Oppy and Pearce's Excellent New God Debate Book

I'm really enjoying Oppy and Pearce's new debate book, Is There a God? A Debate (Routledge, 2021).

Here's the blurb:

Bertrand Russell famously quipped that he didn’t believe in God for the same reason that he didn’t believe in a teapot in orbit between the earth and Mars: it is a bizarre assertion for which no evidence can be provided. Is belief in God really like belief in Russell’s teapot? Kenneth L. Pearce argues that God is no teapot. God is a real answer to the deepest question of all: why is there something rather than nothing? Graham Oppy argues that we should believe that there are none but natural causal entities with none but natural causal properties—and hence should believe that there are no gods. Beginning from this basic disagreement, the authors proceed to discuss and debate a wide range of philosophical questions, including questions about explanation, necessity, rationality, religious experience, mathematical objects, the foundations of ethics, and the methodology of philosophy. Each author first presents his own side, and then they interact through two rounds of objections and replies.

Pedagogical features include standard form arguments, section summaries, bolded key terms and principles, a glossary, and annotated reading lists. In the volume foreword, Helen De Cruz calls the debate "both edifying and a joy," and sums up what’s at stake: "Here you have two carefully formulated positive proposals for worldviews that explain all that is: classical theism, or naturalistic atheism. You can follow along with the authors and deliberate: which one do you find more plausible?"

Though written with beginning students in mind, this debate will be of interest to philosophers at all levels and to anyone who values careful, rational thought about the nature of reality and our place in it.

Important Recent Work on Theodicy

Hill, Scott. "Why God Allows Undeserved Horrendous Evil", Religious Studies (Online First 28 Sept. 2021). In the paper, Hill applies recent work on the non-identity problem in ethics to the problem of evil. Vince Vitale has recently written a monograph applying insights from the non-identity problem literature to the problem of evil as well. Required reading for anyone working on the problem of evil today.

Review of Ekstrom's God, Suffering, and the Value of Free Will

 Kevin Timpe reviews the book for NDPR.

Large New Collection of Papers on Divine Hiddenness

 Here. Happy reading!

Terrific New Volume on Contemporary Arguments in Natural Theology

Colin Ruloff and Peter Horban (eds.) Contemporary Arguments in Natural Theology: God and Rational Belief. Bloomsbury Academic, 2021. 

Check it out!

Quantum Modal Realism and a "Victorious" Ontological Argument for Naturalism

Rough draft.

One can run a minimal modal ontological argument for naturalism with just two simple premises:  

1. Possibly, a necessarily existent natural universe exists.

2. What's necessary doesn't vary from possible world to possible world.

3. Therefore, there is a necessarily existent natural universe.

(2) follows from Axiom S5 of S5 modal logic, and most philosophers accept S5, so it's fairly uncontroversial. So the argument comes down to the plausibility of (1). 

But (1) is plausible as well. For the most plausible interpretation of quantum mechanics is arguably the Everettian interpretation, and as Alastair Wilson has recently argued, one can provide a plausible naturalistic account of modality in terms of Everettian quantum mechanics, which he dubs quantum modal realism (QMR). Roughly: a possible world is a branch of the universal wave function; something is possible just in case it exists in at least one branch of the wave function; and something is necessary just in case it exists in every branch of the wave function. Finally, because the empirical evidence underdetermines whether the decohering branches of the wave function share an initial segment (the overlapping interpretation) or have qualitatively identical yet numerically distinct initial segments (the diverging interpretation), de re modality can be spelled out either in terms of transworld identity (which corresponds to the overlapping interpretation) or in terms of counterpart theory, according to which individuals are worldbound (which corresponds to the diverging interpretation). So in light of the machinery of QMR, (1) asserts that it is true within at least one branch of the wavefunction that the natural universe exists in every branch of the wave function (which is true in our branch, and of course in every branch), where the de re modal properties of the natural universe are given either an overlapping, transworld identity gloss or a diverging, worldbound/counterpart-theoretic gloss.

Furthermore, (1) seems more plausible than the theistic possibility premise in the corresponding modal ontological argument for theism. For the truth of the latter premise requires acceptance of the compossibility of a large swath of exotic properties, such as omnipotence, omniscience, moral perfection, immateriality, and the capacity for creating individuals and/or stuffs out of nothing. It also requires the possibility of personal attributes being instantiated as basic, rather than derivative, properties, which is contrary to experience and our best scientific theories. Therefore, it appears that one has more reason to accept the minimal modal ontological argument for naturalism than the standard modal ontological argument for theism.

A Minimal Modal Ontological Argument for Naturalism

One can run a minimal modal ontological argument for naturalism with just two simple premises:  

1. Possibly, there is a necessarily existent essentially natural thing or stuff.[1]  (i.e., the two properties are compossible).

2. What's necessary doesn't vary from possible world to possible world.

3. Therefore, there is a necessarily existent essentially natural thing or stuff.

(2) follows from Axiom S5 of S5 modal logic, and most philosophers accept S5, so it's fairly uncontroversial. So the argument comes down to the plausibility of (1). But (1) just says that being necessarily existent and being an essentially natural thing or stuff are compossible properties, which seems more plausible than the theistic possibility premise in the corresponding modal ontological argument for theism. For the truth of the latter premise requires acceptance of the compossibility of a large swath of exotic properties, such as omnipotence, omniscience, moral perfection, immateriality, and the capacity for creating individuals and/or stuffs out of nothing. It also requires the possibility of personal attributes being instantiated as basic, rather than derivative, properties, which is contrary to experience and our best scientific theories. Therefore, it appears that one has more reason to accept the minimal modal ontological argument for naturalism than the standard modal ontological argument for theism.

--------------------------

[1] Or whatever ultimately composes natural things: quantum fields; wavefunction stuff (whether in ordinary 3-space or a massively higher-dimensional Hilbert space); physical forces; symmetries or invariances; the strings of string theory; the entities of causal set theory or loop quantum gravity, etc. Henceforth assume this qualification when left unstated.

A Modal Ontological Argument for Spinozistic Naturalism

Rough draft: 

Here's another argument to add to the list:

Consider the following argument for a version of Spinozistic naturalism:

1. It's possible that there is a being who has all perfections essentially.

2. Infinite thought, infinite extension, and necessary existence are perfections.

3. Therefore, it's possible that there is a being who has necessary existence, infinite thought, and infinite extension essentially.

4. What's possible doesn't vary from possible world to possible world.

5. Therefore, a being who has infinite thought and infinite extension essentially actually exists.

This argument is better than the standard modal ontological argument for theism, since the theistic God lacks extension, and Spinoza seems to be correct in thinking that infinite extension is a perfection. At the very least, infinite extension seems to have at least as much going for it as the attributes of the god of theism. Therefore, at the very least, one has at least as much reason to accept the above argument for Spinozistic naturalism as the standard modal ontological argument for theism.

The Problem of Divine Achievement

John Pittard's new paper points to another argument against theism: the problem of divine achievement. In rough terms, the argument is that being worthy of agential praise requires achieving something that is creditworthy. But achieving something that is creditworthy requires doing something that one finds difficult. But if classical theism is true, then none of God's actions are difficult for God. And if not, then none of God's actions are creditworthy, in which case none of God's actions are worthy of agential praise. (Pittard argues that the problem can be avoided, but he admits that it can't be done without incurring some costs.) It seems to me that the problem of divine achievement is another significant problem for classical theism. The list keeps growing.

Alastair Wilson's Excellent New Critique of the Fine-Tuning Argument

At the end of his excellent book, The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism, Alastair Wilson offers a game-changing undercutting defeater for fine-tuning arguments for theism. It's a real advance in the literature, as it offers a persuasive reply to Roger White's celebrated "this universe" objection. The basic idea is that Everettian quantum mechanics implies the existence of a multiverse, and if you (rightly, in my view) accept the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics as abductively best, and if you antecedently come to the data of fine-tuning with a low credence in theism, then you thereby have good reason to think the diversity of universes to be of the right sort to explain the fine-tuning of our universe. Highly recommended.

Rdzak's Nice Paper on the Incompatibility of PSR and Libertarianism

Rdzak, Brandon. "The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Libertarianism: A Reply to Pruss", Philosophia (2021),  https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00364-0. 

Abstract: Alexander Pruss’s Principle of Sufficient Reason states that every contingent true proposition has an explanation. Pruss thinks that he can plausibly maintain both his PSR and his account of libertarian free will. This is because his libertarianism has it that contingent true propositions reporting free choices are self-explanatory. But I don’t think Pruss can plausibly maintain both his PSR and libertarianism without a rift occurring in one or the other. Similar to the old luck/randomness objection, I contend that Pruss’s libertarianism is susceptible to what I call “the inexplicability objection”, which attempts to show that agents’ free choices involve contingent brute facts. Pruss may be able to partially explain a proposition such that Jones freely chose A for reason R, but he cannot adequately explain a contrastive proposition such as that Jones freely chose A for R rather than B for R*. The result is that either PSR is too explanatorily permissive for libertarianism, or libertarianism is too explanatorily impermissive to satisfy PSR. After considering what I take to be Pruss’s best response to the inexplicability objection, I conclude that his attempt to reconcile PSR and libertarianism is unsuccessful.

Steinhart's nice review of Schellenberg's Progressive Atheism

 Here.

The Argument from PSR to Monism

Here's yet another argument to add to the list. A commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is commonly thought to go hand in hand with a commitment to traditional theism. However, as Michael Della Rocca has recently argued, PSR entails monism. Therefore, to the extent that one has reason to accept PSR, one has reason to reject theism.

Fantastic New Paper on Fine-Tuning as Evidence for a Multiverse

Yoaav Isaacs, John Hawthorne, and Jeffrey Sanford Russell. "Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence", Philosophical Review (forthcoming).

Abstract:

Is the fact that our universe contains fine-tuned life evidence that we live in a multiverse? Hacking (1987) and White (2000) influentially argue that it is not. We approach this question through a systematic framework for self-locating epistemology. As it turns out, leading approaches to self-locating evidence agree that the fact that our own universe contains fine-tuned life indeed confirms the existence of a multiverse (at least in a suitably idealized setting). This convergence is no accident: we present two theorems showing that in this setting, *any* updating rule that satisfies a few reasonable conditions will have the same feature. The conclusion that fine-tuned life provides evidence for a multiverse is hard to escape.

Fantastic New Critique of Molinism by Climenhaga and Rubio

 Climenhaga, Nevin and Rubio, Daniel. "Molinism: Explaining Our Freedom Away", Mind (forthcoming).

Abstract:

Molinists hold that there are contingently true counterfactuals about what agents would do if put in specific circumstances, that God knows these prior to creation, and that God uses this knowledge in choosing how to create. In this essay we critique Molinism, arguing that if these theses were true, agents would not be free. Consider Eve’s sinning upon being tempted by a serpent. We argue that if Molinism is true, then there is some set of facts that fully explains both Eve’s action and everything else Eve does that influences that action; and that if this is the case, Eve does not act freely. The first premise of this argument follows from the explanatory relations the Molinist is committed to, and the second premise follows from libertarian intuitions about free will.

The Argument from Modal Normativism Against Theism

Here's another argument to add to the list. Modal normativism is growing in popularity as an account of the nature of modality. However, on that view, modal properties are metaphysically lightweight, and do not exist as features of mind-independent reality. However, on standard theism, modal properties are not metaphysically lightweight, but rather exist as features of mind-independent reality (e.g., the necessary existence of god and the contingent existence of the universe). Therefore, to the extent that one has reason to accept modal normativism, one thereby has reason to reject standard theism.

Three Excellent New Critiques of the Kalam Cosmological Argument from Malpass and Morriston

Malpass, Alex. 2021. "All the Time in the World", Mind. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaa086. 

Morriston, Wes. 2021. "Infinity, Time, and Successive Addition", Australasian Philosophical Quarterly. DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2020.1865426

Malpass, Alex and Morriston Wes. 2020. "Endless and Infinite", The Philosophical Quarterly 70(281): 830-849. 

Theism's Problem of Reasoning Under Moral Uncertainty

 Rough draft

Ever since the 2000 publication of Ted Lockhart's Moral Uncertainty and its Consequences, philosophers have become increasingly concerned about the problem of reasoning under moral uncertainty. Even after a long period of deep study and reflection, many people are uncertain about which moral theory is correct, and even about when one moral principle is weightier than another. Many people are also uncertain, even after a long period of deep study and reflection, about the moral status of at least non-human animals and insects. However, there are many ordinary moral contexts where the moral rightness or wrongness, or goodness or badness, of an action depends on which moral theory is correct, which moral principle is weightier than another, or whether non-human animals and/or insects have moral standing. Furthermore, often the choice between acting on one moral theory (or principle, or view about the moral standing of non-human animals and/or insects) is such that if we make the wrong choice, we've done something horrendously bad or wrong.  Here's a simple intuitive example from Carr (2020):

Go Vegan? Sally is uncertain about whether non-human animals have moral standing. She is certain that, if animals don’t have moral standing, it’s a little better for her to eat meat, eggs, and dairy occasionally for gustatory and social reasons. She’s also certain that, if animals do have moral standing, it’s badly morally wrong for her to eat non-vegan foods.

The phenomena of moral uncertainty of this sort and others is highly surprising on theism, since it is widely held that on that hypothesis, one major purpose for humans in this world is that of exercising our moral freedom to make serious moral choices and to develop our character. In any case, at the very least, it's surprising on theism to find the world to be one of moral Russian roulette. By contrast, the phenomena of reasoning under moral uncertainty is not surprising on the hypothesis of naturalism, since on that hypothesis, there is no personal god who has made the world to be an arena for exercising moral freedom and character development. The phenomena of reasoning under moral uncertainty therefore constitutes at least some evidence for naturalism vis-a-vis theism.

Laura Ekstrom's New Book on the Problem of Evil

God, Suffering, and the Value of Free Will (Oxford University Press, 2021) is now out, and promises to be a major contribution to the problem of evil. Can't wait to read it.

New Critique of Brower's Truthmaker Analysis of Divine Simplicity

 Da Vee, Dean. "Why truthmaker theory cannot save divine simplicity", International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (2021). 

Abstract:

Although the doctrine of divine simplicity has faced substantial criticism in recent years, Jeffrey Brower has recently offered a novel defense of the view by appealing to contemporary truthmaker theory. In this paper, I will argue that Brower’s defense of divine simplicity requires an implausible account of how truthmaking works for essential intrinsic predications. I will first argue that, unless Brower is willing to make an ad hoc exception for how truthmaking works in God’s case, he is committed to saying that essential intrinsic predications about any object are made true by that object alone, not by its having essential properties. I will then argue that reflecting on cases where distinct essential intrinsic predications about an object have different causal explanations behind them shows that this general view of truthmaking is implausible.

Nice Paper on the Impossibility of a Rational Omnipotent Agent

Baker, Derek. "Deliberators Must Be Imperfect", PPR 93(2): 321-347. The aim of the paper is to critique theories that explain practical reason in terms of perfectly rational omniscient agents, but of course the point is  of interest to philosophers of religion as well. Here's the abstract:

This paper argues that, with certain provisos, predicting one's future actions is incompatible with rationally deliberating about whether to perform those actions. It follows that fully rational omniscient agents are impossible, since an omniscient being could never rationally deliberate about what to do (omniscient beings, the paper argues, will always meet the relevant provisos). Consequently, theories that explain practical reasons in terms of the choices of a perfectly rational omniscient agent must fail. The paper considers several ways of defending the possibility of an omniscient agent, and concludes that while some of these may work, they are inconsistent with the aim of explaining practical normativity by appeal to such an agent.

200 (or so) Arguments for Atheism

A popular view in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion is that while there are many arguments[1] for theism -- cosmological, ontological, and teleological arguments; moral arguments; arguments from consciousness; etc. (by Plantinga's lights, two dozen or so), there are only two arguments for atheism[2], viz., the problem of evil and (more recently) the problem of divine hiddenness. Indeed, some argue that the problem of divine hiddenness reduces to a version of the problem of evil, and thus that there is only one argument -- or at most, one category of argument -- for atheism.

This is a misconception. Here are over 200 arguments for atheism, spanning 28 categories:

I. Cosmological-Type Arguments

1. Epicurean cosmological arguments for naturalism 
2. The argument from metaphysical infinitism/coherentism

3. Oppy's cosmological argument for naturalism
4. Smith’s big bang atheistic cosmological argument 

5. Smith's argument from quantum cosmology

6. A Leibnizian-style cosmological argument against theism
7. Smith's Kalam cosmological argument for atheism

8. Park's Kalam cosmological argument for atheism

9. A grounding-based cosmological argument from one-category ontology 
10. The Spinozistic argument from negative PSR to naturalism

11. The argument from PSR to monism

12. Dasgupta's tentative grounding-based argument for naturalism

13. Schaffer's grounding-based arguments for priority monism (see also)

14. Gunn's argument for the metaphysical necessity of matter's ultimate constituents 

15. Steinhart's cosmological argument for atheistic Platonism

16. Leslie's cosmological argument for axiarchism (see also)

II. Ontological-Type Arguments

17. Goff's conceivability argument for atheism
18. A minimal modal ontological argument for naturalism
19. Quantum modal realist ontological argument for naturalism

20. The ontological argument for Spinozism
21. Maitzen’s ontological argument for atheism
22. Inductive arguments against Anselmianism
23. Another ontological disproof of theism

24. Vance's argument from de re modality to our world's necessary existence.

III. Arguments from Order
25. Wilson's Everettian conditional argument from fine-tuning

26. Another argument from fine-tuning against theism (see also)
27. Atheistic teleological arguments (see also)

28. The argument from evolution (see also)

29. Steinhart's fine-tuning argument for atheistic Platonism

IV. Dysteleological Arguments
30. The argument from suboptimal design

31. The argument from the philosophy of nature

32. The problem of divine inefficiency

33. The argument from imperfection 

34. The argument from scale

V. Arguments from Religion/Religious Experience
35. The argument from idolatry

36. The argument from indifference
37. The explanatory problem of religious diversity

38. The probabilistic argument from religious pluralism

39. The argument from the diversity of religious experiences

40. The problem of naturalistic explanations of religious belief

41. The argument from unreliably caused religious belief

42. The problem of natural nonbelief
43. The argument from anti-religious experience and properly basic atheistic belief

44. The argument from naturalistic explanations of the origin and existence of religions

45. The argument from naturalistic explanations of religious practices
46. The argument from the ineffectiveness of prayer (see also)
47. The argument from theistic demographics
48. The common core/diversity dilemma

49. The argument from mystical experience

50. Smith's argument from felt meanings of the world

VI. Arguments from Morality and Moral Psychology
51. The argument from the autonomy of normative ethics
52. The argument from the autonomy of metaethics
53. The argument from normative uncertainty

54. The argument from blameless moral ignorance
55. The argument from moral psychology
56. The argument from lack of character
57. The argument from lack of extensive empathy
58. The argument from ordinary morality
59. The argument from moral epistemology
60. The argument from meager moral fruits

61, 62. Humean arguments from moral sentimentalism and moral motivation

VII. Arguments from the Meaning of Life
63. Sartrean arguments for gravely diminished meaning in a theistic universe

64. The argument from the tedium of immortality

65. Wielenberg's argument for the meaningless of life in a theistic universe

66. Betenson's argument from futility in a theistic universe
67. The argument from excessive "anti-matter", or anti-meaning, in a theistic universe (see also)

68. The argument from diminished motivation in a theistic universe

69. The argument for the impossibility of life narrativity in a theistic universe

70. The argument from diminished virtue in a theistic universe (see also)

71. Sisyphean arguments against meaning in life in a theistic universe

72. The argument from the autonomy of the meaning of life (see also)

VIII. Arguments from Consciousness and Personhood
73. The argument from substance dualism to non-theism

74. The argument from the disunity of the self

75, 76. The problem(s) of dissociative identity disorder 
77. The argument from the mind’s dependence on the brain
78. The argument from quantum mechanics against theistic accounts of personal identity, related issues

79. The structure and dynamics argument for Russellian monism

IX. Arguments from Agency

80. The argument from hard incompatibilism

X. Arguments from Reason

81. The argument from non-moral cognitive biases

82. The argument from motivated reasoning

83. Leon's abductive cumulative case argument from reason

XI. Arguments from Logic

84. The argument from logical pluralism/nihilism

85. The argument from counterexamples to basic "laws" of logic 

XII. Arguments from Abstract Objects
86. The argument from the uncreatability/metaphysical independence of abstracta
87. The argument from abstracta as God’s metaphysical parts
88. The argument from God’s existence as a derivative being that supervenes upon platonic modal space
89. The Benacerraf argument against God’s knowledge of abstracta
90. The argument from one-category ontology

XIII. Arguments from the Nature of Causation

91. The argument from causal nihilism

92. The argument from differential support from theories of causation

93. Smith's argument from theories of causation to the impossibility of a divine cause

94. Fales' arguments for the impossibility of divine causation and intervention

95. The problem of creation ex nihilo 

96. Humean argument from the nature of causation to atheism

XIV. Nomological Arguments

97. The argument from necessitarian accounts of laws of nature

XV. Arguments from General Ontology, Metaphysics, and Metametaphysics (that Don't Fit Neatly Into other Categories)

98. The argument from strong ontological nihilism
99. The argument from neo-Carnapian metametaphysics
100. The argument from modal normativism
101. The argument from necessitarianism

102. Arguments from categorical priority

103. The argument from absences

104. The argument from modal realism

XVI. Epistemological Arguments
105. The argument from theism to radical skepticism

106. The argument from mitigated modal skepticism
107. The argument from epistemic permissivism
108. The argument from pragmatic encroachment
109. The argument from peer religious disagreement

110, 111. The problem(s) of religious luck
112. The argument from Mandevillian intelligence
113. The argument from secondary qualities against the reliability of perception
114. The argument from Bayesian theories of perception (esp. prediction error minimization theories)
115. The argument from wave function realism against the reliability of perception
116. The problem of theistic evidentialist philosophers

XVII. Arguments from Aesthetics
117. The argument from ugliness
118. The argument from revulsion

XVIII. Normative Arguments (Apart from problems of evil)
119. The argument from the impropriety of worship
120. The argument from autonomy 

121. The argument from freedom and moral responsibility

122. Cliffordian arguments from the impropriety of belief without sufficient evidence (and the failure of Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology)

XIX. Arguments from Divine Hiddenness and Non-Belief
123. Deductive arguments from divine hiddenness
124. Probabilistic arguments from divine hiddenness

125. The problem of unjust hiddenness

126. Drange's argument from non-belief

XX. Arguments from Incoherence Within/Among the Divine Attributes and Related Matters (Incomplete. These just scratch the surface. For more, see e.g. Oppy's Describing Gods)

127. Omnipotence (see also)
128. Omniscience (see also)

129. Foreknowledge

130. Beauty
131. Omnipresence

132. Divine freedom (See also)

133. Eternity

134. Aseity (self-existence) 

135. Maximality

136. Perfection

137. Personhood (see also)

138. Creator and Sustainer 
139. Divine consciousness
140. A new paradox of omnipotence 
141. The aloneness argument 

142. The incompatibility of omnipotence and omniscience

143. The incompatibility of omnipotence and essential moral perfection

144. The incompatibility of divine freedom and essential moral perfection

145. The incompatibility of omniscience and worthiness of worship

146. The incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and divine freedom

147. The incompatibility of omniscience and intentional agency

148. The incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom

149. The incompatibility of divine maximality and being a thinking being

150. The impossibility of God being a fitting object of gratitude

151. The problem of divine achievement

152. The problem of no best world 

153. The problem of divine authority

154. The argument from the existence of non-deities

155. The problem of divine moral standing to blame

156. The problem radical divine skepticism

157. The problem of divine constitutive luck

XXI. Arguments from Lower Comparative Prior Probability

158. Draper's argument from low priors

159. Leon's argument from low priors

XXII. Arguments from Explanatory Inferiority 

160. Dawes' defense of the argument from explanatory inferiority

161. The argument from contrastive explanation

XXIII. Arguments from Rival Supernaturalisms and/or Worldviews with Equal or Greater Explanatory Power and Related Matters

162. The problem of classical deism

163. The problem of aesthetic deism

164. The problem of demiurgism

165. The problem of necessitarian theism

166. The problem of euteological theism

167. The problem of pantheism

168. The problem of panentheism

169. The problem of agentive cosmopsychism

170. The problem of non-agentive teleological cosmopsychism

171. The problem of panpsychotheism

172. The problem of ananthropocentric purposivism

173. The problem of axiarchism

174. The problem of ultimism

175. The problem of ordinal polytheism

176. The problem of Spinozistic monism

177. The problem of non-theistic Platonism

178. Another argument from alternative supernaturalisms 

179. Law's Evil-god challenge (see also)

180. The problem of the inclusive disjunction of rival supernaturalisms/worldviews

XXIV. Arguments from the Success of Naturalistic Explanations

181. Dawes' defense of the argument from the success of naturalistic explanations

XXV. Arguments from Private Evidence
182. Bartolome's argument from private evidence

XXVI. Arguments from Evil 

183. The standard deductive argument from evil 

184. Hume's argument from evil in Part X of the Dialogues

185. Hume's argument from evil in Part XI of the Dialogues

186. Mackie's logical problem of evil (and the failure of Plantinga's free will defense)

187. Rowe's evidential arguments from evil 

188. Draper's evidential argument from pain/pleasure 

189. Tooley's argument from evil
190. The argument from horrors 

191. The problem of animal suffering

192. The problem of infant suffering
193. The argument from flourishing/languishing 
194. The Darwinian problem of evil
195. Schellenberg's new logical problem of evil 

196, 197. Oppy's new logical problems of evil and horrendous evil

198. Monaghan's new logical problem of evil
199. The argument from religious evil 
200. The argument from divine evil 
201. The argument from hell 
202. The argument from the requirement of divine interference (see also)

203. The argument from eternally separated lovers 
204. The argument from inhospitable environment 
205. The argument from teleological evil 

206. The argument from evil natural laws
207. The argument from natural inequalities 
208. The argument from social evil 
209. The argument from insect suffering 
210. The argument from tragic moral dilemmas 
211. Sterba's new deductive argument from evil
212. The argument from unfairness 
213. The problem of the death of most humans before the age of accountability 
214. The argument from the harm of coming into existence 
215. The argument from physiological horrors 
216. The argument from heaven 

217. The argument from dual process theory

218. The common sense problem of evil

219. The perspectival problem of evil

220. Bruce Russell's argument from evil

221. The argument from human cognitive moral architecture

222. The Free Will Offense 

223. Morriston's Humean evidential argument from evil (see also)

224. Morriston's problem of evil divine commands (e.g., genocide)

225. The modal problem of evil

226. The Everettian problem of evil

227. The problem of epistemic evil 

228. The higher order problem of evil

229. The normatively relativised logical problem of evil

230. Frances' problem of absurd evil

231. Lemos' Kantian argument from natural evil

(See also these collections on problems of evil) 

XXVII. Pragmatic/Prudential Arguments

232. Jamesian pragmatic arguments for atheism (see also)

233. Pascalian prudential arguments for atheism (see also)

234. Kahane's prudential arguments for atheism 

XVIII. Cumulative case/Combinatorial Arguments
235. Oppy’s abductive cumulative case argument for naturalism

236. Leon’s abductive cumulative case argument for liberal naturalism
237. Draper’s Bayesian cumulative case argument against theism

238. Schellenberg's combinatorial argument for atheism

239. Various cumulative IBE arguments from large conjunctive disjuncts of 1-231.

Some things worthy of note. First, there are very many more arguments for atheism than commonly supposed. Second, while categorization is inevitably somewhat arbitrary, there are clearly very many more types of atheistic arguments than commonly supposed -- on my reckoning, 27 other types of atheistic argument besides the problem of evil. Third, the list doesn't include arguments specifically against orthodox Christianity. If it did, the list would be considerably longer. Fourth, roughly 75-80% of atheistic arguments have nothing to do with the problem of evil -- problems of evil are in the minority. 

Fifth, the evidence against theism appears to be systemic -- it provides non-trivial grounds for thinking the data from virtually every major aspect of reality (e.g.: the origin, existence, and structure of the universe; consciousness; agency; morality and moral psychology; reason; logic; abstract objects; the nature of causation; the laws of nature; epistemology; religions, religious practices, and religious experience; aesthetics; the meaning of life; general ontology, metaphysics, and meta-metaphysics; and yes, suffering and hiddenness, too) points away from theism and towards some form of naturalism. One can cull very large subsets of compatible arguments from the list above to generate a variety of large abductive cumulative case arguments. Prima facie, there is very strong promise that when this is done, naturalism will embody the theoretical virtues (e.g., simplicity, scope, conservatism, etc.) better than orthodox theism. I would argue that this remains so even after throwing in all the viable data points standardly appealed to in the case for theism, in which case the relevant data renders a form of naturalism more probable than orthodox theism.  (A similar point applies to taking all these data points to run a comprehensive Bayesian argument for naturalism.)

Sixth, the previous points constitute non-trivial grounds for thinking the case for atheism doesn't essentially depend on the success of the problem of evil and hiddenness, in which case theists have much more work to do besides addressing those arguments. 

Finally, most people who care about arguments for and against theism are adherents of some form of orthodox religious monotheism or other. Among such groups, it's typically thought that the case for their faith must be persuasive, such that no (or almost no) mature, rational, properly functioning human being who appraised the relevant evidence could non-culpably fail to believe after assessing it (on the grounds that (i) God holds people morally responsible for their belief, and (ii) God would be less than perfectly good if he held people morally responsible for their belief if the evidence were less than persuasive). Thus, consider some rational, mature, properly functioning adult agnostic, Joe, who has strongly grasped, internalized, and carefully appraised the above arguments, as well as all the arguments for theism on the other side of the ledger. Suppose further that after long and careful reflection, Joe finds the grounds for atheism to be either stronger than those for theism, or at least, counterbalanced with them. Finally, suppose that Joe thereby either disbelieves or suspends judgement about theism. According to the group of theists specified just above, there can be no one like Joe: The evidence for orthodox monotheism is so good that for any person S, if S is a rational, mature, properly functioning agent, and (after careful reflection and deliberation) S fails to find the evidence to support theism over atheism, or if S merely finds the evidence to be counterbalanced -- or indeed, if S finds themself unable to tell, with any confidence, which way the evidence points -- then S is morally culpable for failing to believe in the relevant version of orthodox monotheism. In light of the case for atheism expressed in the arguments listed above, this looks to be implausible, if not ridiculous. 

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Notes:

[1] Here and henceforth, I use the notion of an argument broadly, so as to include deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments. I also follow Richard Swinburne in recognizing the distinction between what he calls C-inductive arguments (which are arguments that raise the probabilities of their conclusions at least to some degree, although not necessarily rendering their conclusions more probable than not) and P-inductive arguments (which are arguments that raise the probabilities of their conclusions above 1/2), and include both C-inductive and P-inductive arguments to count as arguments for theism and for atheism.

[2] Here and henceforth, I follow Jeanine Diller and Paul Draper in distinguishing between global atheism (the denial of all gods) and local atheism (denial of a specific god or type of god). I'm taking the arguments in the list below to be arguments for local atheism with respect to the god of orthodox monotheism (although many arguments on the list provide at least some grounds for rejecting at least some other types of gods).

The Argument from Expressivism

Metaethical expressivism is a powerful and popular theory of the nature of moral statements. However, the theory entails that there are no moral facts. This is surprising on theism, since on that view, there are moral facts, and God has moral attributes that seem to entail the existence of moral facts about his/her nature. By contrast, the non-existence of moral facts isn't surprising on naturalism, since it seems to make no predictions about the existence of moral facts. Therefore, those who accept metaethical expressivism thereby have at least some grounds for naturalism vis-a-vis theism.

Malpass' Nice Critique of the Argument from Logic

Malpass, Alex. "Problems for the argument from logic", Sophia (forthcoming).

The Argument from the Autonomy of Ethics Against Theism

There are several secular ethical theories (e.g., contractarian theories, consequentialist theories, deontological theories, sentimentalist theories, etc.) that explain our moral intuitions better than religious accounts, such as divine command theory. This is surprising on standard forms of theism, since on those hypotheses, morality is not independent of the existence, nature, and/or commands of God. Therefore, the phenomenon of the autonomy of ethics is one piece of data in an inference to the best explanation for naturalism vis-a-vis theism.

The Argument from Ontological Nihilism Against Theism

There are non-trivial reasons in support of strong ntological nihilism, according to which there are no individuals. This isn't surprising on naturalism, since naturalism doesn't predict the existence or emergence of individuals. By contrast, ontological nihilism is surprising on theism, since prima facie, theism entails that God is an individual, and that human beings are individuals. Therefore, the data in support of ontological nihilism provides at least some evidence for naturalism vis-a-vis theism.