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The October 2013 Issue of Faith & Philosophy...

...is now out. Here's the table of contents:

Articles
1.Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 4
Tomas Bogardus, The Problem of Contingency for Religious Belief
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2.Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 4
Tyron Goldschmidt, Beth Seacord, Judaism, Reincarnation, and Theodicy
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3.Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 4
Joshua Rasmussen, On the Value of Freedome To Do Evil
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4.Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 4
James East, Infinity Minus Infinity
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5.Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 4
Martin Lembke, Pious Polygenism and Original Sin
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6.Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 4
William Hasker, Can Social Trinitarianism Be Monotheist?: A Reply to Dale Tuggy
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7.Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 4
Ross Parker, Deep and Wide: A Response to Jeff Jordan on Divine Love
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Book Reviews
8.Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 4
William L. Craig, God and Necessity, by Brian Leftow
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9.Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 4
Paul Draper, Probability in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Jake Chandler and Victoria S. Harrison
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10.Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: 4
Michael Fuerstein, Moral Perception, by Robert Audi
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