We noted earlier that Helen de Cruz conducted a survey to determine how many people find the arguments of natural theology persuasive. De Cruz and others are now discussing (at Prosblogion and at New APPs) an interesting piece of information gleaned from the survey: most philosophers of religion are theists. The discussion focuses on whether (as in other areas) this fact should lead dissenting experts in the field to revise their confidence downward, and whether non-experts should defer to the consensus. The main reply is that there is reason to suspect that the data at issue is to be explained in terms of the self-selection effect, motivated reasoning, and confirmation bias in the evaluation of the arguments of natural theology.
As noted on another occasion, James Kraft (Huston-Tillotson University) is one of the pioneers of applying insights from the epistemology of disagreement literature to the phenomenon of reasonable religious disagreement. He now has a book forthcoming on the topic: The Epistemology of Religious Disagreement: A Better Understanding (Palgrave Macmillan), which is slated to come out in May. Here is the link.
In "The Probability of the Resurrection of Jesus" (Philosophia Christi (forthcoming)), Richard Swinburne provides a summary of his book-length defense of Jesus' resurrection. The pre-print version of the article can be found here (scroll down to the bottom for the link).
...by William Hasker, here. The article mainly covers arguments and evidence for and against the possibility of survival after bodily death.
The article struck me as a bit too polemical for an SEP entry. Also, I'm not up to speed on the literature on this topic, but glancing at the bibliography for the entry, I can't help thinking that it can't be sufficiently robust and representative. Am I right about this?
Lara Buchak (UC Berkeley) offers a qualified defense of an affirmative answer in, well, "Can It Be Rational to Have Faith?", Chapter 12 of Probability in the Philosophy of Religion, eds. Jake
Chandler and Victoria S. Harrison. Oxford University Press. Forthcoming.