1. The abstract essence or nature x of any substance or individual (or type thereof), is such that, if x is instantiated/concretized, then x is instantiated/concretized by either: (a) a wholly abstract instantiator/concretizer wholly internal to x, (b) a wholly concrete intantiator/concretizer wholly external to x, (c) a wholly abstract instantiator/concretizer partly internal and partly external to x, or (d) an instantiator that's partly abstract and internal to x and partly concrete and external to x. (Premise)
3. If (a), then if God's wholly abstract essence is instantiated/concretized, then God's wholly abstract nature instrinsically instantiates itself, which then at least prima facie suggests that all abstracta, or at least some other abstracta besides God's essence, intrinsically instantiate themselves, which is contrary to traditional theism. (Premise)
4. If (b), then God's wholly abstract essence is instantiatiated/concretized by a wholly external instantiator, which is false on the hypothesis of traditional theism (by hypothesis, there wasn't anything around to do the job). (Premise)
5. If (c), then both God's wholly abstract nature, in conjunction with one or more other wholly abstract entities, are essentially jointly sufficient to instantiate/concretize wholly abstract entities, in which case the traditional-theism-hostile problems similar to those of (2) obtain. (Premise)
6. If (d), then the traditional-theism-hostile problems of both (3) and (4) obtain. (Premise)
7. Therefore, every account of the possible instantiation/concretization of God's abstract essence is hostile to traditional theism. (From 3-6)
