ANNOUNCEMENT: 2012 BLPR Lecture Series
February 21st and 23rd. Guest lecturers will be Michael J. Murray and Jeffrey Schloss. As noted on other occasions, Murray is the author of Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering, and Murray and Schloss are the editors of The Believing Primate: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Reflections on the Origin of Religion. It looks as though their lectures will focus on these topics. Details here.
What's Wrong With Plantinga's Proper Functionalism? (Second Draft)
I. Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology and His Mature Account of Warranted Belief
Since the 60s, Alvin Plantinga has been arguing that belief in God is "properly basic". That is, like belief in material objects, the past, and other minds, belief in God can be rational in a direct, non-inferential way, wholly apart from propositional evidence and argument. This thesis constitutes the core idea of his version of so-called "Reformed Epistemology".
Plantinga's mature defense of his thesis is grounded in a proper functionalist version of epistemic externalism. Plantinga summarizes his account as follows:
"Put in a nutshell, then, a belief has warrant for a person S only if that belief is produced by cognitive faculties [e.g., perception, memory, introspection, reason, and testimony -EA] functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment that is appropriate for S's kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plan that is successfully aimed at truth."[1]
So that's what's required for a belief to have any warrant at all on Plantinga's account. But he allows that warrant admits of degrees, and he ties the degree of warrant a belief enjoys to the degree of firmness with which it is believed: "We must add, furthermore, that when a belief meets these conditions and does enjoy warrant, the degree of warrant it enjoys depends on the strength of the belief, the firmness with which S holds it."[2] Thus, for such a belief to have a degree of warrant sufficient for knowledge, it must be held with a very high degree of firmness.
Putting these points together, Plantinga's account can be summed up as follows:
I. Conditions of warrant are not met = no warrant (whether the belief is held firmly or not)
II. Conditions of warrant are met + low degree of firmness = low degree of warrant.
III. Conditions of warrant are met + high degree of firmness = high degree of warrant.
So that's Plantinga's account of warranted belief in a nutshell. But how does this account connect to his account of warranted theistic belief in particular?
II. Plantinga's Mature Account of Warranted Theistic Belief: The A/C Model[3]
Plantinga argues that it's epistemically possible (consistent with what we know or reasonably believe) that God has designed us in such a way that we are naturally endowed with a cognitive faculty -- what he (following John Calvin) calls the sensus divinitatis -- that, when functioning properly in an epistemically congenial environment, spontaneously and reliably produces true beliefs about God. So, for example, when one looks at the starry heavens, the sensus divinitatis is (when functioning properly) naturally disposed to spontaneously trigger the belief, "God made all this"; when doing something wrong, it's disposed to trigger the belief, "God disapproves of what I've done"; etc. And since such belief meets all of the conditions of warrant -- viz., (a) it's produced by a properly functioning cognitive faculty (viz., the sensus divinitatis), (b) the faculty is successfully aimed at truth, and (c) the environment in which such beliefs are formed is epistemically congenial --, Plantinga's account entails that such belief enjoys at least some measure of warrant. And if (d) such belief is held with a very high degree of firmness, the degree of warrant it enjoys is sufficient to constitute knowledge (assuming the belief isn't subject to undefeated defeaters).[4]
We've now looked at Plantinga's account of warranted belief in general and his account of warranted theistic belief in particular. It is now time to take a look at his account of warranted Christian belief.
III. Plantinga's Mature Account of Warranted Christian Belief: The Extended A/C Model[5]
Very roughly, on Plantinga’s model of warranted Christian belief, the Holy Spirit acts on the believer by repairing the sensus divinitatis from the ravages of sin, so that it naturally, spontaneously, and reliably produces true belief about God in the basic (i.e., non-inferential) way. It also repairs the person's affective equipment, so that it is no longer hostile to God and his purposes, but is rather attracted to them and delights in them. Finally, the Holy Spirit functions as an analogue to a properly functioning cognitive faculty by acting directly on the "heart" of a person to produce belief in the core truths of Christianity (what Plantinga calls the Great Things of the Gospel) when they are presented to them (if the person wills to accept the gospel message). Therefore, as with warranted theistic belief as described in Plantinga's A/C model, Christian belief formed in the way described in his Extended A/C model meets all the conditions of warrant: (a) it's produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties[6], (b) the faculties are successfullly aimed at truth, and (c) the environment in which they're formed is epistemically congenial. And if (d) (due to the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit) the belief is held with a very high degree of firmness, the degree of warrant it enjoys is sufficient to constitute knowledge (again, assuming the belief isn't subject to undefeated defeaters).
We've now seen a sketch of Plantinga's account of warranted belief in general, warranted theistic belief, and warranted Christian belief. What to make of these accounts? I mention seven criticisms below from the literature that have real bite (for more elaboration, click on the links).
IV. Criticisms of Plantinga's Account of Warranted Belief that Have Real Bite
With respect to his accounts of warranted theistic and Christian belief: (i) His analysis of warranted Christian belief can't adequately account for the variability of belief among Christians[7]; (ii) his postulation of a sensus divinitatis in human beings is at odds with the empirical evidence regarding the demographics of theistic belief[8]; and (ironically) (iii) his account entails that the belief of most Christians has little by way of warrant[9]. But deeper problems lie with his basic account of warrant (see below).
With respect to his account of warranted belief in general: (i) His case for a theistic version of proper functionalism is undercut[10]; indeed, (ii) his theistic version of proper function entails that no beliefs have warrant[11]; (iii) his proper functionalist amendment to straight reliabilism is unmotivated[12]; and (iv) his account of warrant is subject to counterexamples[13] with respect to both to the necessity and sufficiency of the conditions he proposes.
For these reasons, Plantinga's proper functionalism fails to show that Christian or theistic belief can be warranted in the basic or non-inferential way, or even how beliefs can be warranted in general.
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[1] Warranted Christian Belief, p. 156.
[2] Ibid.
[3] (Plantinga calls his account of warranted theistic belief The A/C Model, inspired as it is by the writings of Aquinas and Calvin.) The following is a rough summary of some key points in ch. 6 of Warranted Christian Belief.
[4] Question: If all human beings are endowed with a sensus divinitatis, then why do very many people fail to form theistic belief -- at least in the basic, non-inferential way Plantinga describes? Answer: The sensus divinitatis has been damaged by the Fall of Man and human sin. More on this in the next section.
[5] The following is a very rough summary of some key points in chs. 7-9 of Warranted Christian Belief.
[6] This part is a bit tricky. For, again, according to the model, the Holy Spirit doesn't produce warranted Christian belief via the cognitive faculty of the sensus divinitatis. Rather, it produces it by acting directly on the "heart" of the person. Therefore, strictly speaking, specifically Christian belief isn't produced by a reliable cognitive faculty, but rather by a reliable process. As you might have guessed, people have raised concerns about this. See, for example, Craig and Moreland's Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (IVP, 2003), pp. 168-169; Beilby, James. Epistemology as Theology: An Evaluation of Alvin Plantinga's Religious Epistemology (Ashgate, 2005), pp.151-153.
[7] Cf. Beilby, Epistemology as Theology, pp. 153-156.
[8] Cf. Maitzen, Stephen. "Divine Hiddenness and the Demographics of Theism" (Religious Studies 42 (2006), pp. 177-191.
[9] See, for example, Beilby. "Plantinga's Model of Warranted Christian Belief", in Peter-Baker, Deane. Alvin Plantinga (Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 146; DeRose, Keith."Are Christian Beliefs Properly Basic?" APA Eastern talk, 1998. Available here; Chignell, Andrew. "Epistemology for Saints: Alvin Plantinga's Magnum Opus", Books & Culture (March/April 2002), p. 21.
[10] Cf. Wunder, Tyler. "Anti-Naturalism and Proper Function”, Religious Studies 44 (2008), pp. 209-224; Bardon, Adrian. “Reliabilism, Proper Function, and Serendipitous Malfunction”, Philosophical Investigations 30:1 (Jan. 2007), pp. 47-64; Graham, Peter. "Intelligent Design and Selective History: Two Sources of Purpose and Plan" (in Jonathan Kvanvig, ed. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 3, 2011). (A link to the paper can be found here)
[11] In addition to my formulation of the objection at the link above, see R. Douglass Geivett and Greg Jesson. "Plantinga's Externalism and the Terminus of Warrant-Based Epistemology", Philosophia Christi 3:2, pp. 329-340.
[12] Feldman, Richard. “Proper Functionalism”, Nous 27 (1993), pp. 34-50.
[13] See, for example, Greco, J. 2003. “Virtue and Luck, Epistemic and Otherwise,” Metaphilosophy 34:3, 353-6; Lehrer, Keith. "Proper Function vs. Systematic Coherence", in Kvanvig, Jonathan. Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), pp. 25-46, esp. pp. 32-33; Feldman, “Proper Functionalism”, pp. 34-50; Senor, Thomas. “A Critical Review of Alvin Plantinga’s Warranted Christian Belief”, International Philosophical Quarterly 42:3, Issue 167 (September 2002), 395-396.
Since the 60s, Alvin Plantinga has been arguing that belief in God is "properly basic". That is, like belief in material objects, the past, and other minds, belief in God can be rational in a direct, non-inferential way, wholly apart from propositional evidence and argument. This thesis constitutes the core idea of his version of so-called "Reformed Epistemology".
Plantinga's mature defense of his thesis is grounded in a proper functionalist version of epistemic externalism. Plantinga summarizes his account as follows:
"Put in a nutshell, then, a belief has warrant for a person S only if that belief is produced by cognitive faculties [e.g., perception, memory, introspection, reason, and testimony -EA] functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment that is appropriate for S's kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plan that is successfully aimed at truth."[1]
So that's what's required for a belief to have any warrant at all on Plantinga's account. But he allows that warrant admits of degrees, and he ties the degree of warrant a belief enjoys to the degree of firmness with which it is believed: "We must add, furthermore, that when a belief meets these conditions and does enjoy warrant, the degree of warrant it enjoys depends on the strength of the belief, the firmness with which S holds it."[2] Thus, for such a belief to have a degree of warrant sufficient for knowledge, it must be held with a very high degree of firmness.
Putting these points together, Plantinga's account can be summed up as follows:
I. Conditions of warrant are not met = no warrant (whether the belief is held firmly or not)
II. Conditions of warrant are met + low degree of firmness = low degree of warrant.
III. Conditions of warrant are met + high degree of firmness = high degree of warrant.
So that's Plantinga's account of warranted belief in a nutshell. But how does this account connect to his account of warranted theistic belief in particular?
II. Plantinga's Mature Account of Warranted Theistic Belief: The A/C Model[3]
Plantinga argues that it's epistemically possible (consistent with what we know or reasonably believe) that God has designed us in such a way that we are naturally endowed with a cognitive faculty -- what he (following John Calvin) calls the sensus divinitatis -- that, when functioning properly in an epistemically congenial environment, spontaneously and reliably produces true beliefs about God. So, for example, when one looks at the starry heavens, the sensus divinitatis is (when functioning properly) naturally disposed to spontaneously trigger the belief, "God made all this"; when doing something wrong, it's disposed to trigger the belief, "God disapproves of what I've done"; etc. And since such belief meets all of the conditions of warrant -- viz., (a) it's produced by a properly functioning cognitive faculty (viz., the sensus divinitatis), (b) the faculty is successfully aimed at truth, and (c) the environment in which such beliefs are formed is epistemically congenial --, Plantinga's account entails that such belief enjoys at least some measure of warrant. And if (d) such belief is held with a very high degree of firmness, the degree of warrant it enjoys is sufficient to constitute knowledge (assuming the belief isn't subject to undefeated defeaters).[4]
We've now looked at Plantinga's account of warranted belief in general and his account of warranted theistic belief in particular. It is now time to take a look at his account of warranted Christian belief.
III. Plantinga's Mature Account of Warranted Christian Belief: The Extended A/C Model[5]
Very roughly, on Plantinga’s model of warranted Christian belief, the Holy Spirit acts on the believer by repairing the sensus divinitatis from the ravages of sin, so that it naturally, spontaneously, and reliably produces true belief about God in the basic (i.e., non-inferential) way. It also repairs the person's affective equipment, so that it is no longer hostile to God and his purposes, but is rather attracted to them and delights in them. Finally, the Holy Spirit functions as an analogue to a properly functioning cognitive faculty by acting directly on the "heart" of a person to produce belief in the core truths of Christianity (what Plantinga calls the Great Things of the Gospel) when they are presented to them (if the person wills to accept the gospel message). Therefore, as with warranted theistic belief as described in Plantinga's A/C model, Christian belief formed in the way described in his Extended A/C model meets all the conditions of warrant: (a) it's produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties[6], (b) the faculties are successfullly aimed at truth, and (c) the environment in which they're formed is epistemically congenial. And if (d) (due to the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit) the belief is held with a very high degree of firmness, the degree of warrant it enjoys is sufficient to constitute knowledge (again, assuming the belief isn't subject to undefeated defeaters).
We've now seen a sketch of Plantinga's account of warranted belief in general, warranted theistic belief, and warranted Christian belief. What to make of these accounts? I mention seven criticisms below from the literature that have real bite (for more elaboration, click on the links).
IV. Criticisms of Plantinga's Account of Warranted Belief that Have Real Bite
With respect to his accounts of warranted theistic and Christian belief: (i) His analysis of warranted Christian belief can't adequately account for the variability of belief among Christians[7]; (ii) his postulation of a sensus divinitatis in human beings is at odds with the empirical evidence regarding the demographics of theistic belief[8]; and (ironically) (iii) his account entails that the belief of most Christians has little by way of warrant[9]. But deeper problems lie with his basic account of warrant (see below).
With respect to his account of warranted belief in general: (i) His case for a theistic version of proper functionalism is undercut[10]; indeed, (ii) his theistic version of proper function entails that no beliefs have warrant[11]; (iii) his proper functionalist amendment to straight reliabilism is unmotivated[12]; and (iv) his account of warrant is subject to counterexamples[13] with respect to both to the necessity and sufficiency of the conditions he proposes.
For these reasons, Plantinga's proper functionalism fails to show that Christian or theistic belief can be warranted in the basic or non-inferential way, or even how beliefs can be warranted in general.
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[1] Warranted Christian Belief, p. 156.
[2] Ibid.
[3] (Plantinga calls his account of warranted theistic belief The A/C Model, inspired as it is by the writings of Aquinas and Calvin.) The following is a rough summary of some key points in ch. 6 of Warranted Christian Belief.
[4] Question: If all human beings are endowed with a sensus divinitatis, then why do very many people fail to form theistic belief -- at least in the basic, non-inferential way Plantinga describes? Answer: The sensus divinitatis has been damaged by the Fall of Man and human sin. More on this in the next section.
[5] The following is a very rough summary of some key points in chs. 7-9 of Warranted Christian Belief.
[6] This part is a bit tricky. For, again, according to the model, the Holy Spirit doesn't produce warranted Christian belief via the cognitive faculty of the sensus divinitatis. Rather, it produces it by acting directly on the "heart" of the person. Therefore, strictly speaking, specifically Christian belief isn't produced by a reliable cognitive faculty, but rather by a reliable process. As you might have guessed, people have raised concerns about this. See, for example, Craig and Moreland's Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (IVP, 2003), pp. 168-169; Beilby, James. Epistemology as Theology: An Evaluation of Alvin Plantinga's Religious Epistemology (Ashgate, 2005), pp.151-153.
[7] Cf. Beilby, Epistemology as Theology, pp. 153-156.
[8] Cf. Maitzen, Stephen. "Divine Hiddenness and the Demographics of Theism" (Religious Studies 42 (2006), pp. 177-191.
[9] See, for example, Beilby. "Plantinga's Model of Warranted Christian Belief", in Peter-Baker, Deane. Alvin Plantinga (Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 146; DeRose, Keith."Are Christian Beliefs Properly Basic?" APA Eastern talk, 1998. Available here; Chignell, Andrew. "Epistemology for Saints: Alvin Plantinga's Magnum Opus", Books & Culture (March/April 2002), p. 21.
[10] Cf. Wunder, Tyler. "Anti-Naturalism and Proper Function”, Religious Studies 44 (2008), pp. 209-224; Bardon, Adrian. “Reliabilism, Proper Function, and Serendipitous Malfunction”, Philosophical Investigations 30:1 (Jan. 2007), pp. 47-64; Graham, Peter. "Intelligent Design and Selective History: Two Sources of Purpose and Plan" (in Jonathan Kvanvig, ed. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 3, 2011). (A link to the paper can be found here)
[11] In addition to my formulation of the objection at the link above, see R. Douglass Geivett and Greg Jesson. "Plantinga's Externalism and the Terminus of Warrant-Based Epistemology", Philosophia Christi 3:2, pp. 329-340.
[12] Feldman, Richard. “Proper Functionalism”, Nous 27 (1993), pp. 34-50.
[13] See, for example, Greco, J. 2003. “Virtue and Luck, Epistemic and Otherwise,” Metaphilosophy 34:3, 353-6; Lehrer, Keith. "Proper Function vs. Systematic Coherence", in Kvanvig, Jonathan. Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), pp. 25-46, esp. pp. 32-33; Feldman, “Proper Functionalism”, pp. 34-50; Senor, Thomas. “A Critical Review of Alvin Plantinga’s Warranted Christian Belief”, International Philosophical Quarterly 42:3, Issue 167 (September 2002), 395-396.
Omnipotence, Suicide, Counterpossibles, and Aseity
Here's a question I'm toying with: Can an omnipotent being commit suicide? It seems to me that it could, at least in one sense:
1. If God were to attempt to commit suicide, he would (or might) succeed.
Richard Swinburne seems to agree (cf. his The Coherence of Theism). But if that's right, then it seems to me that no being -- not even a theistic God -- could be inherently indestructible. But if not, then there can be no being that is inherently metaphysically necessary.
Here's a half-baked objection and reply:
Objection: A theistic god is by definition essentially morally perfect. Therefore, while God could commit suicide (in virtue of his essential omnipotence), there is no possible world in which he would do so (in virtue of his essential moral perfection). The objection therefore depends on the thesis that there are non-trivially true counterpossibles, viz., (1). But there are no non-trivially true counterpossibles; so, the objection fails.
Reply: I disagree. First, I seriously doubt that moral perfection precludes suicide. But more importantly, I think there are non-trivially true counterpossibles (e.g., (1)). But at the very least, such a criticism is controversial, as accounts of non-trivially true counterpossibles are all the rage at the moment, and many philosophers who study such things (theist and non-theist alike, fwiw) accept the existence of non-trivially true counterpossibles. As such, one would like to see a good reason to think that all such accounts are bound to fail before one accepts the objection. Pending a case, (1) seems to indicate that while there may be something intrinsic to God's nature qua morally perfect being that prevents his non-existence (via suicide), there is nothing intrinsic to God's nature qua aseity, considered in itself, that prevents his non-existence. For given God's omnipotence, it seems to follow that he can annihilate himself. But if that's right, then it casts doubt on the thesis that a substance (e.g., God), qua type of substance, could be metaphysically necessary merely in virtue of its self-existence. Or in other words, the "stuff" of God's being, so to speak, isn't inherently indestructible. And if not, it's not inherently metaphysically necessary.
1. If God were to attempt to commit suicide, he would (or might) succeed.
Richard Swinburne seems to agree (cf. his The Coherence of Theism). But if that's right, then it seems to me that no being -- not even a theistic God -- could be inherently indestructible. But if not, then there can be no being that is inherently metaphysically necessary.
Here's a half-baked objection and reply:
Objection: A theistic god is by definition essentially morally perfect. Therefore, while God could commit suicide (in virtue of his essential omnipotence), there is no possible world in which he would do so (in virtue of his essential moral perfection). The objection therefore depends on the thesis that there are non-trivially true counterpossibles, viz., (1). But there are no non-trivially true counterpossibles; so, the objection fails.
Reply: I disagree. First, I seriously doubt that moral perfection precludes suicide. But more importantly, I think there are non-trivially true counterpossibles (e.g., (1)). But at the very least, such a criticism is controversial, as accounts of non-trivially true counterpossibles are all the rage at the moment, and many philosophers who study such things (theist and non-theist alike, fwiw) accept the existence of non-trivially true counterpossibles. As such, one would like to see a good reason to think that all such accounts are bound to fail before one accepts the objection. Pending a case, (1) seems to indicate that while there may be something intrinsic to God's nature qua morally perfect being that prevents his non-existence (via suicide), there is nothing intrinsic to God's nature qua aseity, considered in itself, that prevents his non-existence. For given God's omnipotence, it seems to follow that he can annihilate himself. But if that's right, then it casts doubt on the thesis that a substance (e.g., God), qua type of substance, could be metaphysically necessary merely in virtue of its self-existence. Or in other words, the "stuff" of God's being, so to speak, isn't inherently indestructible. And if not, it's not inherently metaphysically necessary.
Wierenga on Plantinga, Defeaters, and the EAAN
In "Plantinga's 'Defeat'" (draft -- don't cite) Edward Wierenga evaluates Plantinga's analysis of defeaters. Near the end of the paper, he raises some interesting criticisms of Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism.
The Real Problem With Craig's Version of Reformed Epistemology (Slightly Revised)
In Reasonable Faith, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, and in several places online (here,
for example), William Lane Craig endorses a modified version of
Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology. According to Craig's version, the
Christian can know that Christianity is true in the basic
(i.e.,immediate, non-inferential) way by means of "the
self-authenticating witness of the Holy Spirit". As Craig summarizes his view:
. . . the
experience of the Holy Spirit is veridical and unmistakable (though not
necessarily irresistible or indubitable) for him who has it; that such a
person does not need supplementary arguments or evidence in order to
know and to know with confidence that he is in fact experiencing the
Spirit of God; that such experience does not function in this case as a
premiss in any argument from religious experience to God, but rather is
the immediate experiencing of God himself; that in certain contexts the
experience of the Holy Spirit will imply the apprehension of certain
truths of the Christian religion, such as "God exists," "I am condemned
by God," "I am reconciled to God," "Christ lives in me," and so forth;
that such an experience provides one not only with a subjective
assurance of Christianity's truth, but with objective knowledge of that
truth; and that arguments and evidence incompatible with that truth are
overwhelmed by the experience of the Holy Spirit for him who attends
fully to it.
Although
both Plantinga's and Craig's models of warrant-basic belief in
Christian theism make essential reference to the activity of the Holy
Spirit, Craig's model differs from Plantinga's in terms of the means by
which the Holy Spirit's activity generates such belief:
Plantinga's model involves crucially what is usually called the inner
witness of the Holy Spirit. In his model the Holy Spirit functions on
the analogy of a cognitive faculty, producing beliefs in us. I myself
prefer to think of the Spirit's witness either as a form of literal
testimony or else as part of the experiential circumstances which serve
to ground belief in God and the great truths of the Gospel. In either
case His deliverances are properly basic.(ibid)
Furthermore,
Craig is a bit more explicit than Plantinga with respect to whether he
thinks such Holy-Spirit-generated belief can function as an intrinsic
defeater-defeater for objections to Christianity:
Plantinga does not to my knowledge clearly commit himself to the view
that the witness of the Holy Spirit is an intrinsic defeater-defeater.
Such a thesis is independent of the model as presented. But I have
argued that the witness of the Spirit is, indeed, an intrinsic defeater
of any defeaters brought against it. For it seems to me inconceivable
that God would allow any believer to be in a position where he would be
rationally obliged to commit apostasy and renounce Christ. It seems to
me rather that in such a situation a loving God would intensify the
Spirit's witness in such a way that it becomes an intrinsic defeater of
the defeaters such a person faces. (Ibid. Emphasis mine.)
Two common complaints about William Lane Craig's "Holy Spirit epistemology"
(to borrow an expression from Michael Martin) are that (i) it's a form
of fideism and that (ii) it's an unacceptable form of dogmatism.
According to (i), Craig is asserting that one can know that Christianity
is true without evidence (or at least without sufficient evidence).
According to (ii), Craig inappropriately asserts that one can and should
believe that Christianity is true even if no arguments for God are
persuasive, and even if there is very strong evidence against
Christianity. I think that both criticisms of Craig's Holy Spirit
epistemology fail. However, I think there is a successful criticism of
it that grants the failure of (i) and (ii).
First,
though, here is why I think criticisms (i) and (ii) fail. The basic
problem is that both fail to appreciate the core idea of Craig's Holy
Spirit epistemology: Craig takes the internal testimony of the Holy
Spirit to present the truth of the Christian faith in such a way that
it's on a par with ordinary Moorean facts (or at least beliefs roughly analogous to such in terms of force, vivacity, and warrant. Hereafter I leave this qualification implicit).
That is, (following Plantinga) Craig thinks the internal testimony of the
Holy Spirit presents the truth of the Christian faith in such a way that
it's on a par with the claims that I exist, that material objects
exist, and that there are other minds besides my own. This comes out in the analogies he
mentions in his discussions of his account. Thus, he appeals to Plantinga's "purloined letter case" to illustrate
the notion of an intrinsic defeater-defeater, which can be summarized
as follows:
The Purloined Letter Case:
Suppose I have means, motive, and opportunity to steal an embarrassing
letter that was in fact stolen from the office of my department chair.
There is also very strong evidence against me (e.g., I've been known to
steal in the past; a trustworthy colleague says he saw someone who looks
like me enter the Dean's Office on the day of the incident, etc.).
However, I have a clear and vivid memory of being alone in the woods all
day on the day of the incident. In this case, I'm rational to retain my
belief that I didn't steal the letter because of my memory, even
without propositional evidence and argument that could defeat the
reasons brought against me. My memory of being alone in the woods all
day on the day of the incident is thus an intrinsic defeater-defeater of
the claim that I stole the letter.
The "I'm Alive" Case: "Pick any belief that you hold confidently and then imagine a state of affairs in which that belief would be false if that state of affairs obtained. For example, I am absolutely sure that I am alive; but if someone were to discover a grave containing my bones, then that belief would be falsified. Should I worry?"
In both cases, it's not prima facie
implausible that the corresponding beliefs (that I was alone in the
woods all day; that I'm alive, etc.) are justified or warranted in the
basic (i.e., direct, non-inferential) way. Furthermore, it's not prima facie
implausible to think that in such cases, the force, vivacity, and
warrant
such beliefs enjoy is so strong that they can function as intrinsic
defeaters of very strong evidence against them. And Craig (following
Plantinga) is arguing that Christian belief, when grounded in
attentiveness to the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, is
sufficiently relevantly similar to such cases in terms of force,
vivacity, and warrant. Therefore, since the latter can
function as intrinsic defeaters to virtually
any evidence that comes into conflict with them, so, likewise, can the
former.
Given
this sketch of Craig's variation on Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology,
we can see why criticisms (i) and (ii) fall far
short of being persuasive. First, criticism (i) is less than persuasive,
since most will not find the acceptance of ordinary Moorean facts to be a form of fideism. So if the
internal testimony of the Holy Spirit presents the truth of Christianity
in such a way that it's on a par with ordinary Moorean facts, then such
people should likewise grant that acceptance of the former is not a
form of fideism.
Criticism
(ii) is less than persuasive as well. For it's not obviously
inappropriate to accept Moorean facts even in the face of
seemingly good arguments and evidence to the contrary (cf. The Purloined Letter Case and the "I'm Alive" Case). So if the internal testimony
of the Holy Spirit presents the truth of Christianity
in such a way that it's on a par with ordinary Moorean facts, then it
might well be appropriate for such
people to likewise accept the former in the face of seemingly good
arguments to the contrary. (At least I grant this for the sake of
argument.)
Although
I find criticisms (i) and (ii) less than persuasive, I think there is a
simple yet decisive criticism of Craig's Holy Spirit epitemology: at least for the majority of Christians, the
Holy Spirit (if such there be) fails to present the truth of
Christianity in such a way that it's anywhere near being on a par with
ordinary Moorean facts. In this regard, Craig's Holy Spirit epistemology suffers from a key problem
shared by Plantinga's account of warranted Christian belief.
Therefore, as with Plantinga's account, Craig's account fails to provide an epistemically possible account of how Christian belief can be warrant-basic for the typical Christian (or at least how
Christian belief can enjoy sufficient warrant to function as an
intrinsic defeater-defeater for strong objections to it).
The Real Problem with Craig's Version of Reformed Epistemology
In Reasonable Faith, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, and in several places online (here,
for example), William Lane Craig endorses a modified version of
Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology. According to Craig's version, the
Christian can know that Christianity is true in the basic
(i.e.,immediate, non-inferential) way by means of "the
self-authenticating witness of the Holy Spirit". As Craig summarizes his view:
. . . the
experience of the Holy Spirit is veridical and unmistakable (though not
necessarily irresistible or indubitable) for him who has it; that such a
person does not need supplementary arguments or evidence in order to
know and to know with confidence that he is in fact experiencing the
Spirit of God; that such experience does not function in this case as a
premiss in any argument from religious experience to God, but rather is
the immediate experiencing of God himself; that in certain contexts the
experience of the Holy Spirit will imply the apprehension of certain
truths of the Christian religion, such as "God exists," "I am condemned
by God," "I am reconciled to God," "Christ lives in me," and so forth;
that such an experience provides one not only with a subjective
assurance of Christianity's truth, but with objective knowledge of that
truth; and that arguments and evidence incompatible with that truth are
overwhelmed by the experience of the Holy Spirit for him who attends
fully to it.
Although
both Plantinga's and Craig's models of warrant-basic belief in
Christian theism make essential reference to the activity of the Holy
Spirit, Craig's model differs from Plantinga's in terms of the means by
which the Holy Spirit's activity generates such belief:
Plantinga's model involves crucially what is usually called the inner
witness of the Holy Spirit. In his model the Holy Spirit functions on
the analogy of a cognitive faculty, producing beliefs in us. I myself
prefer to think of the Spirit's witness either as a form of literal
testimony or else as part of the experiential circumstances which serve
to ground belief in God and the great truths of the Gospel. In either
case His deliverances are properly basic.(ibid)
Furthermore,
Craig is a bit more explicit than Plantinga with respect to whether he
thinks such Holy-Spirit-generated belief can function as an intrinsic
defeater-defeater for objections to Christianity:
Plantinga does not to my knowledge clearly commit himself to the view
that the witness of the Holy Spirit is an intrinsic defeater-defeater.
Such a thesis is independent of the model as presented. But I have
argued that the witness of the Spirit is, indeed, an intrinsic defeater
of any defeaters brought against it. For it seems to me inconceivable
that God would allow any believer to be in a position where he would be
rationally obliged to commit apostasy and renounce Christ. It seems to
me rather that in such a situation a loving God would intensify the
Spirit's witness in such a way that it becomes an intrinsic defeater of
the defeaters such a person faces. (Ibid. Emphasis mine.)
Two common complaints about William Lane Craig's "Holy Spirit epistemology"
(to borrow an expression from Michael Martin) are that (i) it's a form
of fideism and that (ii) it's an unacceptable form of dogmatism.
According to (i), Craig is asserting that one can know that Christianity
is true without evidence (or at least without sufficient evidence).
According to (ii), Craig inappropriately asserts that one can and should
believe that Christianity is true even if no arguments for God are
persuasive, and even if there is very strong evidence against
Christianity. I think that both criticisms of Craig's Holy Spirit
epistemology fail. However, I think there is a successful criticism of
it that grants the failure of (i) and (ii).
First,
though, here is why I think criticisms (i) and (ii) fail. The basic
problem is that both fail to appreciate the core idea of Craig's Holy
Spirit epistemology: Craig takes the internal testimony of the Holy
Spirit to present the truth of the Christian faith in such a way that
it's on a par with ordinary Moorean facts (or at least beliefs roughly analogous to such in terms of force, vivacity, and warrant. Hereafter I leave this qualification implicit).
That is, (following Plantinga) Craig thinks the internal testimony of the
Holy Spirit presents the truth of the Christian faith in such a way that
it's on a par with the claims that I exist, that material objects
exist, and that there are other minds besides my own. This comes out in the analogies he
mentions in his discussions of his account. Thus, he appeals to Plantinga's "purloined letter case" to illustrate
the notion of an intrinsic defeater-defeater, which can be summarized
as follows:
The Purloined Letter Case:
Suppose I have means, motive, and opportunity to steal an embarrassing
letter that was in fact stolen from the office of my department chair.
There is also very strong evidence against me (e.g., I've been known to
steal in the past; a trustworthy colleague says he saw someone who looks
like me enter the Dean's Office on the day of the incident, etc.).
However, I have a clear and vivid memory of being alone in the woods all
day on the day of the incident. In this case, I'm rational to retain my
belief that I didn't steal the letter because of my memory, even
without propositional evidence and argument that could defeat the
reasons brought against me; My belief that I was alone in the woods all
day on the day of the incident is thus an intrinsic defeater-defeater of
the claim that I stole the letter.
The "I'm Alive" Case: "Pick any belief that you hold confidently and then imagine a state of affairs in which that belief would be false if that state of affairs obtained. For example, I am absolutely sure that I am alive; but if someone were to discover a grave containing my bones, then that belief would be falsified. Should I worry?"
In both cases, it's not prima facie
implausible that the corresponding beliefs (that I was alone in the
woods all day; that I'm alive, etc.) are justified or warranted in the
basic (i.e., direct, non-inferential) way. Furthermore, it's not prima facie
implausible to think that in such cases, the force, vivacity, and warrant
such beliefs enjoy is so strong that they can function as intrinsic defeaters of very strong evidence against them. And Craig (following
Plantinga) is arguing that Christian belief, when grounded in
attentiveness to the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, is
sufficiently relevantly similar to such cases in terms of force, vivacity, and warrant. Therefore, since the latter can
function as intrinsic defeaters to virtually
any evidence that comes into conflict with them, so, likewise, can the
former.
Given
this sketch of Craig's variation on Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology,
we can see why criticisms (i) and (ii) fall far
short of being persuasive. First, criticism (i) is less than persuasive,
since most will not find the acceptance of ordinary Moorean facts to be a form of fideism. So if the
internal testimony of the Holy Spirit presents the truth of Christianity
in such a way that it's on a par with ordinary Moorean facts, then such
people should likewise grant that acceptance of the former is not a
form of fideism.
Criticism
(ii) is less than persuasive as well. For it's not obviously
inappropriate to accept Moorean facts even in the face of
seemingly good arguments to the contrary. So if the internal testimony
of the Holy Spirit presents the truth of Christianity
in such a way that it's on a par with ordinary Moorean facts, then it
might well be appropriate for such
people to likewise accept the former in the face of seemingly good
arguments to the contrary. (At least I grant this for the sake of
argument.)
Although
I find criticisms (i) and (ii) less than persuasive, I think there is a
simple yet decisive criticism of Craig's Holy Spirit epitemology: at least for the majority of Christians, the
Holy Spirit (if such there be) fails to present the truth of
Christianity in such a way that it's anywhere near being on a par with
ordinary Moorean facts. In this regard, Craig's Holy Spirit epistemology suffers from a key problem
shared by Plantinga's account of warranted-basic Christian belief.
Therefore, as with Plantinga's account, Craig's account fails to show
how Christian belief can be warrant-basic -- at least in the sense that
Christian belief enjoys sufficient warrant to function as an
intrinsic defeater-defeater for strong objections to Christian theism.
The Secular Outpost: Christian Philosopher Michael Sudduth Converts to ...
The Secular Outpost: Christian Philosopher Michael Sudduth Converts to ...: Bill Vallicella has posted a long letter from Sudduth on his blog, describing what has happened and how. This is not the kind of thing one ...
Post Roundup: Criticisms of Plantinga's Argument from Proper Functionalism to Theism
-Wunder, Tyler. "Anti-Naturalism and Proper Function”, Religious Studies 44 (2008), pp. 209-224. (Notes here.)
-Bardon, Adrian. “Reliabilism, Proper Function, and Serendipitous Malfunction”, Philosophical Investigations 30:1 (Jan. 2007), pp. 47-64. (Notes here.)
-Graham, Peter. "Intelligent Design and Selective History: Two Sources of Purpose and Plan" (in Jonathan Kvanvig, ed. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 3, 2011). (A link to the paper can be found here)
-Bardon, Adrian. “Reliabilism, Proper Function, and Serendipitous Malfunction”, Philosophical Investigations 30:1 (Jan. 2007), pp. 47-64. (Notes here.)
-Graham, Peter. "Intelligent Design and Selective History: Two Sources of Purpose and Plan" (in Jonathan Kvanvig, ed. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 3, 2011). (A link to the paper can be found here)
Plantinga's Proper Functionalism Unmotivated
Plantinga argues that internalist accounts of warrant are inherently inadequate, and thus that some form of externalism must be correct. However, he also argues that standard versions of externalism -- e.g. Goldmanian reliabilism -- are inadequate as well, on the grounds that they can't account for the fact that a belief can't be warranted if it's formed by a mechanism or process that is only accidentally reliable:
"Suppose I am struck by a burst of cosmic rays, resulting in the following unfortunate malfunction. Whenever I hear the word 'prime' in any context, I form a belief, with respect to a randomly chosen natural number less than 100,000, that it is not prime. So you say "Pacific Palisades is prime residential area" or "Prime ribs is my favorite"...; I form a belief, with respect to a randomly selected natural number between 1 and 100,000 that it is not prime. The process or mechanism in question is indeed reliable (given the vast preponderance of non-primes...) but my belief -- that, say, 41 is not prime -- has little or no positive epistemic status. The problem isn't simply that the belief is false; the same goes for my (true) belief that 631 is not prime, if it is formed in this fashion. So reliable belief formation is not sufficient for positive epistemic status." (Warrant: The Current Debate (OUP, 1993), p. 210.).
Plantinga then goes on to argue that an externalist about warrant can avoid the problem of accidental reliability if they go proper functionalist, as a properly functioning truth-aimed cognitive process or faculty precludes accidental reliability. Or so argues Plantinga.
However, Richard Feldman (“Proper Functionalism,” Nous 27 (1993), pp. 34-50) has constructed a variation on Plantinga's "primes" counterexample above to show that the problem of reliably-formed-yet-unwarranted beliefs arises for Plantinga's proper functionalist version of externalism as well. Thus, Feldman changes the counterexample so that the cause of the beliefs about primes is not a burst of cosmic rays, but rather a cognitive faculty formed by an intelligent designer who designs the person to naturally and spontaneously form such beliefs about prime numbers whenever they hear the word 'prime'. In such a case, all of Plantinga's conditions of warrant are satisfied: according to the thought experiment, we have a cognitive faculty that, when functioning properly, reliably produces sufficiently firmly-held true beliefs when in epistemically congenial environments. However, such beliefs have little by way of warrant.
Therefore, the conditions laid out in Plantinga's proper functionalism are not sufficient for warrant. And since his proper functionalist amendment to straight reliabilist externalism fails to rule out the problem cases he raises for the latter, the former appears to be unmotivated.
"Suppose I am struck by a burst of cosmic rays, resulting in the following unfortunate malfunction. Whenever I hear the word 'prime' in any context, I form a belief, with respect to a randomly chosen natural number less than 100,000, that it is not prime. So you say "Pacific Palisades is prime residential area" or "Prime ribs is my favorite"...; I form a belief, with respect to a randomly selected natural number between 1 and 100,000 that it is not prime. The process or mechanism in question is indeed reliable (given the vast preponderance of non-primes...) but my belief -- that, say, 41 is not prime -- has little or no positive epistemic status. The problem isn't simply that the belief is false; the same goes for my (true) belief that 631 is not prime, if it is formed in this fashion. So reliable belief formation is not sufficient for positive epistemic status." (Warrant: The Current Debate (OUP, 1993), p. 210.).
Plantinga then goes on to argue that an externalist about warrant can avoid the problem of accidental reliability if they go proper functionalist, as a properly functioning truth-aimed cognitive process or faculty precludes accidental reliability. Or so argues Plantinga.
However, Richard Feldman (“Proper Functionalism,” Nous 27 (1993), pp. 34-50) has constructed a variation on Plantinga's "primes" counterexample above to show that the problem of reliably-formed-yet-unwarranted beliefs arises for Plantinga's proper functionalist version of externalism as well. Thus, Feldman changes the counterexample so that the cause of the beliefs about primes is not a burst of cosmic rays, but rather a cognitive faculty formed by an intelligent designer who designs the person to naturally and spontaneously form such beliefs about prime numbers whenever they hear the word 'prime'. In such a case, all of Plantinga's conditions of warrant are satisfied: according to the thought experiment, we have a cognitive faculty that, when functioning properly, reliably produces sufficiently firmly-held true beliefs when in epistemically congenial environments. However, such beliefs have little by way of warrant.
Therefore, the conditions laid out in Plantinga's proper functionalism are not sufficient for warrant. And since his proper functionalist amendment to straight reliabilist externalism fails to rule out the problem cases he raises for the latter, the former appears to be unmotivated.
New Issue of Faith & Philosophy
As indicated in the RSS feed on the right (scroll down a bit), Faith & Philosophy 28:4 is now out. Here is a link to the full ToC.
de Ridder's Reply to Baldwin and Thune
In "Religious Exclusivism Unlimited" (Religious Studies 47:4 (2011)), Jeroen de Ridder (VU University, Amsterdam) replies to Baldwin and Thune's recent critique of Plantinga's account of warrant-basic Christian belief. Here is the link.
Quote(s) for the Day
“I, however, have not been blessed with Plantinga faith. I believe that I
have been blessed enough to have had experiences that are in some ways
like those Plantinga describes, but for me, the most I have received
directly from the Holy Spirit have been gentle nudges toward belief,
certainly nothing even approaching the firm and certain conviction of
which Plantinga speaks. And if the people I’ve talked to are to be
believed — and they are — there are many who would be thrilled to
receive faith as Plantinga describes it, but who have not, despite
Plantinga’s claim that faith — presumably as he defines it, as a firm
and certain conviction — “is given to anyone who is willing to accept
it”
-Keith DeRose, "Are Christian Beliefs Properly Basic?" APA Eastern talk, 1998. Available here.
"Plantinga's theological minimalism can be seen in the lack of applicability of his Extended A/C model to the faith of typical Christians. While he speaks a great deal about the recipients of faith, those who have had their religious affections cured and who have been given the divine gift of firm and certain belief in the great things of the gospel, it is far from clear whether there are any people whose faith looks like that in Plantinga's model . . .While it is undoubtedly easier to describe and defend the warrant of "epistemological saints", because the Extended A/C model describes the ideal, fully formed faith of paradigmatic believers rather than the usual, in-process faith of typical believers, Plantinga's attempt to use the Extended A/C model to provide a good way for Christians (including, I assume, typical Christians) to think about the epistemology of Christian belief is in jeopardy. Since the faith of typical believers looks very different from that described in Plantinga's model, they have a choice between questioning the warrant of their belief about God or rejecting Plantinga's model as a good explanation of the warrant of their religious beliefs. Since Plantinga himself argues that the beliefs of "most Christians" are "both externally rational and warranted", the most reasonable option for the typical Christian is the latter."
-James K. Beilby, "Plantinga's Model of Warranted Christian Belief", in Peter-Baker, Deane. Alvin Plantinga (Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 146.
(Andrew Chignell makes the same point in "Epistemology for Saints: Alvin Plantinga's Magnum Opus", Books & Culture, March/April 2002, p. 21)
The passages above underscore the point I'm getting at here: Plantinga's model of warranted belief states that a belief enjoys at least some degree of warrant if (and only if) it's produced by properly functioning, truth-aimed cognitive faculties operating in a congenial epistemic environment. However, it also states that the degree of warrant such a belief enjoys is a function of the degree of firmness or conviction with which it's held. But if so, then Plantinga's model entails if one's faith falls far short of "a firm and certain conviction", then it has little by way of warrant. And the worry is that the latter is the predicament of perhaps most Christians, in which case Plantinga's model entails that their beliefs have little by way of warrant (at least if they're not based on propositional evidence and argument).
-Keith DeRose, "Are Christian Beliefs Properly Basic?" APA Eastern talk, 1998. Available here.
"Plantinga's theological minimalism can be seen in the lack of applicability of his Extended A/C model to the faith of typical Christians. While he speaks a great deal about the recipients of faith, those who have had their religious affections cured and who have been given the divine gift of firm and certain belief in the great things of the gospel, it is far from clear whether there are any people whose faith looks like that in Plantinga's model . . .While it is undoubtedly easier to describe and defend the warrant of "epistemological saints", because the Extended A/C model describes the ideal, fully formed faith of paradigmatic believers rather than the usual, in-process faith of typical believers, Plantinga's attempt to use the Extended A/C model to provide a good way for Christians (including, I assume, typical Christians) to think about the epistemology of Christian belief is in jeopardy. Since the faith of typical believers looks very different from that described in Plantinga's model, they have a choice between questioning the warrant of their belief about God or rejecting Plantinga's model as a good explanation of the warrant of their religious beliefs. Since Plantinga himself argues that the beliefs of "most Christians" are "both externally rational and warranted", the most reasonable option for the typical Christian is the latter."
-James K. Beilby, "Plantinga's Model of Warranted Christian Belief", in Peter-Baker, Deane. Alvin Plantinga (Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 146.
(Andrew Chignell makes the same point in "Epistemology for Saints: Alvin Plantinga's Magnum Opus", Books & Culture, March/April 2002, p. 21)
The passages above underscore the point I'm getting at here: Plantinga's model of warranted belief states that a belief enjoys at least some degree of warrant if (and only if) it's produced by properly functioning, truth-aimed cognitive faculties operating in a congenial epistemic environment. However, it also states that the degree of warrant such a belief enjoys is a function of the degree of firmness or conviction with which it's held. But if so, then Plantinga's model entails if one's faith falls far short of "a firm and certain conviction", then it has little by way of warrant. And the worry is that the latter is the predicament of perhaps most Christians, in which case Plantinga's model entails that their beliefs have little by way of warrant (at least if they're not based on propositional evidence and argument).
Manson on the "Why Design?" Question
Manson, Neil A. "The "Why Design?" Question", in Nagasawa, Yujin and Erick Wielenberg (eds.) New Waves in Philosophy of Religion (Ashgate 2008).
The Secular Outpost: The Parsons Test of Biblical Literalism
The Secular Outpost: The Parsons Test of Biblical Literalism: A number of posts and commentaries recently have argued that even conservative Christian apologists have now largely abandoned the old-fashi...
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