As we've noted on other occasions, Stephen Law has been working on a reply to Plantinga's EAAN. He has since completed and submitted it for publication, and It has recently been accepted at Religious Studies. Stephen has kindly posted the penultimate draft of the article as a blog post, here.
P.S., he also has a paper on the problem of evil forthcoming in the same journal. Here is a link to the penultimate draft.
Michael J. Murray and Paul Bloom on Psychology, Biology, and Belief in God
A quick note before I head off to Father's Day festivities:
Last month, Michael J. Murray and Paul Bloom had a discussion at bloggingheads on issues related to Murray's new book, The Believing Primate: mainly, psychological and evolutionary explanations of belief in God, and whether they undermine the rationality (and perhaps the warrant) of theism.
P.S., Here is a short piece by Murray that discusses several atheistic arguments from psychology of religion.
Last month, Michael J. Murray and Paul Bloom had a discussion at bloggingheads on issues related to Murray's new book, The Believing Primate: mainly, psychological and evolutionary explanations of belief in God, and whether they undermine the rationality (and perhaps the warrant) of theism.
P.S., Here is a short piece by Murray that discusses several atheistic arguments from psychology of religion.
End of the Quarter
Hi gang,
It's finals week where I teach, and tomorrow I administer my last final exam for the quarter. After that, I'm off to the beach for a vacation with family and friends. As such, posting will probably be light for about a week or so. Until then, be well!
Best!
EA
It's finals week where I teach, and tomorrow I administer my last final exam for the quarter. After that, I'm off to the beach for a vacation with family and friends. As such, posting will probably be light for about a week or so. Until then, be well!
Best!
EA
Recent and Forthcoming Titles in Philosophy of Religion from Oxford University Press
Here is a link to new and recent titles, and here is a link to forthcoming titles.
I'm especially looking forward to reading the Kvanvig volume and the one on Adams' work.
I'm especially looking forward to reading the Kvanvig volume and the one on Adams' work.
DePoe's Forthcoming Piece on the Problem of Religious Disagreement
As we've noted on other occasions, the problem of religious disagreement is a potential hot topic in philosophy of religion, as the slightly broader topic of reasonable disagreement is currently "hot" in epistemology. Here is another relevant data point in this regard: John DePoe (Ph.D. candidate, University of Iowa) has recently written a paper on the topic. Here is a link.
P.S. He has a number of other interesting papers in philosophy of religion (scroll down a little to find them).
P.S. He has a number of other interesting papers in philosophy of religion (scroll down a little to find them).
Wielenberg's Recent Paper on Non-Naturalistic, Non-Theistic Ethics
If you don't know already, Philosopher's Digest is an excellent new philosophical resource. As the site's title suggests, philosophers write short but careful summaries of recent articles of note in their respective areas of specialization (including philosophy of religion), and offer worries or criticisms of their arguments to indicate their strengths and weaknesses.
Recently at PD, John Milliken posted a digest of Erik Wielenberg's recent paper, “In Defense of Non-Natural, Non-Theistic Moral Realism” (Faith and Philosophy 26:1 (January 2009), pp. 23-41). The paper argues that moral truths are necessary truths, and that moral facts are non-natural facts (which is my own view, for what it's worth). He further argues that the criticisms of Wainwright, Moreland, and Craig to this sort of view would, if cogent, apply with equal force to their own, theistic accounts of ethics.
Recently at PD, John Milliken posted a digest of Erik Wielenberg's recent paper, “In Defense of Non-Natural, Non-Theistic Moral Realism” (Faith and Philosophy 26:1 (January 2009), pp. 23-41). The paper argues that moral truths are necessary truths, and that moral facts are non-natural facts (which is my own view, for what it's worth). He further argues that the criticisms of Wainwright, Moreland, and Craig to this sort of view would, if cogent, apply with equal force to their own, theistic accounts of ethics.
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