Michael Futch (Tulsa) reviews the book for NDPR.
Griffin attributes to Leibniz a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic possibilities to explain how Leibniz's necessitarian theism doesn't collapse into Spinozism. For what it's worth, I've briefly argued for such a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic possibilities here.
Review of Draper and Schellenberg (eds.), <I>Renewing Philosophy of Religion: Exploratory Essays</I>
Adam Green reviews the book for NDPR.
0. Introduction 0.1 Mackie argues that the problem of evil proves that either no god exists, or at least that the god of Orthodox Judaism, ...
Notes on Swinburne’s “Why God Allows Evil” 1. The kinds of goods a theistic god would provide: deeper goods than just “thrills of pleasure ...
"...[O]ne can have a system of beliefs that is similar to those which Plantinga describes, involving massive misconceptions which are p...