Rdzak's Nice Paper on the Incompatibility of PSR and Libertarianism

Rdzak, Brandon. "The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Libertarianism: A Reply to Pruss", Philosophia (2021),  https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00364-0. 

Abstract: Alexander Pruss’s Principle of Sufficient Reason states that every contingent true proposition has an explanation. Pruss thinks that he can plausibly maintain both his PSR and his account of libertarian free will. This is because his libertarianism has it that contingent true propositions reporting free choices are self-explanatory. But I don’t think Pruss can plausibly maintain both his PSR and libertarianism without a rift occurring in one or the other. Similar to the old luck/randomness objection, I contend that Pruss’s libertarianism is susceptible to what I call “the inexplicability objection”, which attempts to show that agents’ free choices involve contingent brute facts. Pruss may be able to partially explain a proposition such that Jones freely chose A for reason R, but he cannot adequately explain a contrastive proposition such as that Jones freely chose A for R rather than B for R*. The result is that either PSR is too explanatorily permissive for libertarianism, or libertarianism is too explanatorily impermissive to satisfy PSR. After considering what I take to be Pruss’s best response to the inexplicability objection, I conclude that his attempt to reconcile PSR and libertarianism is unsuccessful.

The Argument from PSR to Monism

Here's yet another argument to add to the list. A commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is commonly thought to go hand in hand with a commitment to traditional theism. However, as Michael Della Rocca has recently argued, PSR entails monism. Therefore, to the extent that one has reason to accept PSR, one has reason to reject theism.

Fantastic New Paper on Fine-Tuning as Evidence for a Multiverse

Yoaav Isaacs, John Hawthorne, and Jeffrey Sanford Russell. "Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence", Philosophical Review (forthcoming).

Abstract:
Is the fact that our universe contains fine-tuned life evidence that we live in a multiverse? Hacking (1987) and White (2000) influentially argue that it is not. We approach this question through a systematic framework for self-locating epistemology. As it turns out, leading approaches to self-locating evidence agree that the fact that our own universe contains fine-tuned life indeed confirms the existence of a multiverse (at least in a suitably idealized setting). This convergence is no accident: we present two theorems showing that in this setting, *any* updating rule that satisfies a few reasonable conditions will have the same feature. The conclusion that fine-tuned life provides evidence for a multiverse is hard to escape.

Fantastic New Critique of Molinism by Climenhaga and Rubio

 Climenhaga, Nevin and Rubio, Daniel. "Molinism: Explaining Our Freedom Away", Mind (forthcoming).

Abstract:

Molinists hold that there are contingently true counterfactuals about what agents would do if put in specific circumstances, that God knows these prior to creation, and that God uses this knowledge in choosing how to create. In this essay we critique Molinism, arguing that if these theses were true, agents would not be free. Consider Eve’s sinning upon being tempted by a serpent. We argue that if Molinism is true, then there is some set of facts that fully explains both Eve’s action and everything else Eve does that influences that action; and that if this is the case, Eve does not act freely. The first premise of this argument follows from the explanatory relations the Molinist is committed to, and the second premise follows from libertarian intuitions about free will.

The Argument from Modal Normativism Against Theism

Here's another argument to add to the listModal normativism is growing in popularity as an account of the nature of modality. However, on that view, modal properties are metaphysically lightweight, and do not exist as features of mind-independent reality. However, on standard theism, modal properties are not metaphysically lightweight, but rather exist as features of mind-independent reality (e.g., the necessary existence of god and the contingent existence of the universe). Therefore, to the extent that one has reason to accept modal normativism, one thereby has reason to reject standard theism.

Three Excellent New Critiques of the Kalam Cosmological Argument from Malpass and Morriston

Malpass, Alex. 2021. "All the Time in the World", Mind. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaa086. 

Morriston, Wes. 2021. "Infinity, Time, and Successive Addition", Australasian Philosophical Quarterly. DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2020.1865426

Malpass, Alex and Morriston Wes. 2020. "Endless and Infinite", The Philosophical Quarterly 70(281): 830-849. 


Rdzak's Nice Paper on the Incompatibility of PSR and Libertarianism

Rdzak, Brandon. " The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Libertarianism: A Reply to Pruss ", Philosophia (2021),  https://doi.org/...