The Argument from Autonomy Against Theism

Rough draft:

On another occasion, we noted Kahane's excellent (2011) paper, "Should We Want God to Exist?" (PPR 82(3): 674-696). The paper suggests a data point that can be transformed into an argument against the hypothesis of classical theism. 

The sort of argument I have in mind can be gleaned from the following passages:

“Imagine that instead of growing up to become an independent adult, you would forever remain a child, forever under the protection of wise and loving parents. Or imagine living in a land ruled by a benevolent monarch who, although keeping constant watch over everything his subjects do, grants them extensive liberties. These counterfactual worlds would be better, even much better, in various respects. Yet few of us, I believe, would prefer them to the way things actually are, however imperfect. The anti-theist believes we should make a similar choice.”

“The thought is that in a world where complete privacy is impossible, where one is subordinated to a superior being, certain kinds of life plans, aspirations, and projects cannot make sense. I suspect that certain actual life plans, aspirations, and projects that revolve around these values do not make sense, if the world is like that. (Compare: many life plans are incompatible with childhood. If it becomes clear that, contrary to appearance, there is no escape from childhood, then many lives would become absurd and pointless. And discovering that this childhood is eternal would make things worse, not better. As Williams reminds us, immortality is useless if one’s life has no meaning.) Theists sometimes claim that if God does not exist, life has no meaning. I am now suggesting that if God does exist, the life of at least some would lose its meaning. 

Of course this outcome wouldn’t be averted if God were to hide Himself—say if He were to hide Himself only from those who would, in this way, be most grievously hurt by His existence. This wouldn’t help. It would only give these persons the illusion that certain values can be realized—that their lives have meaning.”

It would take much more work to properly develop and defend the argument, but briefly, the way I have in mind to use his core point here as evidence against theism is as follows. If autonomy is required for the flourishing of properly functioning adult humans, then being a subordinate who lacks privacy to even their own thoughts is contrary to the flourishing of mature, properly functioning adult humans, in which case beings made for autonomy of this sort is prima facie surprising on theism. For one would expect God to create beings that are capable of flourishing within his universe.

By contrast, the existence of beings with a prima facie rational and fitting desire for autonomy of this sort is not surprising on naturalism, since on that hypothesis, there is no such being to which we are subordinate. Rather, evolution selected for a preference structure that desires this sort of autonomy -- an autonomy that's compatible with interdependence with similar creatures, but which favors using one's own judgement for navigating our way through life when (e.g.) the wisdom of others seems wrong. Beings with a natural desire or preference of this sort would seem to have an evolutionary advantage over those that do not, since the wisdom of the group might go wrong in ways that are contrary to their survival and reproduction. Therefore, the existence of a prima facie rational and fitting preference for this kind of autonomy provides at least some confirming evidence for naturalism vis-a-vis theism.