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ANNOUNCEMENT: Purdue Conference on the Epistemology of Moral and Religious Belief

On September 6-8, 2012, Purdue University will host an interdisciplinary conference entitled “Challenges to Religious and Moral Belief: Disagreement and Evolution”.
The conference will focus on three main challenges to religious and moral beliefs:
  1. Widespread interpersonal disagreement among intellectual peers on religious and on moral topics provides reason to doubt these beliefs;
  2. Belief-source disagreement on moral issues between commonsense moral intuitions and religious belief sources raises doubts about both methods of belief formation;
  3. Evolutionary accounts of the origins of our religious and moral beliefs creates doubts about these beliefs by undermining our confidence in the reliability of their sources.
 Conference Participants:
  • Robert Audi                              University of Notre Dame (Philosophy)
  • Sarah Brosnan                         Georgia State University (Psychology)
  • Kelly James Clark                    Calvin College (Philosophy)
  • Stephen Davis                          Claremont McKenna College (Philosophy)
  • Kyla Ebels-Duggan                  Northwestern University (Philosophy)
  • William FitzPatrick                   University of Rochester (Philosophy)
  • John Greco                              Saint Louis University (Philosophy)
  • John Hare                                Yale University (Divinity School)
  • Kevin Hector                            University of Chicago (Divinity School)
  • Timothy Jackson                     Emory University (Candler School of Theology)
  • Jordan Kiper                            University of Connecticut (Anthropology)
  • Jennifer Lackey                       Northwestern University (Philosophy)
  • Dustin Locke                           Claremont McKenna College (Philosophy)
  • Charles Mathewes                  University of Virginia (Religious Studies)
  • Christian Miller                        Wake Forest University (Philosophy)
  • Mark Murphy                           Georgetown University (Philosophy)
  • John Pittard                             Yale University (Philosophy & Religious Studies)
  • Jeffrey Schloss                        Westmont College (Biology)
  • Walter Sinnott-Armstrong        Duke University (Philosophy)
  • Richard Sosis                           University of Connecticut (Anthropology)
  • Sharon Street                           New York University (Philosophy)
  • Ralph Wedgwood                     University of Southern California (Philosophy)
  • Erik Wielenberg                        DePauw University (Philosophy)
  • Michael Bergmann                  Purdue University (Philosophy)
  • Patrick Kain                             Purdue University (Philosophy)
For more information, including how to register, go to


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