Yet Another Version of the Problem of Creation Ex Nihilo

There is both strong intuitive and abductive empirical support for the principle that all made things and stuffs are made from other things or stuffs. Given this, any comprehensive metaphysical theory will incur a strong theoretical cost by including a thesis that falls crosswise of the principle, such as the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. In particular, the cost will significantly reduce such a theory's prior probability, putting it at a severe disadvantage to comprehensive metaphysical theories that can explain all the same data, and yet don't include the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. Examples of theories of the latter sort include panentheism and demiurgism. Given that (for example) panentheism and demiurgism can explain roughly all the same data as theism, prima facie, theism can never catch up to panentheism and demiurgism with  respect to posterior probability, given the strong drag on its prior probability incurred by its inclusion of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. Therefore, theism is a significantly less probable comprehensive metaphysical theory than either panentheism or demiurgism.