If you would please point me to (at least, but hopefully more than) one post on your blog that doesn't ultimately defend conservative views about free markets and the role of government with respect to free markets, I'd greatly appreciate it.
--------------  that is, when the topic is economics, and not, say, philosophical theology.  A slew of recent posts at EPS have been based exclusively on interviews of members of economic libertarian (think Ayn Rand) think tanks -- mainly the Acton Institute and the Atlas Economic Research Foundation. To get some of the flavor of these organizations, here's some pertinent information:
Re: The Acton Institute: "The Acton Institute's staff includes dominion theologian Calvin Beisner as an adjunct scholar. It melds [economic] libertarianism with Christianity, embracing both free markets and a Biblically-based view of environmentalism , and challenges the scientific consensus on global warming. It has received…
"Some theists who accept the conclusion of the God as the source of ethics argument fail to appreciate its consequences fully. [William Lane] Craig is an example. One of his central themes is how awful it would be if God did not exist...Craig refers to the “horror of modern man” – facing life in (what “modern man” takes to be) a Godless universe. But if there can be no good or evil if God does not exist, then there can be no evil if God does not exist. So if God doesn’t exist, nothing bad can ever happen to anyone. The conclusion of the God as the source of ethics argument implies that there is nothing good about a Godless universe – but it equally implies that there is nothing bad about it either. If this argument is sound there can be nothing awful or horrible about a Godless universe. The short version of Craig’s self-contradictory message is “Without God there would be no value in the universe – and think how horrible that would be!”"
"Now, my main point: If one were to watch the history of the universe going backwards in time, one would see the energies increasing. Let me make the same point that [William Lane] Craig made about the physics getting speculative, but put in terms of energy. As the energy increases to 100 GeV, the physics becomes speculative – we're not really sure what happens at that point. As the energy increases to 1014 GeV (assuming it does increase to that point) the physics becomes extremely speculative, even unknown. In other words, we just don't know what happens once the energies get that high. The way Craig puts the point, it sounds like we know that there's a big bang, and we know what happens in the history of the universe once 10-12 seconds have passed, but we don't know what happens between the big bang and 10–12 seconds after the big bang. But in fact our lack of knowledge is much more fundamental. Because the physics doesn't tell us what happens once we trace …
Herman Philipse (Utrecht, The Netherlands) has a book coming out (God in the Age of Science? A Critique of Religious Reason, Oxford University Press) that looks to be in the vein of Gregory Dawes' Theism and Explanation. The main difference in approach appears to be that while Dawes evaluated the theistic hypothesis qua inference to the best explanation, Philipse evaluates the theistic hypothesis via Bayes' Theorem. Toward that end, the book will involve a sustained critique of Richard Swinburne's Bayesian case for theism. Here's the blurb:
*A powerful response to philosophical attempts to justify religious belief *Engages head-on with Richard Swinburne and other leading philosophers of religion *Original and elegant arguments; written in a clear and accessible style
God in the Age of Science? is a critical examination of strategies for the philosophical defence of religious belief. The main options may be presented as the end nodes of a decision tree for religio…
I examine the evidential argument from inscrutable evil, evil for which we can see no morally adequate reason. Such evils are often thought to provide evidence for the existence of gratuitous evil that God could not be justified in allowing, but arguments for this are often informal and intuitive. I try to contribute greater rigor by developing a probabilistic argument that large numbers of inscrutable evils are strong evidence for the existence of gratuitous evil. Then, I consider and reject two plausible replies on behalf of the theist.