ex-apologist

Theistic Conceptualism and the Free Will Defense

Rough Draft.

If theistic conceptualism is true, then either there are constraints on what God can think, and thus on the space of possibilities (since possible worlds are standardly taken to be among the entities God's intellectual activity is supposed to ground on theistic conceptualism), or there aren't. If there are, then there are modal facts about what God can and can't think that aren't accounted for by theistic conceptualism, in which case theistic conceptualism looks unmotivated. On the other hand, if there aren't constraints on what God can think, and thus no such constraints on the space of possibilities, then God has the ability to structure the space of possible worlds such that the doctrine of possible universal transworld depravity (PUTD) -- the core thesis of Plantinga's free will defense (FWD) -- is false. Now either PUTD is true or it's false. If it's true, then (under the assumption of the horn of the dilemma that there are no such constraints on the space of possibilities) it's God's fault that it's true, since he could've made the space of possibilities such that it's false (e.g., by generating a distribution of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom so that it conforms to a pattern of intraworld plenitude, rather than one that conforms to one of interworld plenitude), in which case the old logical problem of evil comes roaring back. On the other hand, if it's false, then (again, still under the assumption of the same horn of the dilemma) Plantinga's FWD fails. (This seems especially problematic for Plantinga, since he's in print as a defender of theistic conceptualism.)

The Metaphysics of Modality and Plantinga's Free Will Defense: A Tension

Very rough draft.

An aspect of Plantinga's free will defense (FWD) -- in particular, his doctrine of possible universal transworld depravity (PUTD) -- has been bothering me for a good while. The worry can be put in terms of a dilemma: Either PUTD assumes the distribution of possible worlds is prior to God's will, or it assumes the distribution is posterior to it. But if PUTD relies on a distribution of possible worlds that's prior to his will (as with, say, straight Platonism), then sure, it might, for aught we know, turn out that God's hands are tied with respect to the distribution of creaturely essences across the space of possible worlds, and that distribution includes at least one world in which every creaturely essence is transworld depraved. But that assumption leads to other problems that are costly to traditional monotheists. First, it's a weird take on omnipotence: There are a lot more impossible things that we antecedently thought were possible (e.g., some actualizable creaturely essences or other at every possible world who always freely choose to do what is right of their own accord). The threat of modal skepticism looms, and in its train, skepticism about the possibility premise in Plantinga's modal ontological argument. Second, it's incompatible with Plantinga's acceptance of theistic conceptualism. Third, the existence of a distribution of possible worlds and creaturely essences that are prior to God's will (as abstract possibilia lurking in platonic space) seems incompatible with the aseity-sovereignty doctrine.

On the other hand, suppose the distribution of possible worlds, and the distribution of creaturely essences at each world, is posterior to God's will (as seems to be the case with theistic conceptualism about abstracta, including possible worlds). Then an undercutting defeater looms for Plantinga's PUTD, and thereby his version of the FWD. For then it seems that God could've generated the space of possibilities such that PUTD is false (e.g., by generating a distribution of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom so that it conforms to a pattern of intraworld plenitude, rather than one that conforms to one of interworld plenitude), in which case PUTD is false, in which case Plantinga's version of the FWD fails and the logical problem of evil comes roaring back.

So dilemma: Either: (i) reject theistic conceptualism, accept modal skepticism, and reject the aseity-sovereignty doctrine), or (ii) reject Plantinga's FWD. Unsavory choices all around for traditional theist.

Bartolome's New Paper on Private Evidence for Atheism...

...in Religious Studies. Here's the abstract:

This article presents an argument for atheism that contains a premise stated from the first-person perspective and that is intended to rationally persuade people who satisfy certain conditions. The argument also contains a premise about what God would do, if God existed, that is acceptable to theists and is affirmed in some major monotheistic religious traditions. This article explains how the argument differs from some other familiar arguments for atheism and then discusses some critical responses to it.

The Argument from Neo-Carnapian Metametaphysics

Rough draft.

Here's another argument to add to the list. According to a popular and well-motivated version of neo-Carnapian metametaphysics, the accidental, essential, and/or individuating properties attributed to an entity aren't "deep", but rather are attributed to an object via linguistic rules about the application-conditions of an expression used to denote a referent, where these rules are created and revised on the basis of our practical interests[1]. But if so, then there is non-trivial epistemic pressure to think the accidental, essential, and/or individuating properties we attribute to God aren't deep, either, but are likewise selected, negotiated, and revised on the basis of our practical interests. Indeed, the history of theological and philosophical reflection on the concept of the god of traditional monotheism seems to confirm this point, as theologians and philosophers of religion continue to tinker with the concept of God right up to the present. Furthermore, the reasons for doing so seem to clearly relate to issues of practical interest, such as, e.g., renegotiating and revising the medieval concept of God as absolutely simple, static, and impassible being to a dynamic, temporal, empathic being so as to align more closely with our personal wants and needs. Similarly for the recent trend of renegotiating and revising the gender-terms associated with God. But according to traditional monotheism, the accidental, essential, and/or individuating properties attributed to God are deep, and not carved out and negotiated on the basis of our practical interests. Therefore, to the extent that one is moved by the arguments for neo-Carnapian metametaphysics, one has a significant reason to doubt that our concept of the god of traditional monotheism carves reality at the joints[2]-- or even that there are mind-independent divine joints there to be carved in the first place.

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[1] Exceptions are the apparently innate concepts for agency, number, and the generic sortal for objects (cf. Carey's The Origin of Concepts). But as Thomasson argues, these were selected for by evolution to aid in survival and reproduction, and there is no reason to think their selection was truth-aimed. So while such concepts seem to be innate, they are like our non-innate concepts in the crucial sense of being produced primarily to serve our practical interests.

[2] One might object that the existence of the specifically traditional theistic god could be confirmed via inference to the best explanation (IBE), but Thomasson argues (a la Shalkowski, Saatsi, and others) that while IBE may be a legitimate form of inference in ordinary contexts (e.g., in confirming that a mouse is in the house via data such as small droppings, gnawed holes in food bags, etc.) and in the sciences, it isn't legitimate in metaphysics. This is because hypotheses of the former sorts can be independently confirmed in ordinary contexts (say, by waiting up to catch the mouse with a mousetrap), but not in metaphysics. Indeed, IBE itself can be independently confirmed as a reliable method of inference in ordinary contexts (via empirical feedback), but not in metaphysics.

Cameron's Forthcoming Book Critiquing Metaphysical Foundationalism

Be on the lookout for Ross Cameron's important forthcoming book, Chains of Being. It promises to pose a formidable challenge to metaphysical foundationalism, which is a standardly accepted commitment of classical theism.

I've been interested in this issue since reading Ricki Bliss's excellent work on the possibility of metaphysical infinitism and metaphysical coherentism/holism in her dissertation and subsequent papers. It's exciting to see these views developed in a book-length monograph.

Schellenberg and Draper's New Paper on Renewal in Philosophy of Religion

Schellenberg, J.L. and Draper, Paul. "The Why and the How of Renewal in Philosophy of Religion", European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (1):1-20 (2022). Absolutely required reading.