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CFP Announcement: Workshop on Defeat and Religious Epistemology

(Via PhilEvents)

CFP: Workshop on Defeat and Religious Epistemology

Submission deadline: Monday, January 20 2014

Conference date(s):
Monday, March 17 2014 - Tuesday, March 18 2014



Conference Venue:
Oxford University 

Oxford, United Kingdom


Topic areas

Details

The New Insights and Directions in Religious Epistemology project at Oxford University invites the submission of papers related to the application of issues concerning epistemic defeat to any question in the philosophy of religion or analytic theology.


Papers should be suitable for blind review and be no longer than 4000 words in length. Submissions should be accompanied by a cover letter including the name, affiliation, and contact details of the author.

Papers should be submitted to giorgia.carta@philosophy.ox.ac.uk.

Submission deadline is 20 January, 2014.

Partial funding is available to support travel and accommodation expenses for speakers.

Further details of the New Insights project can be found at:

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