Erik Baldwin is a graduate student at Purdue. He's also a visiting graduate student at Notre Dame, doing research at their Center for Philosophy of Religion. In his paper "Could the Extended Aquinas/Calvin Model Defeat Basic Christian Belief?", (Philosophia Christi 8:2 (2006), pp. 383-399), he raises concerns about Plantinga's model of warranted Christian belief. In the process, he does an excellent job of clarifying Plantinga's account.
P.S., Recall that Erik Baldwin is the one who co-authored this nice paper with Michael Thune (one of his former fellow grad students at Purdue).
Quick Links
- Book
- 200 (or so) Arguments for Atheism
- Index: Assessing Theism
- Why Mainstream Scholars Think Jesus Was A Failed Apocalyptic Prophet
- What's Wrong With Plantinga's Proper Functionalism?
- Draper's Critique of Behe's Design Argument
- The Failure of Plantinga's Free Will Defense
- 100 Arguments for God Answered
- Thomistic Arguments for God Answered
- On a Common Apologetic Strategy
- On Caring About and Pursuing Truth
- A Priori Naturalism, A Priori Inerrantism, and the Bible
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A Quick Objection to the Modal Ontological Argument
(From an old Facebook post of mine back in 2018) Assume Platonism about properties, propositions, and possible worlds. Such is the natural b...
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Erik Baldwin's site has moved: http://web.me.com/ebaldwin5/Site/Welcome.html
Thanks, Erik. The links have now been updated.
No problem! And thanks for posting a link to my paper. So far, the paper hasn't gotten much response. But perhaps it's taking a while to digest?
By the way, since we're on the topic, in a recently published paper, "On the Prospects of an Islamic Externalist Account of Warrant," is available online -- if you have access to books using Springlink! (link to my post on my blog about it http://erikbaldwin.blogspot.com/2009/11/classic-issues-in-islamic-philosophy.html)
Hi Erik,
Thanks for referencing your paper. Sounds ineresting! I hope to get a chance to look at it soon.
Best,
EA
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