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Forthcoming Papers to Look For: Lackey on Testimony and Disagreement

A while back, I noted some recent trends in epistemology that were bound to become -- and were quickly becoming -- hot topics in philosophy of religion (a project devoted to generating research on these topics and others has since been inaugurated, and is currently in full swing). Two of those topics were the the epistemology of disagreement and the epistemology of testimony. Jennifer Lackey is one of the most insightful in the field on both topics, and has been working on at least two papers in these areas:
  • “Taking Religious Disagreement Seriously,” forthcoming in Timothy O’Connor and Laura Frances Goins (eds.), Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
  • “Religious Belief and the Epistemology of Testimony", to be presented at the 2013 Baylor-Georgetown-Notre Dame Philosophy of Religion Conference
Keep an eye out for these papers and others from Lackey, as they are likely to be important contributions to these topics. 


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