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The November Issue of Jobs for Philosophers: Doom

Well, it's official: This is the worst job season since at least the formation of the American Philosophical Association. The publication of the October issue of the APA's Jobs for Philosophers marks the official beginning of the year's philosophy hiring season. The number of jobs listed in that issue is down roughly 50 percent from 2008 (256 jobs, down from 507 jobs), and that was a bad year.

To make matters worse, the newly-released November issue of JfP has just 18 -- 18! -- new positions posted. Guesstimating, if you add to the newly-minted PhDs (e.g., me) the ABDs, the people who didn't get a job the last couple of seasons, and the tenured or tenure-track people seeking to switch institutions this year, there are probably about 1,000 job candidates on the market.

Fuck.

UPDATE: I stand corrected: this is not the worst job season on APA record (see the comments of the anons at 4:54PM (NOV. 7th) and 12:46AM (Nov. 8th).

Comments

Wes said…
Sorry, man. This sucks.
Luke said…
If you're single, spend a couple years working 3 hours a day in Antarctica and writing philosophy the rest of the time. Then try the job market again.

If you're married, well... you're fucked in so many ways.
exapologist said…
Thanks, Wes.

Luke,

Thankfully, my wife works as well, and we have a (small) rental property, so I think we'll survive another year. Still, money will be tight!
Sabio Lantz said…
Ouch ! Hang in there dude.
Gambate (Japanese) !
exapologist said…
Thanks, Sabio!

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