A popular view in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion is that while there are many arguments[1] for theism -- cosmological, ontological, and teleological arguments; moral arguments; arguments from consciousness; etc. (by Plantinga's lights, two dozen or so), there are only two arguments for atheism[2], viz., the problem of evil and (more recently) the problem of divine hiddenness. Indeed, some argue that the problem of divine hiddenness reduces to a version of the problem of evil, and thus that there is only one argument -- or at most, one category of argument -- for atheism.
This is a misconception. Here are over 240 arguments for atheism--i.e., 20 dozen (or so), spanning 29 categories:
I. Cosmological-Type Arguments
1. A modal cosmological argument for atheism
2. Epicurean cosmological arguments for naturalism
3. The argument from metaphysical infinitism/coherentism
3. The argument from metaphysical infinitism/coherentism
7. A Leibnizian-style cosmological argument against theism
8. Smith's Kalam cosmological argument for atheism
8. Smith's Kalam cosmological argument for atheism
10. A grounding-based cosmological argument from one-category ontology
11. The Spinozistic argument from negative PSR to naturalism
11. The Spinozistic argument from negative PSR to naturalism
II. Ontological-Type Arguments
18. Goff's conceivability argument for atheism
19. A minimal modal ontological argument for naturalism
20. Quantum modal realist ontological argument for naturalism
19. A minimal modal ontological argument for naturalism
20. Quantum modal realist ontological argument for naturalism
21. The ontological argument for Spinozism
22. Maitzen’s ontological argument for atheism
23. Inductive arguments against Anselmianism
24. Another ontological disproof of theism
22. Maitzen’s ontological argument for atheism
23. Inductive arguments against Anselmianism
24. Another ontological disproof of theism
27. Another argument from fine-tuning against theism (see also)
28. Atheistic teleological arguments (see also)
28. Atheistic teleological arguments (see also)
43. The problem of natural nonbelief
44. The argument from anti-religious experience and properly basic atheistic belief
44. The argument from anti-religious experience and properly basic atheistic belief
46. The argument from naturalistic explanations of religious practices
47. The argument from the ineffectiveness of prayer (see also)
48. The argument from theistic demographics
49. The common core/diversity dilemma
47. The argument from the ineffectiveness of prayer (see also)
48. The argument from theistic demographics
49. The common core/diversity dilemma
51. Smith's argument from felt meanings of the world
VI. Arguments from Morality and Moral Psychology
52. The argument from the autonomy of normative ethics
53. The argument from the autonomy of metaethics
54. The argument from normative uncertainty
VI. Arguments from Morality and Moral Psychology
52. The argument from the autonomy of normative ethics
53. The argument from the autonomy of metaethics
54. The argument from normative uncertainty
55. The argument from blameless moral ignorance
56. The argument from moral psychology
57. The argument from lack of character
58. The argument from lack of extensive empathy
59. The argument from ordinary morality
60. The argument from moral epistemology
61. The argument from meager moral fruits
56. The argument from moral psychology
57. The argument from lack of character
58. The argument from lack of extensive empathy
59. The argument from ordinary morality
60. The argument from moral epistemology
61. The argument from meager moral fruits
VII. Arguments from the Meaning of Life
64. Sartrean arguments for gravely diminished meaning in a theistic universe
64. Sartrean arguments for gravely diminished meaning in a theistic universe
67. Betenson's argument from futility in a theistic universe
68. The argument from excessive "anti-matter", or anti-meaning, in a theistic universe (see also)
68. The argument from excessive "anti-matter", or anti-meaning, in a theistic universe (see also)
VIII. Arguments from Consciousness and Personhood
74. The argument from substance dualism to non-theism
74. The argument from substance dualism to non-theism
76, 77. The problem(s) of dissociative identity disorder
78. The argument from the mind’s dependence on the brain
79. The argument from quantum mechanics against theistic accounts of personal identity, related issues
78. The argument from the mind’s dependence on the brain
79. The argument from quantum mechanics against theistic accounts of personal identity, related issues
X. Arguments from Reason
XI. Arguments from Logic
XII. Arguments from Abstract Objects
87. The argument from the uncreatability/metaphysical independence of abstracta
88. The argument from abstracta as God’s metaphysical parts
89. The argument from God’s existence as a derivative being that supervenes upon platonic modal space
90. The Benacerraf argument against God’s knowledge of abstracta
91. The argument from one-category ontology
87. The argument from the uncreatability/metaphysical independence of abstracta
88. The argument from abstracta as God’s metaphysical parts
89. The argument from God’s existence as a derivative being that supervenes upon platonic modal space
90. The Benacerraf argument against God’s knowledge of abstracta
91. The argument from one-category ontology
XIII. Arguments from the Nature of Causation
XIV. Nomological Arguments
XV. Arguments from General Ontology, Metaphysics, and Metametaphysics (that Don't Fit Neatly Into other Categories)
99. The argument from strong ontological nihilism
100. The argument from neo-Carnapian metametaphysics
101. The argument from modal normativism
102. The argument from necessitarianism
100. The argument from neo-Carnapian metametaphysics
101. The argument from modal normativism
102. The argument from necessitarianism
XVI. Epistemological Arguments
106. The argument from theism to radical skepticism
106. The argument from theism to radical skepticism
107. The argument from mitigated modal skepticism
108. The argument from epistemic permissivism
109. The argument from pragmatic encroachment
110. The argument from peer religious disagreement
108. The argument from epistemic permissivism
109. The argument from pragmatic encroachment
110. The argument from peer religious disagreement
111, 112. The problem(s) of religious luck
113. The argument from Mandevillian intelligence
114. The argument from secondary qualities against the reliability of perception
115. The argument from Bayesian theories of perception (esp. prediction error minimization theories)
116. The argument from wave function realism against the reliability of perception
117. The problem of theistic evidentialist philosophers
XVII. Arguments from Aesthetics
118. The argument from ugliness
119. The argument from revulsion
113. The argument from Mandevillian intelligence
114. The argument from secondary qualities against the reliability of perception
115. The argument from Bayesian theories of perception (esp. prediction error minimization theories)
116. The argument from wave function realism against the reliability of perception
117. The problem of theistic evidentialist philosophers
XVII. Arguments from Aesthetics
118. The argument from ugliness
119. The argument from revulsion
XVIII. Arguments from Political Philosophy
121. Rawlsian arguments argument from distributive justice
122. Dworkinian arguments from distributive justice
123. Contractarian arguments against non-democratic rule
XVIII. Normative Arguments (Apart from problems of evil)
124. The argument from the impropriety of worship
125. The argument from autonomy
XVIII. Normative Arguments (Apart from problems of evil)
124. The argument from the impropriety of worship
125. The argument from autonomy
127. Cliffordian arguments from the impropriety of belief without sufficient evidence (and the failure of Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology)
XIX. Arguments from Divine Hiddenness and Non-Belief
128. Deductive arguments from divine hiddenness
129. Probabilistic arguments from divine hiddenness
128. Deductive arguments from divine hiddenness
129. Probabilistic arguments from divine hiddenness
131. Drange's argument from non-belief
XX. Arguments from Incoherence Within/Among the Divine Attributes and Related Matters (Incomplete. These just scratch the surface. For more, see e.g. Oppy's Describing Gods)
XX. Arguments from Incoherence Within/Among the Divine Attributes and Related Matters (Incomplete. These just scratch the surface. For more, see e.g. Oppy's Describing Gods)
134. Foreknowledge
137. Divine freedom (See also)
138. Eternity
140. Maximality
141. Perfection
142. Personhood (see also)
143. Creator and Sustainer
144. Divine consciousness
145. A new paradox of omnipotence
146. The aloneness argument
144. Divine consciousness
145. A new paradox of omnipotence
146. The aloneness argument
XXI. Arguments from Lower Comparative Prior Probability
XXII. Arguments from Explanatory Inferiority
XXIII. Arguments from Rival Supernaturalisms and/or Worldviews with Equal or Greater Explanatory Power and Related Matters
166. The problem of classical deism
183. Law's Evil-god challenge (see also)
184. The problem of the inclusive disjunction of rival supernaturalisms/worldviews
XXIV. Arguments from the Success of Naturalistic Explanations
XXV. Arguments from Private Evidence
186. Bartolome's argument from private evidence
XXVI. Arguments from Evil
186. Bartolome's argument from private evidence
XXVI. Arguments from Evil
196. The problem of infant suffering
197. The argument from flourishing/languishing
198. The Darwinian problem of evil
197. The argument from flourishing/languishing
198. The Darwinian problem of evil
203. Monaghan's new logical problem of evil
204. The argument from religious evil
205. The argument from divine evil
206. The argument from hell
207. The argument from the requirement of divine interference (see also)
204. The argument from religious evil
205. The argument from divine evil
206. The argument from hell
207. The argument from the requirement of divine interference (see also)
208. The argument from eternally separated lovers
209. The argument from inhospitable environment
210. The argument from teleological evil
209. The argument from inhospitable environment
210. The argument from teleological evil
211. The argument from evil natural laws
212. The argument from natural inequalities
213. The argument from social evil
214. The argument from insect suffering
215. The argument from tragic moral dilemmas
216. Sterba's new deductive argument from evil
217. The argument from unfairness
218. The problem of the death of most humans before the age of accountability
219. The argument from the harm of coming into existence
220. The argument from physiological horrors
221. The argument from heaven
212. The argument from natural inequalities
213. The argument from social evil
214. The argument from insect suffering
215. The argument from tragic moral dilemmas
216. Sterba's new deductive argument from evil
217. The argument from unfairness
218. The problem of the death of most humans before the age of accountability
219. The argument from the harm of coming into existence
220. The argument from physiological horrors
221. The argument from heaven
229. Morriston's problem of evil divine commands (e.g., genocide)
236. Lemos' Kantian argument from natural evil
237, 238. Rawlsian arguments from evil.
237, 238. Rawlsian arguments from evil.
(See also these collections on problems of evil)
XXVII. Pragmatic/Prudential Arguments
XVIII. Cumulative case/Combinatorial Arguments
242. Oppy’s abductive cumulative case argument for naturalism
242. Oppy’s abductive cumulative case argument for naturalism
243. Leon’s abductive cumulative case argument for liberal naturalism
244. Draper’s Bayesian cumulative case argument against theism
244. Draper’s Bayesian cumulative case argument against theism
246. Various cumulative IBE arguments from large conjunctive disjuncts of 1-238.
Some things worthy of note. First, there are very, very many more arguments for atheism than commonly supposed. Indeed, if Plantinga is to be believed that there are just two dozen (or so) arguments for theism, then atheistic arguments outnumber theistic arguments by an order of magnitude. Second, while categorization is inevitably somewhat arbitrary, there are clearly very many more types of atheistic arguments than commonly supposed -- on my reckoning, 27 other types of atheistic argument besides the problem of evil. Third, the list doesn't include arguments specifically against orthodox Christianity. If it did, the list would be considerably longer. Fourth, roughly 75-80% of atheistic arguments have nothing to do with the problem of evil -- problems of evil are in the minority.
Fifth, the evidence against theism appears to be systemic -- it provides non-trivial grounds for thinking the data from virtually every major aspect of reality (e.g.: the origin, existence, and structure of the universe; consciousness; agency; morality and moral psychology; reason; logic; abstract objects; the nature of causation; the laws of nature; epistemology; religions, religious practices, and religious experience; aesthetics; political philosophy; the meaning of life; general ontology, metaphysics, and meta-metaphysics; and yes, suffering and hiddenness, too) points away from theism and towards some form of naturalism. One can cull very large subsets of compatible arguments from the list above to generate a variety of large abductive cumulative case arguments. Prima facie, there is very strong promise that when this is done, naturalism will embody the theoretical virtues (e.g., simplicity, scope, conservatism, etc.) better than orthodox theism. I would argue that this remains so even after throwing in all the viable data points standardly appealed to in the case for theism, in which case the relevant data renders a form of naturalism more probable than orthodox theism. (A similar point applies to taking all these data points to run a comprehensive Bayesian argument for naturalism.)
Sixth, the previous points constitute non-trivial grounds for thinking the case for atheism doesn't essentially depend on the success of the problem of evil and hiddenness, in which case theists have much more work to do besides addressing those arguments.
Finally, most people who care about arguments for and against theism are adherents of some form of orthodox religious monotheism or other. Among such groups, it's typically thought that the case for their faith must be persuasive, such that no (or almost no) mature, rational, properly functioning human being who appraised the relevant evidence could non-culpably fail to believe after assessing it (on the grounds that (i) God holds people morally responsible for their belief, and (ii) God would be less than perfectly good if he held people morally responsible for their belief if the evidence were less than persuasive). Thus, consider some rational, mature, properly functioning adult agnostic, Joe, who has strongly grasped, internalized, and carefully appraised the above arguments, as well as all the arguments for theism on the other side of the ledger. Suppose further that after long and careful reflection, Joe finds the grounds for atheism to be either stronger than those for theism, or at least, counterbalanced with them. Finally, suppose that Joe thereby either disbelieves or suspends judgement about theism. According to the group of theists specified just above, there can be no one like Joe: The evidence for orthodox monotheism is so good that for any person S, if S is a rational, mature, properly functioning agent, and (after careful reflection and deliberation) S fails to find the evidence to support theism over atheism, or if S merely finds the evidence to be counterbalanced -- or indeed, if S finds themself unable to tell, with any confidence, which way the evidence points -- then S is morally culpable for failing to believe in the relevant version of orthodox monotheism. In light of the case for atheism expressed in the arguments listed above, this looks to be implausible, if not ridiculous.
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Notes:
[1] Here and henceforth, I use the notion of an argument broadly, so as to include deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments. I also follow Richard Swinburne in recognizing the distinction between what he calls C-inductive arguments (which are arguments that raise the probabilities of their conclusions at least to some degree, although not necessarily rendering their conclusions more probable than not) and P-inductive arguments (which are arguments that raise the probabilities of their conclusions above 1/2), and include both C-inductive and P-inductive arguments to count as arguments for theism and for atheism.
[2] Here and henceforth, I follow Jeanine Diller and Paul Draper in distinguishing between global atheism (the denial of all gods) and local atheism (denial of a specific god or type of god). I'm taking the arguments in the list below to be arguments for local atheism with respect to the god of orthodox monotheism (although many arguments on the list provide at least some grounds for rejecting at least some other types of gods).