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Home Stretch For The Dissertation

Hi gang,

After many years of darkness, light is beginning to dawn at the end of the tunnel. My advisor wants me to aim for finishing and defending the dissertation by the end of the quarter (woo-hoo!), so I'll be on a marathon to finish the final bits of it and do some revisions for the next 10 weeks. Unfortunately, that means that I'll have to neglect my blog until then. Still, feel free to leave a comment, and that'll function as a post-it note of sorts for me to return to and comment. Please accept my rain checks until then.

In the meantime, I'd like to ask you all a favor: if you catch me posting or commenting here, or at any other blog, please call me on it, and tell me to get back to work on my dissertation -- you have my permission (and encouragement!) to bark at me about it. My family is depending on me to finish, so that they can continue to eat and have a roof over their heads, and so that we can finally move on to the next stage of our lives together.

Yours sincerely,


p.s., although I'll be on blogging hiatus until I finish, I can still be reached by email.


marie said…
CONGRATULATIONS!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! I heard from Katie that you looked at a job up by me?

Good luck and congratulations on almost being done!
March said…
Wes said…
Good luck; we'll be praying for you ;)
exapologist said…
Thanks, y'all! Talk to you soon!


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