In his 1982 APA presidential address, "How to be an Anti-Realist", Alvin Plantinga (Notre Dame) argued that anti-realism is true, and that the best account of anti-realism entails the truth of theism. Plantinga summarizes his argument at the end of his address as follows:
"By way of conclusion then: the fundamental anti-realist intuition-
that truth is not independent of mind--is indeed correct. This intuition
is best accommodated by the theistic claim that necessarily, proposi-
tions have two properties essentially: being conceived by God and being
true if and only if believed by God. So how can we sensibly be anti-
realists? Easily enough: by being theists."
Recently, Michael Rea (Notre Dame) has offered a similar version of Plantinga's argument (‘‘Theism and Epistemic Truth-Equivalences’’, Nous 34:2 (2000), pp. 291–301).
Joe Salerno (Saint Louis University) and Berit Brogaard (U of MIssouri, St. Louis) published a paper ("Anti-realism, Theism and the Conditional Fallacy", Nous 39:1 (2005), pp. 123-139) that critiques Plantinga's and Rea's versions of the argument. The paper can be found here.
As we saw in the previous post , Morriston's (2000) paper, " Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause? " cr...
0. Introduction 0.1 Mackie argues that the problem of evil proves that either no god exists, or at least that the god of Orthodox Judaism, ...
Notes on Swinburne’s “Why God Allows Evil” 1. The kinds of goods a theistic god would provide: deeper goods than just “thrills of pleasure ...
In this post, I’d like to sketch a new (or at least under-explored) version of the problem of evil, which I will dub the problem of teleolo...