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2011 Bellingham Lectures in Philosophy of Religion: Plantinga on God and Evolution

In 2009, Western Washington University began the annual Bellingham Lectures in Philosophy of Religion. Alvin Plantinga is the guest lecturer for 2011. Plantinga gave the first of his two lectures yesterday, which appears to cover the core argument of his new book, Where the Conflict Really Lies. Here is a link to a video of the lecture, as well as downloadable lecture notes. He'll give the second and final lecture tomorrow night. The notes for tomorrow's lecture are already up (here).

P.S., If you don't know already, Western Washington University is home to a number of people who do excellent work in philosophy of religion: Daniel Howard-Snyder, Frances Howard-Snyder, Hud Hudson, and Dennis Whitcomb. In addition, while neither appear to have publications in philosophy of religion, Ryan Wasserman and Ned Markosian are excellent philosophers who dabble in philosophy of religion. Lots of Christians aspiring to become professional philosophers go through the undergraduate program there.


Garren said…
From the lecture notes:

"Clearly there are questions of justice here—would it be just to teach in public schools positions that go contrary to the religious beliefs of most of those who pay for those schools?"

...where the position in question is teaching evolution as an 'unguided' process.

But couldn't the same objection be made to teaching the water cycle as a natural process to students whose teachers believe God directs the rain?

Furthermore, what does 'justice' have to do with pandering to the people who pay for education?

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