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Scientific Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion

Scientific Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion (Yujin Nagasawa, ed.) is due out in August. Here is the table of contents:

Series Editors' Preface
Notes on Contributors
Introduction: Y.Nagasawa
PART I: DIVINE ATTRIBUTES
The Necessity of God and the Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking; R.Le Poidevin
Why Would Anyone Believe in a Timeless God?: Two Types of Theology; B.Murphy
PART II: GOD, CREATION AND EVOLUTION
Darwin's Argument from Evil; P.Draper
Attributing Agency: Fast and Frugal or All Things Considered?; G.Wood
PART III: GOD AND THE UNIVERSE
On Non-Singular Spacetimes and the Beginning of the Universe; W.L.Craig & J.D.Sinclair
The Theistic Multiverse: Problems and Prospects; K.J.Kraay
PART IV: RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
How Relevant is the Cognitive Science of Religion to Philosophy of Religion?; D.Leech & A.Visala
The Rationality of Classical Theism and Its Demographics; T.J.Mawson
PART V: RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AND DISAGREEMENT
Coercion, Consequence and Salvation; S.Clarke
Polarized yet Warranted Christian Belief; D.Efird
PART VI: THE COMPATIBILITY OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION
Freedom, Science, and Religion; K.A.Rogers
The Compatibility of Science and Religion: Why the Warfare Thesis is False; M.Ruse
Index

Further details here.

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