Notes on Ch. 5 of Rowe's Philosophy of Religion: Religious Experience, Part II

3. Mystical Religious Experience as a Rational Basis for Theism
3.1 Extrovertive mystical experience:
3.1.1 Looks outward at the world experienced through the senses and sees the divine in it
3.1.2 Common features (taken virtually verbatim from p.74)
3.1.2.1 Looks outward through the senses
3.1.2.2 Sees the inner essence of things, an essence that appears to be alive, beautiful, and the same in all things
3.1.2.3 Sense of union of one’s deeper self with this inner essence
3.1.2.4 Feeling that what is experienced is divine
3.1.2.5 Sense of reality, that one sees things as they really are
3.1.2.6 Sense of peace and bliss
3.1.2.7 Timelessness, no sense of the passage of time during the experience
3.2 Introvertive mystical experience:
3.2.1 Looks inward into the self and finds the divine reality there
3.2.2 Common features (taken virtually verbatim from p. 81)
3.2.2.1 A state of consciousness devoid of its ordinary contents: sensations, images, thoughts, desires, etc.
3.2.2.2 An experience of absolute oneness, with no distinctions or divisions
3.2.2.3 Sense of reality, that what one is experiencing is ultimately real
3.2.2.4 Feeling that what one is experiencing is divine
3.2.2.5 Sense of complete peace and bliss
3.2.2.6 Timelessness, no sense of the passage of time during experience
3.3. Our focus: Introvertive mystical experience
3.4 The unanimity thesis: Mystics everywhere have fundamentally the same type of introvertive mystical experience.
3.5 Unanimity as evidence for veridicality
3.5.1 In general, when there is widespread agreement among different people’s experiences, that is good evidence that the thing experienced is real, and accurately represented in those experiences
3.5.2 However, if some don’t experience what others do, this isn’t automatically evidence that the thing experienced isn’t real. In order for their lack of experiencing the thing to count as evidence against veridicality:
3.5.2.1 They must be in the right place to experience it, if that is relevant
3.5.2.2 They must be in the right frame of mind, if that is relevant
3.6 The Basic Argument from introvertive mystical experience:

1. If the unanimity thesis is true, then it’s reasonable to think mystical experiences are veridical, unless we have a good reason to think otherwise.
2. The unanimity thesis is true.
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3. Therefore, it’s reasonable to think mystical experiences are veridical, unless we have good reason to think otherwise.

3.7 Objection: Premise (2) is false: mystics have differing experiences
3.7.1 True, they all claim to experience “the divine”
3.7.2 But different mystics report the divine in different ways
3.7.3 Some experience a Christian Trinitarian god; others experience Brahman
3.7.4 Some experience the divine as being impersonal; others as personal, etc.
3.7.5 If so, then isn’t this evidence that they aren’t having the same sorts of experiences?
3.8 Reply: No.
3.8.1 There’s a difference between one’s experience of a thing, on the one hand, and one’s interpretation of it, on the other.
3.8.2 Mystics from different religions come to their experiences of the divine with different interpretive frameworks that they inherit from their differing religious traditions
3.8.3 The differences in the reports are due to their having different interpretations of the same sort of experience
3.9 A caveat: unanimity is not a guarantee of veridicality, but only a fairly reliable indicator of it. (So how can we tell when such experiences are veridical?)
3.9.1 The “santonin” case
3.9.2 The “alcohol” case
3.10 Russell’s objection:
3.9.1 In general, abnormal mental and bodily states cause distorted, unreliable perceptions (the “alcohol” illustration)
3.9.2 But mystics are in abnormal mental and bodily states when they have their mystical experiences
3.9.3 Therefore, it’s probable that mystical experiences are unreliable/delusory
3.11 Broad’s reply:
3.11.1 Russell’s objection assumes that abnormal states that distort one’s experiences of the physical world will also distort one’s experiences of the spiritual world
3.11.2 Russell might be right about this assumption, but so far we have no reason to think he’s right
3.11.3 In fact, there may be good reason to think that such abnormal states may enhance one’s perception of the spiritual
3.11.4 But more importantly, there’s a real difference between the delusory alcoholic and santonin experiences and the mystical experiences.
3.11.4.1 In the former cases, the experiences of the physical world that occur during abnormal states conflict with our experiences of the physical world that occur during abnormal states.
3.11.4.2 By contrast, mystical experiences don’t conflict with our experiences of the physical world that occur during normal states
3.12 Rowe’s assessment of the debate:
3.12.1 There’s a difference between ordinary and mystical experiences, even after we make Broad’s distinction, viz., that in the former cases, we have a good idea of how to resolve disputes, whereas in the latter case we don’t. If so, then it appears that we have a stalemate between theist and non-theist.
3.12.2 Even if mystical experiences are veridical, it’s at least not clear that they get us all the way to theism.
3.12.2.1 For many mystics report that the divine being experienced isn’t personal.
3.12.2.2 But if so, then the experience/interpretation distinction may apply here: it’s plausible to think that mystic reports of the divine being a person may be due to their interpretation of the experience, and not a part of the experience itself.
3.12.2.3 To the extent that this is plausible, the evidence for theism from mystical religious experience is weakened