of. As such, it's not at all clear that Plantinga has even justified (2c); a fortiori he has not justified (2a). And if that's right, then it looks as though Plantinga has failed to deflect Quinn's charge: even if belief in God could be properly basic for parochial or pre-critical theists, it's not properly basic for intellectually sophisticated contemporary adult theists.
--------------------------------
[1] Plantinga, Alvin. "Is Belief in God Properly Basic", Nous 15:1 (1981), pp. 41-51.
[2] Quinn, Phillip. "In Search of the Foundations of Theism", Faith and Philosophy 2:4 (1985), pp. 469-486.
[3] Plantinga, "The Foundations of Theism: A Reply", Faith and Philosophy 3:3 (1986), pp. 298-313.
[4] Ibid., p. 311.
[5] Quinn, "The Foundations of Theism Again: A Rejoinder to Plantinga", in Zagzebski, Linda, ed. Rational Faith: Catholic Responses to Reformed Epistemology (University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), pp. 14-47.
Plantinga[1]: Belief in God is properly basic, i.e., it's rational or justified or warranted wholly apart from supporting arguments. For there is parity between universally accepted properly basic beliefs (e.g., perceptual beliefs and memory beliefs) on the one hand, and basic theistic beliefs on the other. Both sorts of beliefs are naturally and spontaneously "triggered" in a wide variety of circumstances. So, for example, one will naturally and spontaneously form the following beliefs under certain familiar circumstances:
-I see a tree. (upon having a perceptual experience as of a tree)
-I had breakfast this morning. (upon trying to recall what one had for breakfast)
-That person is angry. (upon looking at a particular person's face)
Similarly, one might naturally and spontaneously form the following theistic beliefs under certain familiar circumstances (at least they're familiar to certain sorts of theists):
-God is speaking to me. (upon reading the Bible)
-God has created all this. (upon looking at the starry heavens)
-God disapproves of what I have done. (upon doing something cheap, or wrong, or wicked)
-God forgives me. (upon asking God for forgiveness for the cheap, wrong, or wicked thing)
-God is to be thanked and praised. (when life is sweet and satisfying)
Those who deny that theistic beliefs can be properly basic are adherents of Clifford-style evidentialism, which in turn is grounded in either classical or modern foundationalism. But while such versions of foundationalism entail that belief in God cannot be properly basic, they are self-referentially incoherent: the classical and modern foundationalist theses themselves fail their own criteria of proper basicality; nor can they be properly deductively or inductively inferred from the beliefs they countenance as properly basic. Therefore, Clifford-style evidentialism is unmotivated; as such, it can't serve as a principled basis for ruling out theistic beliefs as being properly basic.
Quinn[2]: Even if belief in God is properly basic for some people (provincial aunt Mabel and pre-critical little brother Timmy), it's not properly basic for contemporary, intellectually sophisticated adult theists. For any basic justification or warrant such beliefs may have enjoyed has been defeated by their knowledge of contemporary objections to/defeaters for theism (the problem of evil, naturalistic accounts of theistic belief, etc.). Thus, to retain justified or warranted belief in God, sophisticated contemporary adult theists require good replies to such criticisms -- defeater-defeaters for the original defeaters for theistic belief. But then their theistic belief is at least partly based on propositional evidence, in which case it is no longer properly basic.
Plantinga[3]: Not necessarily. For this assumes that all defeaters are extrinsic defeaters -- other arguments or evidence. But in addition to extrinsic defeaters, there are also intrinsic defeaters. "When a basic belief P has more by way of warrant than a potential defeater q of p, then p is an intrinsic defeater of q -- an intrinsic defeater-defeater, we might say."[4]
Two examples:
(i) The purloined letter case: Suppose I have means, motive, and opportunity to steal an embarrassing letter that was in fact stolen from the office of my department chair. There is also very strong evidence against me (e.g., I've been known to steal in the past; a trustworthy colleague says he saw someone who looks like me enter the Dean's Office on the day of the incident, etc.). However, I have a clear and vivid memory of being alone in the woods all day on the day of the incident. In this case, I'm rational to retain my belief that I didn't steal the letter because of my memory, even without propositional evidence and argument that could defeat the reasons brought against me; My belief that I was alone in the woods all day on the day of the incident is thus an intrinsic defeater-defeater of the claim that I stole the letter.
(ii) The Moses and the burning bush case: Suppose Moses has an overwhelming and vivid perceptual, auditory, and (no doubt) mystical experience as of Yahweh speaking to him from a bush that appears to burn, and yet is not consumed. Now suppose Freud strolled by and explained to Moses how his belief about Yahweh is the result of neurotic wish fulfillment. In this case, Moses is rational in retaining his belief about Yahweh, even if he were at a loss as to how to show Freud that his experience was veridical and not illusory. Moses' basic belief about Yahweh is thus an intrinsic defeater-defeater of Freud's criticism.
Thus, properly basic beliefs enjoy a degree of warrant that's independent of propositional evidence and argument. And if the degree of warrant of a properly basic belief is greater than that of one of its potential defeaters, then it is an intrinsic defeater of that defeater: it remains properly basic and warranted even in the absence of a propositional argument against that defeater.
Similarly, if belief in God is properly basic for a given theistic believer, and the degree of basic warrant their belief enjoys is greater than that of a given objection to their belief, then their theistic belief is an intrinsic defeater of that defeater; it retains its properly basic status even apart from an argument offered in reply to the criticism to their belief. And if this applies to the contemporary intellectually sophisticated adult theist as well, then they, too, can have properly basic theistic belief.
Quinn[5]: First: while it's certainly true that at least some types of properly basic beliefs have the property of being intrinsic defeater-defeaters for certain sorts of defeaters, it doesn't follow that such types of properly basic beliefs have this property essentially. Rather, properly basic beliefs must meet certain conditions if they are to be intrinsic defeater-defeaters. For example:
(a) Such beliefs must be sufficiently clear (e.g., fuzzy memories, perceptions in dim lighting, etc., have a lower degree of warrant, and thus can be defeated by good evidence).
(b) One must not have decent evidence that the source of such a belief is unreliable (e.g., you have good evidence from your doctor that you have a certain sort of memory disorder that affects the reliability of the sort of belief at issue).
Second: from the fact that
1. some basic beliefs are intrinsic defeater-defeaters.
it doesn't follow that
2. Some theistic beliefs are intrinsic defeater-defeaters.
or even
3. Possibly, some theistic beliefs are intrinsic defeater-defeaters.
(3) may well be acceptable, though, on the grounds that the scenario seems at least possible and, prima facie, it seems as though it would be an intrinsic defeater-defeater for Freud's objection if it were to obtain. Unfortunately, justifying (3) is insufficient in this context. For this only provides reason to think that there is at least one possible world at which belief in God is properly basic for an intellectually sophisticated theist. But what is metaphysically possible doesn't even entail what is epistemically possible (i.e., what could be true of the actual world, given what we already know of it), let alone what is actual.
What about (2)? It'll prove helpful to distinguish several interpretations of (2) before evaluating it (ordered from strongest to weakest):
(2a) For most theists, some thestic beliefs are intrinsic defeater-defeaters.
(2b) For some theists, some theistic beliefs are intrinsic defeater-defeaters.
(2c) It's epistemically possible (i.e., it could turn out, for all we know, that the actual world is such that) for most theists, some thestic beliefs are intrinsic defeater-defeaters.
(2d) It's epistemically possible (i.e., it could turn out, for all we know, that the actual world is such that) for some theists, some thestic beliefs are intrinsic defeater-defeaters.
Which construal of (2) is Plantinga arguing for in his exchange with Quinn? Of course, the one that's of most interest to the typical Christian theist is (2a). For they care (or at any rate, they ought to care) about whether their faith is at least minimally rational. So if they lack both arguments for their faith and adequate responses to criticisms against their faith (or even knowledge that someone, somewhere, has adequate arguments for their faith and adequate responses to such criticisms), Plantinga's arguments will be cold comfort for the vast majority of them if the only conclusion warranted by his arguments is something weaker than (2a). In fact, in the last paragraph of his reply to Quinn, he offers a qualified endorsement of (2a): "I am therefore inclined to believe that belief in God is properly basic for most theists - even intellectually sophisticated adult theists." (The Foundations of Theism, p. 312. Italics mine.)
However, as Quinn argues in his rejoinder, Plantinga offers nothing in their exchange that could adequately support (2b), let alone (2a). To see this, recall Plantinga's two paradigm cases of intrinsic defeaters:
(i) The purloined letter case
(ii) The Moses and the burning bush case
In case (i), we have a clear, fresh memory that serves as an intrinsic defeater-defeater of evidence that one stole a letter out of the department chair’s office. Such a belief has a lot by way of psychological force, vivacity, and warrant. In case (ii) Moses has an overwhelming experience as of God speaking to him from a bush that appears to burn, and is yet not consumed by the flame. It, likewise, has a lot by way of psychological force, vivacity, and warrant. Thus, if you were to be the subject in either scenario, and you met conditions (a) and (b) mentioned earlier (clear, fresh, vivid experiences in normal conditions, and you had no decent evidence that your cognitive faculties are unreliable with respect to forming the relevant sort of belief), then such beliefs have such a high degree of force, vivacity, and warrant for you that they will overwhelm the force of virtually any argument one could offer.
The same is true of the uncontroversially properly basic beliefs Plantinga mentioned in the earlier paper, viz.:
-I see a tree. (upon having a perceptual experience as of a tree)
-I had breakfast this morning. (upon trying to recall what one had for breakfast)
-That person is angry. (upon looking at a particular person's face)
For these are clearly analogous to cases (i) and (ii) in terms of warrant, force, and vivacity. In effect, Plantinga has given a list of examples of (what epistemologists call) Moorean facts. As such, their force, vivacity, and warrant will trump just about any philosophical argument against them, even if one is unable to refute them.
However, the crucial issue is whether Plantinga's examples of the humdrum variety of properly basic theistic beliefs -- the sorts of cases that are applicable to the typical Christian believer (and not just Moses and, perhaps, a handful of other fortunate souls) -- are comparable to cases (i) and (ii) in terms of degree of warrant, force, and vivacity.
Well, are they? To help answer this question, let's review Plantinga's examples of what he takes to be the typical, humdrum triggering conditions of properly basic theistic belief for most theists:
-God is speaking to me. (upon reading the Bible)
-God has created all this. (upon looking at the starry heavens)
-God disapproves of what I have done. (upon doing something cheap, or wrong, or wicked)
-God forgives me. (upon asking God for forgiveness for the cheap, wrong, or wicked thing)
-God is to be thanked and praised. (when life is sweet and satisfying)
Reflecting on such cases as these in his own Christian life, Quinn finds that they don't have anywhere near the degree of force, vivacity, and warrant of, for example, that involved in the Moses and the Burning Bush case; i.e., they don't seem to be anything remotely like Moorean facts for him. And of course, very many Christians likewise testify of having, at most, "gentle nudges" with respect to the sorts of triggering conditions of belief Plantinga mentions. But if so, then the relatively weak force, vivacity, and warrant such beliefs enjoy will not be sufficient to function as intrinsic defeaters for the objections to the faith that intellectually sophisticated adult theists are aware of. As such, it's not at all clear that Plantinga has even justified (2c); a fortiori he has not justified (2a). And if that's right, then it looks as though Plantinga has failed to deflect Quinn's charge: even if belief in God could be properly basic for parochial or pre-critical theists, it's not properly basic for intellectually sophisticated contemporary adult theists.
--------------------------------
[1] Plantinga, Alvin. "Is Belief in God Properly Basic", Nous 15:1 (1981), pp. 41-51.
[2] Quinn, Phillip. "In Search of the Foundations of Theism", Faith and Philosophy 2:4 (1985), pp. 469-486.
[3] Plantinga, "The Foundations of Theism: A Reply", Faith and Philosophy 3:3 (1986), pp. 298-313.
[4] Ibid., p. 311.
[5] Quinn, "The Foundations of Theism Again: A Rejoinder to Plantinga", in Zagzebski, Linda, ed. Rational Faith: Catholic Responses to Reformed Epistemology (University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), pp. 14-47.
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