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A Quick Objection to the Modal Ontological Argument
(From an old Facebook post of mine back in 2018) Assume Platonism about properties, propositions, and possible worlds. Such is the natural b...
2 comments:
Hey exapologist,
I hope you are having a good time there in Amsterdam.
Hey, I had a question I wanted to ask you. I recently got into a discussion about the laws of logic with a theist and I tried explaining to him how they exist necessarily and therefore don't require an outside explanation for their existence. His response was that the laws of logic have to refer to something. So, he couldntt see how they could exist on their own. What he told me was that before anything existed, it's not like the laws of logic were sitting around going, "something cannot be north and south of a person at the same time." With nothing to refer to, they are themselves illogical. In other words they have to refer to something to be logical. How would you respond to this?
I told him that maybe there is an eternal universe outside ours that gave birth to this one and the laws of logic have always refered to something.
Sorry if I'm bothering you but I couldn't think of anything else to say to him and thought that I would ask you about it.
Hey Cole,
Thanks! I'm actually back now, but it was a nice trip!
About your question: there are different views about this, but my own view is that logical truths are grounded in inclusion, preclusion, and compatibility relations among property structures. So, for example, it's a necessary truth that whatever's blue is colored. Why? Because being blue includes being colored. That is, the property, BEING COLORED, is a sub-complex of the property, BEING BLUE.
For the details about this account, see Tony Roy's online paper, "Making Sense of Relevant Semantics" (you can google it to find it). The philosopher Michael Jubien has a similar view.
Best,
EA
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