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Announcement: Conference on Pantheism, Panentheism, and Cosmopsychism

Pantheism and Panentheism
Royal Institute of Philosophy Workshop, Birmingham branch

November 28, 2017
Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham

Precise venue tbc
University of Birmingham
Birmingham B15 2TT
United Kingdom

Royal Institute of Philosophy
John Templeton Foundation

All speakers:
Samuel Lebens
University of Haifa
Yujin Nagasawa
University of Birmingham
Michael Stenmark
Uppsala Universitet
Nicholas K Jones
University of Birmingham
Yujin Nagasawa
University of Birmingham

Topic areas
Philosophy of Religion

Talks at this conference
God and His Imaginary Friends: Acosmism, Pantheism and Priority Monism, Pantheism, Panpsychism and Cosmopsychism


Pantheism is the view that God is identical with the universe. Panentheism is the view that the universe is part of God. These views are radically different from traditional theism, which says that God is an all-powerful, all-loving creator that is ontologically distinct from the universe. Pantheism and panentheism have a long history since ancient Greece and many prominent philosophers, theologians and scientists—such as Nicholas of Cusa, Baruch Spinoza, John Locke, T. H. Green, Albert Einstein, and Stephen Hawking—have defended or expressed sympathy with them. Yet, there has been very little discussion of these views in philosophy and theology as they have focused nearly exclusively on traditional theism.

The aim of this workshop is to create opportunities for philosophers to present their latest work on pantheism and panentheism to students and the general public.

The timetable for the workshop is:

-- 12.30 – 1.50: Yujin Nagasawa (University of Birmingham), "Pantheism, Panpsychism, and Cosmopsychism"

-- 1.50 – 2.00: Break

-- 2.00 – 3.20: Sam Lebens (University of Haifa), "God and His Imaginary Friends: Acosmism, Pantheism and Priority Monism"

-- 3.20 – 3.50: Refreshments

-- 3.50 – 5.10: Mikael Stenmark (University of Uppsala), "Panentheism and Its Rivals"


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