I recently
mentioned Howard-Snyder's important new paper, "The Logical Problem of Evil: Mackie and Plantinga". Given the importance of the paper, I thought I'd give a rough sketch of the core argument. Plantinga's Free Will Defense (FWD) depends on his claim that there is a possible world at which every creaturely essence suffers from transworld depravity (<>TWD). However, <>TWD depends on a controversial picture of the the distribution of the counterfactuals of freedom to creaturely essences. In particular, it depends on the thesis Howard-Snyder calls
Interworld Plenitude, which is (very roughly) the view that while there are an infinite number of creaturely essences and an infinite number of differing bundles of counterfactuals of freedom for each creaturely essence to have, and while each possible bundle is had by one or more essences, the plenitude of essence/bundle pairs is diffused across a large stretch of the space of possible worlds. To be more specific: while each bundle is had by some essences at some possible world or other, not every bundle is had by some essence or other at every possible world. Given Interworld Plenitude, then, (i) there are possible worlds at which every creaturely essence suffers from transworld sanctity, (ii) there are possible worlds at which every creaturely essence suffers from transworld depravity, and (iii) in between these two extremes, each other combination and quantity of essence/bundle
pair exists at some possible world or other. If Interworld Plenitude holds, then, TWD is possible, as there will be a possible world at which every creaturely essence suffers from transworld depravity.
However, there is another basic account of the distribution of counterfactuals of freedom, which Howard-Snyder calls Intraworld Plenitude. Very roughly, this account states that a token of each such bundle is had by at least one (and indeed perhaps infinitely many) creaturely essence(s) at every possible world. But if so, then even if infinitely many creaturely essences suffer from transworld depravity at any given possible world, it's also true that at least one (and indeed perhaps infinitely many) creaturely essence(s) enjoy(s) transworld sanctity at every possible world ([]TWS).[1] And if that's right, then at no possible world are God's hands tied: at every possible world, there are creaturely essences God can instantiate that never freely go wrong. And if so, then <>TWD is false, in which case Plantinga's FWD fails to establish the compatibility of God and evil.
Now here's the rub. As Howard-Snyder puts it:
which picture (if either)
accurately represents the distribution of counterfactuals of freedom to
essences? Each picture is internally consistent; and each is consistent with
everything we know or reasonably believe. So which is it? I submit that none of
us is in a position to answer that question. We are in no position to tell
which picture (if either) is accurate. But in that case, we are in no position
to tell whether S [ i.e., []TWS] or D [i.e., <>TWD] is true. And if we are in no position to tell whether S or D is true, then it is no more reasonable for us to believe D than S and,
therefore, it is reasonable for us to refrain from believing D, in which case
Plantinga’s FWD fails.
Now those who follow the literature on the logical problem of evil know that Howard-Snyder has made this point
before (with John Hawthorne). This paper furthers the discussion in at least two important ways: (i) by fleshing out and motivating both Interworld Plenitude and Intraworld Plenitude (and by distinguishing weak and strong versions of both. See the paper for the details), and (ii) by responding (in my view, decisively) to the most important replies to the argument, viz., those from
Plantinga and
Rowe. Howard-Snyder points out that the core of their replies is the same, and that both replies beg the question by assuming that Interworld Plenitude is true and Intraworld Plenitude is false. As such, Howard-Snyder's (and Hawthorne's) defeater for Plantinga's FWD remains undefeated.
In short, FWD succeeds in showing the compossibility of God and evil only if <>TWD is true. But <>TWD is true only if Interworld Plenitude is true and Intraworld Plenitude is false. But we have no reason to prefer one of these two pictures of the distribution of the counterfactuals of freedom to creaturely essences over the other, in which case we have no reason to think <>TWD is true. And if that's right, Plantinga's FWD fails to show the compossibility of God and evil.
My intuitions
sometimes incline me toward a
stronger construal of Howard-Snyder's (and Hawthorne's) core claim, and
Rasmussen has argued persuasively for the latter. I'm grateful that Howard-Snyder (and Hawthorne) have done the hard work to flesh out the case for the weaker claim, and that Rasmussen has done the hard work to flesh out the case for the stronger construal.
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[1] It's crucial to note that transworld sanctity, like transworld depravity, isn't construed as an essential property of a given essence; rather, both are contingent, world-indexed properties of creaturely essences.
