Here's the blurb:
In this book Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski gives an extended argument that
the self-reflective person is committed to belief on authority.
Epistemic authority is compatible with autonomy, but epistemic
self-reliance is incoherent. She argues that epistemic and emotional
self-trust are rational and inescapable, that consistent self-trust
commits us to trust in others, and that among those we are committed to
trusting are some whom we ought to treat as epistemic authorities,
modeled on the well-known principles of authority of Joseph Raz. Some of
these authorities can be in the moral and religious domains.
Why
have people for thousands of years accepted epistemic authority in
religious communities? A religious community's justification for
authority is typically based on beliefs unique to that community.
Unfortunately, that often means that from the community's perspective,
its justifying claims are insulated from the outside; whereas from an
outside perspective, epistemic authority in the community appears
unjustified. But as Zagzebski's argument shows, an individual's
acceptance of authority in her community can be justified by principles
that outsiders accept, and the particular beliefs justified by that
authority are not immune to external critiques.
Why have people
for thousands of years accepted epistemic authority in religious
communities? A religious community's justification for authority is
typically based on beliefs unique to that community. Unfortunately, that
often means that from the community's perspective, its justifying
claims are insulated from the outside; whereas from an outside
perspective, epistemic authority in the community appears unjustified.
But as Zagzebski's argument shows, an individual's acceptance of
authority in her community can be justified by principles that outsiders
accept, and the particular beliefs justified by that authority are not
immune to external critiques.
Table of contents and further details can be found here.
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