Dan Baras' Reliability Challenge for Theistic Platonism

In "A Reliability Challenge for Theistic Platonism" (Analysis 77(3): 479-87 (2017)), Dan Baras argues that theistic platonists face something analogous to Street's evolutionary debunking argument. Here's the abstract:
Many philosophers believe that when a theory is committed to an apparently unexplainable massive correlation, that fact counts significantly against the theory. Philosophical theories that imply that we have knowledge of non-causal mind-independent facts are especially prone to this objection. Prominent examples of such theories are mathematical Platonism, robust normative realism and modal realism. It is sometimes thought that theists can easily respond to this sort of challenge and that theism therefore has an epistemic advantage over atheism. In this paper, I will argue that, contrary to widespread thought, some versions of theism only push the challenge one step further and thus are in no better position than atheism. 
The next step is to apply the debunking argument to God's moral knowledge in particular.

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