Graham's New Critique of Plantinga's Argument from Proper Function

Peter Graham recently offered an excellent critique of Plantinga's argument from proper function in his "Intelligent Design and Selective History: Two Sources of Purpose and Plan" (in Jonathan Kvanvig, ed. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 3, 2011). (On previous occasions, we've noted critiques of the argument from Adrian Bardon and Tyler Wunder).

Update: Graham is a naturalistic proper functionalist about epistemic warrant, and his work on the nature of functions is ongoing. Cf. his PhilPapers page for more of his work on naturalistic proper functionalism generally, and on the nature of functions. Here's an important recent paper on the latter..

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A Quick Objection to the Modal Ontological Argument

(From an old Facebook post of mine back in 2018) Assume Platonism about properties, propositions, and possible worlds. Such is the natural b...