Tuesday, July 26, 2016

Contrarian Philosophy of Religion Assertion Tuesday

On classical theism, purpose is built into God's nature without a prior cause, in which case classical theism entails the existence of purpose that God cannot create at the metaphysical ground floor.

Sunday, July 24, 2016

The Summer 2016 Issue of the European Journal for Philosophy of Religion...

...is out, and looks to be a great read. It contains a book symposium on Metz'  Meaning in Life, as well as articles on a host of other topics.

New Issue of Philo

Here. The table of contents is below to whet your appetite.

Dan Flores, Correlations and Conclusions: Neuroscience and the Belief in God
Mark Glouberman, ‘O God, O Montreal!’: Secularity and Turbo-Charged Humanism

Mark Glouberman, ‘O God, O Montreal!’: Secularity and Turbo-Charged Humanism

Tony Houston, Renaissance Humanism: Obscurantist Impieties

R. Zachary Manis, The Problem of Epistemic Luck for Naturalists

Steve Petersen, A Normative Yet Coherent Naturalism

CP Ruloff, Against Mind-Dependence

Lawrence Torcello, On the Virtues of Inhospitality: Toward an Ethics of Public Reason and Critical Engagement

Sunday, July 10, 2016

Fantastic Recent, New, and Forthcoming Books by Timpe et al.

Timpe, Kevin and Ben Arbour (eds.). Philosophical Essays Against Open Theism (Routledge, forthcoming).

Timpe, Kevin and Daniel Speak (eds.). Free Will and Theism: Connections, Contingencies, and Concerns (OUP, 2016).

Timpe, Kevin. Free Will in Philosophical Theology (Bloomsbury, 2014).

Thursday, June 30, 2016

Wielenberg's New Paper on Plantinga's Free Will Defense

Wielenberg, Erik. "Plantingian theism and the free-will defense", Religious Studies 52:2 (forthcoming). 

Here's the abstract:
I advance a challenge to the coherence of Alvin Plantinga's brand of theism that focuses on Plantinga's celebrated free-will defence. This challenge draws on (but goes beyond) some ideas advanced by Wes Morriston. The central claim of my challenge is that Plantinga's free-will defence, together with certain claims that are plausible and/or to which Plantinga is committed, both requires and rules out the claim that it is possible that God is capable of engaging in moral goodness. I then critically evaluate an interesting strategy for responding to my challenge inspired by some recent work by Kevin Timpe, arguing that the response ultimately fails. The upshot of the article is that Plantinga's brand of theism is internally inconsistent; furthermore, because the claims that are in tension with the free-will defence are ones that many theists are likely to find attractive, many theists are not able to appeal to Plantinga's free-will defence in responding to the logical problem of evil.

Sunday, May 01, 2016

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