Daniel Johnson reviews the book for NDPR.
In keeping with recent posts on non-standard arguments against theism, I'll here briefly sketch another proposed argument in that vein: the argument from Mandevillian intelligence. Roughly, 'Mandevillian intelligence' denotes intellectual vices of individuals that, when taken collectively (i.e., among a group of similar individuals), result in positive epistemic outcomes. An example is intellectual stubbornness. Such a trait is clearly vicious in an individual, but when a group of intellectually stubborn individuals interact through (say) philosophical argumentation, it leads to the investigation of vast swathes of epistemic space, which is clearly a good epistemic outcome.
Mandevillian intelligence is prima facie surprising on theism, as individual intellectual vices seem bad, and something God would want us to eliminate in ourselves. By contrast, Mandevillian intelligence is unsurprising on naturalism, as blind evolutionary forces don't "care" about intellectual vice, but rather about whatever happens to help individuals and groups survive and reproduce. And clearly such vices can contribute to achieve such an end, as in the above case. Therefore, Mandevillian intelligence provides at least some evidence for naturalism vis-a-vis theism.
at May 13, 2019
Daniel Johnson reviews the book for NDPR .
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