Rollins, Joshua. "Beliefs and Testimony as Social Evidence: Epistemic Egoism,Epistemic Universalism, and Common Consent Arguments", Philosophy Compass 10:1 (February 2015), pp. 78-90.
...and a nice proposal for the way forward for a moral realist's reply: Vavova, Katia. "Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism", Philosophy Compass 10:2 (February 2015), 104-116. For what it's worth, I'm inclined to accept something like Street's own reply: a kind of constructivism. I'm still open to something like Wielenberg's non-natural moral realism, though.
Tucker, Chris. "Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization (in the Philosophy of Religion)", Philosophy & Phenomenological Research (forthcoming).
Here's the abstract:
In replying to certain objections to the existence of God, Robert Adams, Bruce Langtry, and Peter van Inwagen assume that God can appropriately choose a suboptimal world, a world less good than some other world God could have chosen. A number of philosophers, such as Michael Slote and Klaas Kraay, claim that these theistic replies are therefore committed to the claim that satisficing can be appropriate. Kraay argues that this commitment is a significant liability. I argue, however, that the relevant defenses of theism are committed to the appropriateness of, not satisficing, but motivated submaximization. When one submaximizes with motivation, one aims at the optimum but accepts the good enough because of a countervailing consideration. When one satisfices, one aims at the good enough and chooses the good enough because it realizes her aim at the good enough. While commitment to the appropriateness of satisficing may be a significant liability, commitment to the appropriateness of motivated submaximization is not.
...is now out. It's a book symposium on Linda Zagzebski's Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief.
McBrayer, Justin. "The Wager Renewed: Believing in God is Good for You", Science, Religion, and Culture 1 (3):130 (2014). Here's the abstract:
Not all of our reasons for belief are epistemic in nature. Some of our reasons for belief are prudential in the sense that believing a certain thing advances our personal goals. When it comes to belief in God, the most famous formulation of a prudential reason for belief is Pascal’s Wager. And although Pascal’s Wager fails, its failure is instructive. Pascal’s Wager fails because it relies on unjustified assumptions about what happens in the afterlife to those who believe in God verses those who do not. A renewed wager can avoid this difficulty by relying solely on well-documented differences between those who believe in God verses those who do not. Social scientists have put together an impressive set of data that shows that theists do better in terms of happiness, health, longevity, inter- personal relationships, and charitable giving. Hence, most people have a strong reason to believe in God regardless of the evidence.
Daniel Johnson reviews the book for NDPR .
0. Introduction 0.1 Mackie argues that the problem of evil proves that either no god exists, or at least that the god of Orthodox Judaism, ...
Notes on Swinburne’s “Why God Allows Evil” 1. The kinds of goods a theistic god would provide: deeper goods than just “thrills of pleasure ...
Justin McBrayer (Fort Lewis College) is an excellent young philosopher. He's also an up-and-comer in philosophy of religion, with speci...