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Announcement: William L. Rowe Memorial Conference

July 26, 2016 - July 27, 2016
Purdue University

610 Purdue Mall
West Lafayette 47907
United States

Organisers:
Paul Draper
(unaffiliated)
Bertha Manninen
(unaffiliated)
Jack Mulder
(unaffiliated)
Kevin Sharpe
(unaffiliated)

Topic areas
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Religion


Details
We are pleased to announce the “William L. Rowe Memorial Conference” to be held July 26 – July 27, 2016, at Purdue University in West Layette, IN. The conference will celebrate the life and career of William Rowe, a long time professor of Philosophy at Purdue University and one of the preeminent philosophers of religion in the past century.

The speakers will be:

· Michael Bergmann

· Kevin Corcoran

· Scott Davison

· Evan Fales

· William Hasker

· Jeff Jordan

· Timothy O’Connor

· Bruce Russell

· John Schellenberg

· Beth Seacord

· Eleonore Stump

· William Wainwright

· Erik Wielenberg

· Stephen Wykstra

On the evening of July 26, the organizers will host a banquet in honor of Rowe and have invited members of his family to participate.

The conference is being organized by Paul Draper (Purdue University), Bertha Alvarez Manninen (Arizona State University, West Campus), Jack Mulder (Hope College), and Kevin Sharpe (St. Cloud State University) and is sponsored by Purdue University (Department of Philosophy, College of Liberal Arts, and Religious Studies), The Society of Christian Philosophers, and The University of Notre Dame’s Center for Philosophy of Religion.

Additional information, including a complete schedule of events and registration information, will be sent out in the near future.

(via)

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