Notes on Morriston's "Creation Ex Nihilo and the Big Bang"

Notes on Morriston’s “Creation Ex Nihilo and the Big Bang”, Philo 5:1 (2002), pp. 23-33.

0. Introduction (fill in later)

1. Craig’s First Argument: Infinite Density = Nothing
1.1 According to the Big Bang theory, the universe began with a great explosion from an infinitely dense point-particle.
1.2 There can be no object having infinite density.
1.3 So, “infinite density” is synonymous with “nothing”.
1.4 Therefore, the Big Bang theory requires that the universe had a beginning and was created out of nothing.

2. Criticisms of Craig’s First Argument
2.1 First, an infinitely dense point-universe is not nothing
2.1.1 the initial singularity is not nothing
2.1.2.1 Nothingness can’t begin expanding, since there is nothing there to expand. By contrast, the “point-universe” began expanding.
2.1.2.2 Even if the point-universe lacks spatial and temporal spread, it yet has other properties, e.g., being a point, being infinitely dense, being capable of expanding, etc.
2.2 Second, 'infinitely dense entity' is not synonymous with 'nothing'
2.2.1 Compare: (a) There can be no round squares; therefore, (b) 'round square'; is synonymous with 'nothing'. 
2.2.2 In general, from the fact that there can be no entity E, it doesn’t follow that ‘E’ is synonymous with ‘nothing’.
2.2.3 Therefore, even if there can be no infinitely dense point-universe, it doesn’t follow that ‘infinitely dense point-universe' is synonymous with ‘nothing’
2.3 Third, if nothing can be infinitely dense, then the universe was never infinitely dense
2.3.1 But if so, then premise 1 is false as stated
2.3.3 Craig’s argument is therefore subject to a dilemma:
2.3.1.1 Either we change Craig’s description of what the Big Bang theory says, so that it doesn’t involve a state of infinite density, or we don’t
2.3.1.2 if we do, then the argument loses its basis for inferring that the universe was created out of nothing
2.3.1.3 If we don’t, then the criticism above (viz., that if (2) is true, then (1) is false) goes through
2.3.1.4 either way, the argument is unsound
2.4 Fourth, few Big Bang cosmologists today think the universe was ever infinitely dense and point-sized
2.4.1 It’s true that, on the standard Big Bang model, the geometry of the universe’s expansion, when traced backward in time, continually decreases toward a limit of a diameter of zero
2.4.2 However, the limit diameter zero is thought of as an ideal, and not an actual, limit
2.4.3 Furthermore, we have no theory that allows us to infer the universe’s behavior  as we approach this limit
2.4.3.1 Relativity theory breaks down prior to Planck time (i.e., 10-43seconds), and quantum effects become dominant prior to that point
2.4.3.2 we need a quantum theory of gravity (which we don’t yet have) to accurately infer what happened prior to Planck time
2.4.3.3 Until then, any claim about the earliest stage of our universe’s history is “sheer speculation”

3. Craig’s Second Argument: No Time Prior to the Singularity Entails Creation Ex Nihilo
3.1 The initial singularity exists at the earliest point of space-time.
3.2 There is no time prior to the earliest point of space-time.
3.3 Therefore, there was nothing temporally prior to the initial singularity.
3.4 So, the initial singularity must have come into existence out of nothing.
3.5 If, therefore, the initial singularity was created, it must have been created out of nothing

4. Criticisms of Craig’s Second Argument
4.1 First, the Big Bang theory doesn’t entail that there was no time “prior” the singularity
4.1.1 Craig himself has argued that it’s possible that there is a more fundamental “metaphysical time” that can exist independently of the physical time of our universe.
4.1.2 Craig’s thought experiment: Suppose God led up to creation by counting “1, 2, 3, … fiat lux!” 
4.1.3 In this scenario, time is elapsing, and yet no physical objects exist.  Its moments are individuated by the succession of contents in God’s mind.
4.1.4 Craig thinks this thought experiment shows that a time “prior” to physical time is metaphysically possible.
4.1.5 In fact, given Craig’s theism, he thinks this metaphysical time is actual
4.1.6 According to Craig, metaphysical time is absolute, tensed, and dynamic
4.1.7 But if so, then Craig’s view of metaphysical time entails the metaphysical possibility of time prior to the Big Bang singularity
4.1.8 The epistemic possibility of metaphysical time prior to the singularity is thus an undercutting defeater for premise 2
4.2 Second, there being nothing temporally prior to the singularity doesn’t entail there being nothing causally or ontologically prior to the singularity
4.2.1 What follows from (3) is not (4), but rather the weaker claim that the universe didn’t come from something that existed  at an earlier time.  It's therefore compatible with the possibility of the universe created from timeless stuff
4.2.2 To close the logical gap between (3) and (4), then, we need another premise, viz.,
(3 ½) If there was nothing temporally prior to the initial singularity, then it must have come into existence out of nothing.
4.2.2 But it’s not clear that (3 ½) is true
4.2.2.1 Craig is already committed to saying that, ontologically prior to the singularity, God exists timelessly
4.2.2.2 It’s therefore not clear what principled grounds he could have to rule out the epistemic possibility that, causally and/or ontologically prior to the singularity, other things besides God exist timelessly (e.g., a timeless stuff from which the universe was made)
4.2.2.3 And if that’s right, it’s not clear how Craig can rule out the epistemic possibility that God created the universe out of a timeless stuff
4.2.2.4 Therefore, even if there was no time prior to the singularity, it doesn’t follow that God created the universe out of nothing
4.2.3 Anticipated reply: Craig thinks he can rule out the epistemic possibility of timeless stuff because he thinks: (a) the only possible stuff from which God could make the universe is matter/energy; (b) timeless stuff is quiescent; and (c) matter/energy is never quiescent.
4.2.4 Rejoinder: it’s not clear that (a) is true: it’s epistemically possible that God created the universe out of some timeless stuff that’s distinct from matter/energy
4.2.5 Third, the grounds for a requirement of a timeless efficient cause of the universe is on an epistemic par with the grounds for a requirement of a timeless material cause
4.2.5.1 The evidence for both causal principles is the same
4.2.5.1.1 Both are intuitive
4.2.5.1.2 Both enjoy strong empirical confirmation [N.B., actually, the case for material causes is stronger, given apparent counterexamples to the need for efficient causes in quantum mechanical phenomena. --EA]
4.2.5.2 The theoretical costs of both is the same
4.2.5.2.1 We’ve never observed timeless stuff, but we’ve never observed a timeless person, either. 
4.2.5.2.2 It’s odd to think that the material cause of the universe was timeless sans creation, and then entered time with its creation, but then Craig thinks the same is true of the efficient cause of the universe: God is timeless sans creation, but entered time at the moment of creation
4.2.5.3 Given epistemic parity, we have a dilemma: Either our commonsense intuitions about ordinary cases of causation can reasonably applied to the beginning of the universe or they can’t. If they can, then creation of the universe out of timeless stuff is more plausible than creation ex nihilo. If they can’t, then we can’t draw any conclusion whatever about the existence and nature of the cause of the universe. Either way, Craig’s argument fails


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