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The Single Best Article on Behe's Design Argument From Irreducible Complexity Paul Draper's "Irreducible Complexity and Darwinian Gradualism: A Reply to Michael J. Behe". Faith and Philosophy 19:1 (2002), pp. 3-21.

Draper is my favorite philosopher of religion. If you haven't read his stuff, I encourage you to do so!

Btw: he's the current editor of Philo, which is the non-theistic counterpart of the premier philosophy of religion journal, Faith and Philosophy (although some say Philosophia Christi may overtake it)


karl said…

Do you subscribe to any of these journals?
karl said…
I'm probably wrong but isn't Behe considered by many scientists to be a hack?
exapologist said…
Hey Karl,

I subscribed to Faith and Philosophy for about 9 years, and Philosophia Christi for about 7, but my subscriptions have lapsed this year. I'll probably re-subscribe soon.

Yes, Behe is considered a hack by many of his fellow scientists (his own department - Lehigh University - has overtly distanced itself from his stuff on biochemical arguments for design). However, whether they're right, that's an ad hominem criticism, and doesn't speak to whether his argument is any good (I know you know this -- I'm just making it explicit).
M said…
Draper is a good philosopher in addition to being a nice guy. I met him at the "Future of Naturalism" conference in September. He delivered a lecture that, true to his introductory caveat, nobody liked "very much" due to its hostility to the philosophical bent of the audience. Like many other of the lectures that weekend, the lecture was rather hostile to naturalism, and offered some sympathetic (and disagreeable) characterizations of supernaturalism. Though I strongly disagree with some of his characterizations, among others, of atheism and naturalism--he denies himself the latter label(!)--his stuff is well worth reading.

Cf. "Paul Draper - The Future of Naturalism Interview"


exapologist said…
Thanks for the link to the interview with Draper, M! Very interesting interview.

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