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Graham's Naturalistic Proper Functionalism

Alvin Plantinga has argued that (i) epistemic warrant should be cashed out in terms of proper function, and that (ii) naturalistic accounts of proper function are hopeless. In a series of fantastic papers, however, Peter J. Graham (UC Riverside) has fleshed out an extremely plausible, empirically informed version of naturalistic proper functionalism. See, for example:

Graham, Peter J. "The Function of Perception", in Abrol Fairweather (ed.), Virtue Scientia: Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Synthese Library (forthcoming).

-"Epistemic Entitlement", Nous 46 (2012): 449-482. Published online January 20, 2011.

-Functions, Warrant, History Forthcoming in Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue, A. Fairweather & O. Flanagan, eds. (Cambridge University Press).

-"Perceptual Entitlement and Basic Beliefs", Philosophical Studies 152 (2011), 467-475.

-"Does Justification Aim at Truth?", Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2011): 51-72.

-"Testimonial Entitlement and the Function of Comprehension", Social Epistemology, D. Pritchard, A. Millar, A. Haddock, eds. (Oxford University Press, 2010): 148-174.

-"Intelligent Design and Selective History: Two Sources of Purpose and Plan", Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion 3 (2011): 67-88. (This paper is a direct reply to Plantinga's (ii)).

One upshot of these papers is that Plantinga's (ii) is undercut. Another is that Plantinga's theistic version of proper functionalism is undercut.

(We've looked at Plantinga's account of epistemic warrant on a number of other occasions -- here, for example.)


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