Showing posts sorted by relevance for query liberal naturalism. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query liberal naturalism. Sort by date Show all posts

On a Common Apologetic Strategy

I. A Common Apologetic Strategy
Many apologetic critiques of naturalism share a common basic strategy: point to a piece of data (e.g., abstract objects, morality, consciousness, the apparent fine-tuning of the universe, the apparent contingency of the universe, etc.), say that it doesn't fit in the naturalist's sparse ontology, and then argue that the data is better explained on the hypothesis of theism. Call this form of argumentation The Common Apologetic Strategy.

What to make of arguments that instantiate The Common Apologetic Strategy? Instead of evaluating particular instances of this strategy -- i.e., evaluating this or that theistic argument from morality, or consciousness, or cosmic fine-tuning, etc. -- I'd like to raise a worry about the general line of reasoning such arguments take, as outlined above. In order to do so, I'll need to spend some time making some basic distinctions. This in turn will provide a framework that (I hope) will help in evaluating such arguments.

II. First Preliminary: Varieties of Naturalism
There are several versions of naturalism. Naturalists share in common the view that the natural world is all there is -- there is no supernatural realm of spiritual beings. However, naturalists differ in how they define 'the natural world'. Now there are at least three broad ways of characterizing "the natural world", and so there are at least three kinds of naturalists -- let's call them 'Conservatives', 'Moderates', and 'Liberals'.

Conservative naturalists are straight physicalists -- nothing exists but the physical, and the physical is characterized by all and only the properties listed in physics and chemistry textbooks. Recent proponents include Andrew Melnyk, Paul and Patricia Churchland, and some of the members of the so-called New Atheist movement.

Moderate naturalists differ from Conservative naturalists, in that they expand their conception of the natural world so as to include abstract objects (e.g., propositions, properties, possible worlds, etc.). Recent proponents include Tyler Burge, Jeff King, W.V.O. Quine, and Kit Fine.

Finally, Liberal naturalists differ from Moderates and Conservatives, in that they admit into their ontology of the natural world the abstracta of the Moderates, but they also allow for a conception of concreta according to which they have more properties and powers than the Conservatives and Moderates allow. Thus, perhaps they're straight Spinozists, or type-F monists, or panprotopsychists, etc. Famous past Liberal naturalists include people like Spinoza; more recent Liberal Naturalists include Donald Davidson, Thomas Nagel, David Chalmers, Daniel Stoljar, and Derk Pereboom. Since liberal forms of naturalism are no doubt the least familiar, perhaps it'll help to sketch one such account. David Chalmers' version of contemporary Liberal Naturalism is representative, so I'll sketch his version (call it 'CLN'):

(CLN) the world of concrete objects is composed of just one kind of substance, and its essence has both physical and phenomenological or proto-phenomenal (or at least representational or proto-representational) attributes (an alternative version of LN: the one kind of substance is neither physical nor mental, but but the physical and mental are composed of it).

III. Second Preliminary: Two Basic Explanatory Approaches Available to Naturalists
There are two basic approaches a naturalist can take to explaining the relevant data. According to one, one keeps one's ontology sparse by adopting (say) Conservative Naturalism, and then tries to explain all the data in terms of of the entities in that limited ontology. Furthermore, if something doesn't "fit", then one eliminates it -- i.e., one says that such entities aren't real. Call this approach, the Shoehorning Approach.

Now if naturalism were limited to Conservative Naturalism, The Shoehorning Approach would be the naturalist's only option. But as we have seen above, naturalists are not so limited -- Moderate and Liberal forms of naturalism are live possibilities as well, and there is no a priori or a posteriori basis for ruling them out. This fact about naturalism leaves room for a second approach to explanation, which I will call The Base-Expanding Approach. The Base-Expanding Approach starts out like the Shoehorning Approach: start with a sparser ontology, and then try to explain all the data in terms of it. However, the Base-Expanding Approach diverges from the Shoehorn Approach when it comes to entities that don't fit: if the data to be explained cannot be reduced to the sparser ontology, but the data really seem to be recalcitrant, then one does not eliminate them. Rather, one expands one's ontology. So, for example, a naturalist might start out tentatively adopting Conservative Naturalism as a working hypothesis, and then find that he can't reduce abstract objects to such a sparse ontology; nor can he plausibly eliminate them. He may then broaden his ontology by allowing for abstract objects, thereby moving from Conservative to Moderate Naturalism.

In light of the preceding, we can now provide a broad characterization of the ontologies and explanatory strategies available to naturalists. Thus, naturalists have available to them at least three basic ontologies: Conservative, Moderate, and Liberal. Conservatives are straight physicalists; Moderates go further by adding abstract objects to the ontology of Conservative Naturalism; and Liberals go further than both Conservatives and Moderates by positing a richer nature to concrete objects by allowing representational or proto-representational properties to be part of the essence of matter.

Furthermore, given that naturalists aren't limited to Conservative Naturalism, they have two basic explanatory approaches available to them: the Shoehorning Approach and the Base-Expanding Approach. Shoehorners reduce all phenomena they can to the fundamental elements of the naturalistic ontology they've adopted, and eliminate all else that they cannot so reduce. And Base-Expanders, by contrast, add more elements to their ontology when they cannot reduce or plausibly eliminate a given phenomenon to their fundamental ontology.

IV. The Framework Applied: Two Examples
In light of the preceding preliminaries, we are in a better position to evaluate The Common Apologetic Strategy outlined at the beginning of our discussion. First of all, we see that apologists who adopt it fail to appreciate that naturalists need not adopt Conservative Naturalism. And because of this, they fail to appreciate that naturalists need not adopt the Shoehorning Approach to explanation. Therefore, pending good arguments against other versions of naturalism and against the Base-Expanding Approach, arguments that adopt The Common Apologetic Strategy are bound to fail.

At least two contemporary naturalists --David Chalmers and Erik Wielenberg -- exemplify the success of the Base-Expanding Approach in their work. In so doing, they expose the inadequacy of The Common Apologetic Strategy.

Case 1: Erik Wielenberg, Moderate Naturalism, and the theistic argument from morality
Erik Wielenberg's version of Moderate Naturalism exposes the inadequacy of a contemporary apologetic argument from morality to theism, the latter of which exemplifies the Common Apologetic Strategy. The argument states that the naturalist is limited to the ontology of Conservative Naturalism, and that the data of moral facts cannot be shoehorned into such a sparse ontology; nor can it be plausibly eliminated. By contrast, theism can, with God as the ground of moral facts. Therefore, the data of moral facts is best explained in terms of theism and not naturalism.

Wielenberg agrees that moral facts cannot be adequately reduced to the ontology of Conservative Naturalism; he also agrees that they cannot be plausibly eliminated. However, he also thinks there are good reasons to reject theism. He therefore feels pressure to expand the base of his ontology and move from Conservative to Moderate Naturalism. Thus, he posits abstract objects such as properties and states of affairs. These abstract objects ground the necessity of basic moral truths, such as that it's wrong to cause a person or animal significant pain without a sufficient reason for doing so. And given that this view is epistemically possible, the theistic argument from morality is undercut.

Case 2: David Chalmers, Liberal Naturalism, and the theistic argument from consciousness
David Chalmers' version of Liberal Naturalism exposes the inadequacy of a contemporary apologetic argument from consciousness to theism, the latter of which also exemplifies the Common Apologetic Strategy. The argument states that the naturalist is limited to the sparse ontology of Conservative Naturalism, and that the data of phenomenal consciousness cannot be shoehorned into such a sparse ontology; nor can it be plausibly eliminated. By contrast, theism can, with its substance dualist ontology. Therefore, the data of phenomenal consciousness is best explained in terms of theism and not naturalism.

Chalmers agrees that the data of phenomenal consciousness cannot be adequately reduced by means of the sparse ontology of Conservative Naturalism. He also rejects the strategy of eliminating the data, as the Churchlands do. However, he also finds theism implausible. He therefore opts for the Base-Expanding approach, thus moving from Conservative to Liberal Naturalism. Thus, he grants that consciousness can't be squeezed out of the properties of objects listed in physics and chemistry textbooks, and thus posits that they must therefore have more properties as a part of their essence -- proto-phenomenal or proto-represenational properties. This account allows that simpler concrete objects aren't conscious, but it also entails that when a complex collection of such objects exists and is suitably arranged, it necessarily exemplifies consciousness. But if this account of the origin of phenomenal consciousness is epistemically possible, then the theistic argument from consciousness to theism is undercut.

What went wrong with the theistic arguments above? I submit that my framework sketched above provides the means for an illuminating diagnosis: In both cases, the flaw was not with something particular to either argument. Rather, the problem was with the Common Apologetic Strategy exemplified by both arguments. Thus, both arguments assumed that the naturalist was limited to Conservative Naturalism, and thus that the naturalist was stuck with the Shoehorning Approach to explaining the relevant data (moral facts in the first case, phenomenal consciousness in the second). But we saw that both assumptions were false: Moderate and Liberal versions of naturalism are prima facie epistemically possible, in which case Wielenberg and Chalmers were free to opt for the Base-Expanding approach to explanation, which they did: Wielenberg broadened his ontology to adopt Moderate Naturalism, thereby allowing him to account for necessary truths about morality within a naturalist framework; and Chalmers broadened his ontology to adopt Liberal Naturalism, thereby allowing him to account for phenomenal consciousness within a naturalist framework.
at

Liberal Naturalism and Theistic Arguments from Consciousness

Hi gang,

I'm pretty busy at the moment, so in lieu of a new post, here's an old (2007) post I've been thinking about lately and have been meaning to revise.

Now play nice and stay out of the liquor cabinet while I'm away.

-EA

*ROUGH DRAFT*

A number of contemporary Christian philosophers think there's a good argument for God in the phenomenon of consciousness, including Richard Swinburne, Robert M. Adams, J.P. Moreland, and Victor Reppert. There are at least two forms of the argument.

The first argument postulates God as the best explanation of the mere existence of consciousness. This argument has various forms: some are Cartesian conceivability arguments for substance dualism, where the theist then posits God as the best explanation of the existence of souls. But more modest versions refrain from inferences to substance dualism and just focus on the fact that consciousness is extremely difficult to make sense of if the natural world is all there is. For consciousness has properties (esp. phenomenal states) that don't seem reducible to the properties of physical objects. Therefore, since consciousness can't be accounted for purely in terms of the contents of the physical world, it must have a cause in terms of something beyond it, and the best candidate for such a cause is a god. Call this the Soul-Stuff Argument.

The second argument postulates God's activity as the best explanation for why our conscious states are correlated in a law-like way with certain brain states. The idea is that it's at least initially puzzling why one set of brain states actualizes experiences of, say, the color red, rather than some other set of brain states. For if the natural world is all there is, then the conscious states about the color red are identical to or otherwise reducible to physical states in the brain. But if so, then there should be no mystery regarding such correlations. For when it comes to every other scientific phenomenon in the natural world, once one discovers the underlying physical basis of the phenomenon, there is no residual mystery as to why that physical state gives rise to this phenomenon. So, for example, once you learn the scientific account of heat as molecular motion, it's no longer mysterious how heat, as opposed to cold, is caused by molecular motion. But things are different with respect to our experience of red and the other phenomenal states. For even after learning the scientific account about c-fibers firing in the brain, the mystery as to why that brain state gives rise to this experience of red remains. Therefore, if the law-like correlation between brain states and conscious states is to have a satisfactory explanation, it must be in terms of something beyond the naturalist's ontology. And as it turns out, God is the best explanation. The idea is that the only plausible way to account for contingent yet law-like correlations is via appeal to the intentional activity of a person. But since the law-like correlations are laws of nature, the appropriate sort of person posited is a god. Call this the Correlation Argument.

In effect, both arguments have the following five-step strategy. In Step One, they assert that the kinds of entities in the naturalist's ontology are limited to those describable in the language of chemistry and physics. In Step Two, they assert that if naturalism is true, then the relevant phenomena must be explained in terms of just those entities. In Step Three, they argue that certain phenomena (e.g., the existence of consciousness, and the correlation between certain conscious states and certain brain states) can't be explained in terms of just those entities alone. In Step Four, they assert that theism is the most plausible view with an ontology that's adequate to explain those phenomena. And in Step Five, they infer that theism is true (or probably true).

I think such theistic arguments from consciousness -- viz., the Soul-Stuff Argument and the Correlation Argument -- are both flawed, and that the flaw in each occurs at Step One, i.e., the assertion that the kinds of entities in the naturalist's ontology are limited to those describable in the language of chemistry and physics. This is because there is no good reason why the naturalist must accept the minimalist ontology foisted upon him by the theist. And if not, then the options for the naturalist aren't limited to

(i) Shoehorn all phenomena into a limited ontology of fundamental entities described by chemistry and physics.

or

(ii) Postulate a theistic ontology of souls (including a god).

For there is an epistemically possible third option, viz.,

(iii) postulate a version of naturalism with a more robust supervenience base.

Let me elaborate on this reply.

Recall the different versions of naturalism discussed in a previous post. Thus, there is Conservative Naturalism, which claims that the natural world can be exhaustively defined in terms of the language of contemporary chemistry and physics (or some revised account of chemistry and physics not too dissimilar from their current construals). By contrast, Moderate Naturalism allows abstract objects to be a part of the ontology of the natural world, and Liberal Naturalism goes further by postulating non-physical properties as base-level/non-derivative features of concrete objects.

In light of this account of the varieties of naturalism, we can state the underlying dubious assumption in both the Soul-Stuff Argument and the Correlation Argument: both assume that Naturalism entails Conservative Naturalism. That is, both arguments assume that if certain aspects of consciousness can't be accounted for in terms of the language of contemporary chemistry and physics, then we need to bring in such exotica as immaterial substances -- such as souls and God.

The reason why this is a dubious assumption is because, as indicated by the varieties of naturalism listed above, Naturalism doesn't entail Conservative Naturalism. But if not, then we have more options on the table before positing God if it turns out that some aspects of consciousness can't be accounted for in terms of the world described by the language of chemistry and physics. Thus, instead of the following false dichotomy of options implied by the Arguments From Consciousness:

I. CN: the world is composed of all and only things exhaustively desribed by the language of chemistry and physics.

II. T: the world is composed of two kinds of substances: purely phsyical substances and purely immaterial substances, and these two sorts of substances are distinct entities. Furthermore, the two sorts of substances are capable of interacting with one another. In addition, there are both finite and infinite immaterial substances -- human (and perhaps animal) souls and God -- and the infinite immaterial substance created the finite immaterial substances (and perhaps the material ones, too), and created them without pre-existing materials (i.e., out of nothing).

There are really three that are relevant, viz., (I), (II), and

III. LN: the world is composed of just one kind of substance, and its essence has both physical and phenomenological or proto-phenomenal (or at least representational or proto-representational) attributes (an alternative version of LN: the one kind of substance is neither physical nor mental, but but the physical and mental are composed of it).

But if so, then before the theist can legitimately infer God and finite immaterial substances as the best explanation of consciousness, he must not only rule out CN (Conservative Naturalism), but he must also rule out LN (Liberal Naturalism). But this has yet to be done; if not, then since both versions of the Argument From Consciousness -- the Soul-Stuff Argument and the Correlation Argument -- only rule out CN (at most) before inferring T, both are undercut.

Now I know you're thinking that LN is a weird view. But the problem is that theism is at least as weird as LN. But if so, then it seems that the Arguments from Consciousness discussed here are in trouble. For it's at least not clear what grounds could be offered that would favor T over LN. For LN appears to explain consciousness at least as well as T. To see this, let's see how each of the two arguments from consciousness fare in light of replies from the standpoint of LN:

I. The LN-based reply to the Soul-Stuff Argument: LN allows that the features of experience are not reducible to the physical aspects of natural objects, yet they are nonetheless reducible to the phenomenal (or perhaps proto-phenomenal) aspects of natural objects, and the latter are just as essential and ontologically fundamental to natural objects as the physical aspects. Thus, consciousness is reducible to the basic properties of natural objects postulated by Liberal Naturalists. But if so, then the key premise of The Soul-Stuff Argument is undercut.

II. The LN-based reply to the Correlation Argument: According to some versions of LN, such as Spinoza's version -- or more recently, David Chalmers' version -- natural objects have both physical and proto-phenomenal attributes as basic, fundamental constituents of their essence. Furthermore, the proto-phenomenal attributes are inherently representational, and they accurately represent the physical attributes. Think of the fundamental stuff of the universe as Shannon information (note to Dembski fans: not necessarily complex, specified Shannon information). Now information can be expressed in physical form or phenomenal (or proto-phenomenal) form; indeed, perhaps each form is just a different side of the same coin. If so, then it's not so mysterious why certain brain states are correlated with certain phenomenal states in a law-like way. For if the latter is just a sort of "mirror" or representation of the former, then it couldn't have been otherwise than that they are correlated. And if that's right, then LN explains the correlation between the physical and the mental, in which case the key premise of The Correlation Argument is undercut.

If what I have said above is on track, then even if you grant the phenomena highlighted by the Arguments From Consciousness -- i.e., the existence of phenomenal states, and their law-like correlation with certain brain states -- these points, by themselves, don't yet provide a cogent argument to God as the best explanation of such phenomena.

Let me belabor the point a bit more. Suppose we treat the phenomena of the Arguments From Consciousness as data, and suppose we treat CN, LN and T as hypotheses proposed to explain the data. Then we have:

Data:

D: The phenomena of (i) the mere existence of consciousness, and (ii) the apparently contingent yet law-like correlation between conscious states of one type and brain states of another type.

Hypotheses:

CN: The world is composed of all and only things exhaustively desribed by the language of chemistry and physics.

LN: The world is composed of just one kind of substance, and the base properties of its essence include both physical phenomenal or proto-phenomenal (or at least representational or proto-representational) attributes (an alternative version of LN: the one kind of substance is neither physical nor mental, but but the physical and mental are composed of it).

T: the world is composed of two distinct kinds of substances: purely physical substances and purely immaterial, mental substances (conscious minds). Furthermore, among the immaterial substances, some are finite, and one is infinite and eternal. In addition, the infinite, eternal immaterial substance created all the finite immaterial substance (and perhaps all the material substances, too), and it did so without using pre-existing materials.

Now the problem is that even if you think that P(CN/D) is extremely low, you don't thereby have reason to think that P(T/D) is greater than 1/2. For since you would expect D if LN were true about just as much as you would expect D if T were true, it looks as though T and LN are roughly equally probable; that is, P(LN/D) = P(T/D). But if so, then the Arguments from Consciousness, whether taken individually or collectively, don't make theism more likely than not.

Thus, it appears that LN poses a serious problem for theistic Arguments from Consciousness. For LN explains the phenomena at issue in both formulations of the argument at least as well as T. Therefore, even if LN is weird, it's no weirder than theism, with its view of the mind as a distinct immaterial substance that interacts with the brain, and its view of a god, which is an infinite, eternal, necessarily existent immaterial substance, and which creates all finite material and immaterial substances out of nothing. Indeed, the fact that LN doesn't suffer from the interaction problem that plagues substance dualist accounts of the mind (not to mention the hypothesis that God -- an immaterial substance -- interacts with the world) seems to give it a slight advantage over theism in explaining the phenomena in question. But if so, then the arguments from consciousness don't provide sufficient reason for accepting T. Therefore, since LN stands as a live and stubborn option between CN and T, the prospects for a successful argument for God from consciousness don't look very promising.

To sum up: Arguments From Consciousness point to the existence of consciousness and/or its contingent yet law-like correlation with certain brain states as a problem for naturalists. Their strategy is to get you to accept the very minimal ontology of Conservative Naturalism, and then say that if you can't shoehorn all the data into that ontology, then the most plausible way out is to adopt theism. Many naturalists attempt to tackle the argument head-on, accepting the stringent explanatory constraints of Conservative Naturalism, but then arguing that they can explain the relevant data within such constraints. My strategy is different and less burdensome: just advert to an epistemically possible version of naturalism with a suitably robust supervenience base. For Naturalism doesn't entail Conservative Naturalism, as (e.g.) Liberal Naturalism is another relevant and epistemically possible version of Naturalism. And since it appears that Liberal Naturalism explains the data at issue in arguments from Consciousness at least as well as theism, theistic arguments from consciousness are undercut.
at 6 comments:

Review of Jack Ritchie's Understanding Naturalism

David Macarthur (University of Sydney) reviews the book for NDPR. Here's the link.

Like me, Macarthur holds to a "liberal" conception of naturalism. The following passage from MacArthur's review captures my sentiments about more conservative forms of naturalism:

"Ritchie's strategy of taking up a position within the landscape of current scientific naturalism, however, leads to a blindspot about the range of viable naturalisms on offer in contemporary philosophy. He misses the possibility of a non-scientific or liberal naturalism that is arguably associated with such leading philosophers as Dewey, McDowell, Putnam and Wittgenstein. Such naturalism lies in the largely unexplored conceptual space between scientific naturalism and supernaturalism. It allows that one can respect science without supposing that science is our only resource for understanding humanity. Not everything that exists is explicable, or fully explicable, by science. There are many things in our everyday world of which there is no complete scientific theory but that are, nonetheless, presupposed by science -- e.g. tables, persons, artworks, institutions, rational norms. A liberal naturalism can more readily do justice to such things. It is also in a better position to ask whether there exist non-scientific modes of knowing and understanding tables, persons, reasons, etc. The best prospects for an account of rational or conceptual normativity ("the hardest task") are, presumably, neither scientific nor supernatural."
at 4 comments:

Arguments From Consciousness for God's Existence

A number of contemporary Christian philosophers think there's a good argument for God in the phenomenon of consciousness, including Richard Swinburne, Robert M. Adams, J.P. Moreland, and Victor Reppert. There are at least two forms of the argument.

The first argument postulates God's activity as the best explanation for why our concious states are correlated in a lawlike way with certain brain states. Thus, it's utterly mysterious why one set of brain states actualizes experiences of, say, the color red, rather than some other set of brain states, if God doesn't exist. For if the natural world is all there is, then the conscious states of the color red are indentical to or otherwise reducible to physical states in the brain. But if so, then there should be no mystery: just like any other scientific phenomenon in the physical world, once you know the physical basis of phenomenon, there is no residual mystery why *that* physical state gives rise to *this* phenomenon. E.g., once you hear the scientific story of heat as molecular motion, it's no longer mysterious how heat, as opposed to, say, cold, is caused by molecular motion. Not so with our experience of red. For once you hear the scientific story about c-fibers firing in the brain, there's *still* a residual mysteriousness as to why *that* brain state gives rise to *this* experience of red. Therefore, if the lawlike correlation between brain states and conscious states is to have an explanation, it must be in terms of something beyond the natural world. And God is the best explanation. The idea is that God creates the lawlike correlations, and if he felt like it, he could've correlated the different brain states with our experience of, say, red. Call this 'The Correlation Argument'.

The second argument postulates God as the best explanation for the mere existence of consciousness. This argument has various forms: some try to argue that we have immaterial souls that can survive the death of our bodies (at least in principle), and posit God as the best explanation of the existence of souls (where else could they come from? The Big Bang? Evolution?). But a weaker version brackets the question of whether we have souls that can survive the death of our bodies, and just focuses on the fact that consciousness is extremely difficult to make sense of if the natural world is all there is. For consciousness has properties that don't seem reducible to the properties of physical objects. Therefore, since conciousness can't be accounted for purely in terms of the physical world, it must have a cause in terms of something beyond it, and the best candidate for such a cause is a god. Call this 'The Soul-Stuff Argument".

In effect, both arguments have the following five-step strategy. In Step One, they tell the naturalist that the kinds of entities in their ontology are limited, of necessity, to very few, and only have a limited set of properties (viz., the entities describable by the language of chemistry and physics). In Step Two, they point out that they must therefore explain all phenomena in the universe in terms of just those entities. In Step Three, they argue that certain phenomena (e.g., consciousness, the correlation between certain conscious states and certain brain states) can't be explained in terms of just those entities alone. In Step Four, they assert that theism is the only plausible view that has an ontology that's adequate to explain those phenomena. And in Step Five, they invite you to conclude that theism is true.

I think these arguments are both flawed, and that the flaw in each occurs at Step One, i.e., that the kinds of entities in the naturalist's ontology are necessarily limited to those describable in the language of chemistry and physics. This is because there is no good reason why the naturalist must accept the miminalist ontology foisted upon him by the theist. And if not, then the options for the naturalist aren't "(i) shoehorn all phenomena into a limited ontology of fundamental entities described by chemistry and physics or (ii) believe in gods and souls and become a theist." For there is a sensible third option, viz., (iii)* postulate more entities in your basic ontology*. Let me elaborate on this reply.

Recall the different versions of naturalism discussed in a previous post. Thus, there is Conservative Naturalism, which claims that the natural world can be exhaustively defined in terms of the language of contemporary chemistry and physics (or some revised account of chemistry and physics not too dissimilar from their current construals). By contrast, Moderate Naturalism allows abstract objects to be a part of the ontology of the natural world, and Liberal Naturalism goes further to include not only abstract objects, but further attributes of concrete objects that allow non-physical properties to be a part of their essence.

In light of this account of the varieties of naturalism, we can state the underlying dubious assumption in both The Correlation Argument and the Soul-Stuff Argument: both assume that Naturalism entaills Conservative Naturalism. That is, both arguments assume that if certain aspects of conciousness can't be accounted for in terms of the language of contemporary chemistry and physics, then we need to bring in such exotica as immaterial substances, such as souls and God (who, after all, is supposed to be just a "great big" unembodied soul).

The reason why this is a dubious assumption is because Naturalism *doesn't* entail Conservative Naturalism. But if not, then we have more options on the table before positing God if it turns out that some aspects of consciousness can't be accounted for in terms of the world described by the language of chemistry and physics. Thus, instead of the following false dichotomy of options implied by the Arguments From Consciousness:

CN: the world is composed of all and only things exhaustively desribed by the language of chemistry and physics.

T: the world is composed of two kinds of substances: purely phsyical substances and purely immaterial substances, and these two sorts of substances are distinct entities.

There are really three that are relevant:

CN: the world is composed of all and only things exhaustively desribed by the language of chemistry and physics.

LN: the world is composed of just one kind of substance, and its essence has both physical and phenomenological or protophenomenal (or at least representational or protorepresentational) attributes (an alternative version of LN: the one kind of substance is neither physical nor mental, but but the physical and mental are composed of it).

T: the world is composed of two kinds of substances: purely phsyical substances and purely immaterial, mental substances (conscious minds), and these two sorts of substances are distinct entities.

But if so, then before the theist can infer God and immaterial substances as the best explanation of conciousness, he must not only rule out CN (Conservative Naturalism), but he must *also* rule out LN (Liberal Naturalism). And this he hasn't done. But if not, then since both versions of the Argument From Consciousness only rule out CN (at most) before inferring T, both are unsound.

Now I know you're thinking that LN is a weird view. But the problem is that Theism is *at least* as weird as LN. But if so, then it seems that the Christian philopher is in trouble. For it seems that he'll never be able to say why we should prefer T to LN. For *LN explains consciousness at least as well as T*. To see this, let's see how each of the two arguments from consciousness fare in light of replies from the standpoint of LN:

I. The LN-based reply to the Soul-Stuff Argument: LN allows that the features of experience are not reducible to the *physical* aspects of natural objects, yet they are nonetheless reducible to the *phenomenal* (or perhaps protophenomenal) aspects of natural objects, and the latter are just as essential and basic to natural objects as the physical aspects. Thus, consciousness *is* reducible to the basic properties of natural objects postulated by Liberal Naturalists. But if so, then the key premise of The Soul-Stuff Argument is undercut.

II. The LN-based reply to the Correlation Argument: According to some versions of LN, such as Spinoza's version -- or more recently, David Chalmers' version -- natural objects have both physical and protophenomenal attributes as a part of their essence. Furthermore, the protophenomenal attributes are inherently representational, and they accurately represent the physical attributes. Think of the fundamental stuff of the universe as information. Now information can be expressed in physical form or phenomenal (or protophenomenal) form; indeed, perhaps each form is just a different side of the same coin. if so, then it's *not* mysterious why certain brain states are correlated to certain phenomenal states in a lawlike way -- if the latter is just a sort of "mirror" of the former, then it couldn't have been otherwise! if so, then LN explains the correlation between the physical and the mental, in which case the key premise of The Correlation Argument is undercut.

If what I have said above is on track, then *even if you grant* that the phenomena highlighted by the Arguments From Consciousness, these points, by themselves, don't yet give you an argument that points to God as the best explanation. Let me belabor the point a little bit more. Suppose we treat the phenomena of the Arguments From Consciousness as data, and LN and T as hypotheses attempting to explain the data. Thus, suppose we have:

Data:

D: The phenomena of (i) the mere *existence* of consciousness, and (ii) the apparently contingent yet lawlike *correlation* between conscious states of one type and brain states of another type.

Hypotheses:

CN: the world is composed of all and only things exhaustively desribed by the language of chemistry and physics.

LN: the world is composed of just one kind of substance, and its essence has both physical and phenomenological or protophenomenal (or at least representational or protorepresentational) attributes (an alternative version of LN: the one kind of substance is neither physical nor mental, but but the physical and mental are composed out of it).

T: the world is composed of two kinds of substances: purely phsyical substances and purely immaterial, mental substances (conscious minds), and these two sorts of substances are distinct entities.

Now the problem is that even if you think that P(CN/D) is extremely low, you don't *thereby* have reason to think that P(T/D) is greater than 1/2. For since you would expect D if LN were true about just as much as you would expect D if T were true, it looks as though T and LN are roughly equally probable, if all the evidence we have is D; that is, P(LN/D) = P(T/D). But if so, then the Arguments from Consciousness, whether individually or collectively, don't make theism more likely than not.

Thus, it appears that LN should be a real headache for theists. For LN explains the phenomena highlighted by both formulations of the argument from conciousness at least as well as T. Therefore, even if LN is weird it's *no weirder* than theism, and its view of the mind as a distinct immaterial substance that interacts with the brain. Indeed, the fact that LN doesn't suffer from the interaction problem that plagues substance dualist accounts of the mind (not to mention the hypothesis that God -- an immaterial substance -- interacts with the world) seems to give it a slight *advantage* over theism in explaining the phenomena in question. But if so, then the arguments from consiousness don't give us sufficient reason to accept T -- LN stands as a nasty obstacle between CN and T. And if that's right, then the prospects for a successful argument for God from consciousness looks pretty bleak.

To sum up: Arguments From Consciousness point to the existence of consciousness and/or its contingent yet lawlike correlation with certain brain states as a problem for naturalists. Their strategy is to get you to accept a very minimal ontology, and then say that if you can't shoehorn everything into it, then the only way out is to become a theist. Many naturalists attempt to tackle the argument head-on, accepting the costraints of explaining everything (including consciousness) in terms of this limited ontology, but then arguing that they can do so. My strategy is different and easier: just *broaden your ontology*, so that there are more fundamental properties to get the explanatory work done.
at 8 comments:

Liberal Naturalism and the Defeat of the Theistic Hypothesis

Ok, the post title is a bit of hyperbole (intentionally employed to attract attention and discussion). But I'd like to propose a version of naturalism that seems to explain the relevant range of data better theism. To be a tad more precise: there is a prima facie viable version of naturalism that (a) explains the data appealed to in theistic arguments at least as well as theism, and (b) there is a range of other data that is better explained by this version of naturalism than by theism.

Thus, consider the following hypothesis, which I'll call 'Chalmersian Liberal Naturalism' (in honor of the contemporary philosopher David Chalmers, who appears to accept a view somewhat similar to it. Call the view 'CLN' for short):

(CLN) There are both abstract objects and concrete objects. The abstract objects are eternal, necessary beings. All concrete objects are composed of just one kind of substance, and its essence has both physical and phenomenal or proto-phenomenal (or at least representational or proto-representational) attributes (alternatively, the one kind of substance is neither physical nor mental, but but the physical and mental are composed of it). Furthermore, this kind of substance is factually or metaphysically necessary. It is also eternal, and comprises a multiverse.

It seems to me that CLN can explain all the data appealed to by the standard arguments of natural theology: we'd expect fine-tuning if for every possible combination of fundamental constants, there is a universe that instantiates it -- indeed, a finely-tuned universe is inevitable on such a hypothesis; we'd expect consciousness in animals and humans if proto-phenomenal states are a part of the essence of concrete substance, since consciousness logically supervenes on structures composed of such a substance when it is suitably complex, and such complexity is accounted for in terms of mutation and natural selection; we'd expect abstract objects if they were eternal, necessary beings; we'd expect moral properties if they logically supervene on certain states of affairs, the latter of which are abstract, necessary beings that contingently obtain or fail to obtain; the contingency of objects in the world is explained in terms of the factually or metaphysically necessary stuff of which it's composed.[1]

Furthermore, it seems to me that CLN explains a wide range of other data better than the hypothesis of theism. Thus, if CLN were true, then we'd expect the data of huge amounts of prima facie gratuitous human and animal suffering; we'd expect the data of divine hiddenness; we'd expect the data of radical religious diversity; we'd expect the data of scientific studies involving double-blind experiments indicating the ineffectivenss of prayer; and we'd expect the data of religious demographics. However, we wouldn't expect such data if theism were true.

Thus, it seems to me that CLN explains not only all the data appealed to in theistic arguments at least as well as theism, but it also better explains a wide range of data that is only awkwardly explained if explained at all by the hypothesis of theism. But CLN is a version of naturalism. Therefore, I conclude that naturalism is a better explanation of the range of relevant data than theism.

Some objections and replies:

Objection 1: "CLN is too weird to be true!"
Reply: True, CLN is weird. However, I don't know how to validly argue from "x is weird" to "x is false". A theory accrues support in virtue of embodying various theoretical virtues (simplicity, explantory scope, explanatory power, etc.), and so the theory stands or falls on that basis and that basis alone. Furthermore, CLN is certainly no weirder than the hypothesis of (say) Christian theism, with its explanation of the relevant data in terms of an immaterial tri-personal creator-out-of-nothing. In any case, it's a mistake to think that one must be a Liberal Naturalist to accept the conclusions here. One could be a Conservative or Moderate Naturalist -- or even a skeptic or agnostic -- and yet still properly accept the crucial claim here, viz., that whether it's the actual explanation of the relevant data or not, it's a better explanation of the data than theism -- or at the very least: as good an explanation of the data as theism --, in which case the data doesn't favor theism over naturalism.

Objection 2: CLN is too complex to be plausible.
Reply: Two points. First, CLN posits two sorts of entities -- abstract and concrete -- and they require separate treatment. As to the former: Since the abstract objects are posited as necessary beings, they need no explanation. That leaves us with the realm of concrete objects, and here we have postulated one type of substance, which in turn gives rise to a multiverse. Is this hypothesis complex?

Well, it's complex in one sense; in another it's not. The objector mistakenly assumes that there is only one kind of theoretical parsimony, viz., *quantitative* parsimony (i.e., the explanation postulates fewer entities). However, as David Lewis has taught us, another type is *qualitative* parsimony (i.e.,the explanation postulates fewer *kinds* of entities). And while the theistic hypothesis is a much more *quantitatively* parsimonious explanation of the data (it explains all of the data in terms of just one entity, viz., a god), the CLN multiverse hypothesis is a more *qualitatively* parsimonious explanation of the data (since it explains all of the data solely in terms of one *kind* of entity, viz., Chalmersian panprotopsychist substance). And it's not clear which type of theoretical parsimony is more important here.

Thoughts?
--------------
[1] Objection: "but I can imagine the fundamental stuff failing to exist. And since conceivability is sufficient evidence for possibility, it's possible for the fundamental stuff posited by CLN to fail to exist, in which case we have reason to doubt that such stuff is metaphysically necessary, in which case it can't explain the data of contingency." Reply: Either conceivability is sufficient evidence of possibility or it isn't. If it isn't, then of course the data of the conceivable non-existence of a Chalmersian multiverse isn't sufficient evidence of its possible non-existence, in which case the objection fails. On the other hand, suppose conceivability is sufficient evidence of possibility. Then since it's conceivable that both God and the Chalmersian multiverse fail to exist, then there's sufficient evidence that it's possble that both God and the Chalmersian multiverse fail to exist, in which case it looks as though no being of the relevant sort could be metaphysically necessary, in which case the jig is up for arguments from contingency, in which case contingency falls out of the range of data that needs explaining. Either way, then, the objection fails.
at 3 comments:

Liberal Naturalism and the Defeat of the Theistic Hypothesis

(Re-posted)

I think there is a version of naturalism that seems to explain the relevant range of data better than theism. To be a tad more precise: there is a prima facie viable version of naturalism that (a) explains the data appealed to in theistic arguments at least as well as theism, and (b) there is a range of other data that is better explained by this version of naturalism than by theism. Below I will provide a brief sketch of the sort of view I have in mind, as well as some considerations in its favor vis-a-vis theism.

Thus, consider the following hypothesis, which I'll call 'Chalmersian Liberal Naturalism' (in honor of the contemporary philosopher David Chalmers, who appears to accept a view somewhat similar to it. Call the view 'CLN' for short):

(CLN) There are both abstract objects and concrete objects. The abstract objects are eternal, necessary beings. All concrete objects are composed of just one kind of substance, and its essence has both physical and phenomenal or proto-phenomenal (or at least representational or proto-representational) attributes as a part of its essence (alternatively, the one kind of substance is neither physical nor mental, but the physical and mental are composed of it). Furthermore, this kind of substance is factually or metaphysically necessary. It is also eternal, and comprises a multiverse.

It seems to me that CLN can explain all the data appealed to by the standard arguments of natural theology: we'd expect fine-tuning if for every possible combination of fundamental constants, there is a universe that instantiates it -- indeed, a finely-tuned universe is inevitable on such a hypothesis; we'd expect consciousness in animals and humans if proto-phenomenal states are a part of the essence of concrete substance, since consciousness logically supervenes on structures composed of such a substance when it is suitably complex, and such complexity is accounted for in terms of mutation and natural selection; we'd expect abstract objects if they were eternal, necessary beings; we'd expect moral properties if they logically supervene on certain states of affairs, the latter of which are abstract, necessary beings that contingently obtain or fail to obtain; and the contingency of objects in the world is explained in terms of the factually or metaphysically necessary stuff of which it's composed.[1]

Furthermore, it seems to me that CLN explains a wide range of other data better than the hypothesis of theism. Thus, if CLN were true, then we'd expect the data of huge amounts of prima facie gratuitous human and animal suffering; we'd expect the data of divine hiddenness; we'd expect the data of radical religious diversity; we'd expect the data of scientific studies involving double-blind experiments indicating the ineffectivenss of prayer; and we'd expect the religious demographics data that we actually have. However, we wouldn't expect such data if theism were true.

Thus, it seems to me that CLN explains not only all the data appealed to in theistic arguments at least as well as theism, but it also better explains a wide range of data that is only awkwardly explained if explained at all by the hypothesis of theism. But CLN is a version of naturalism. Therefore, I conclude that naturalism is a better explanation of the range of relevant data than theism.

Some objections and replies:

Objection 1: "CLN is too weird to be true!"
Reply: True, CLN is weird. However, I don't know how to validly argue from "x is weird" to "x is false". A theory accrues support in virtue of embodying various theoretical virtues (simplicity, explantory scope, explanatory power, etc.), and so the theory stands or falls on that basis and that basis alone. Furthermore, CLN is certainly no weirder than the hypothesis of theism. For compare CLN to theism:

T: The world is composed of two really distinct kinds of substance: purely physical substances and purely immaterial substances. Furthermore, these two sorts of substances are capable of interacting with one another. In addition, there are both finite and infinite immaterial substances -- human (and perhaps animal) souls and God -- and the infinite immaterial substance created the finite immaterial substances (and perhaps the material ones, too), and created them without pre-existing materials (i.e., out of nothing).

Things get even more exotic if we move to specifically Christian theism, with its additional doctrines of the trinity and the incarnation. But the point is that both hypotheses -- theism and CLN -- include odd and problematic theses, and when one does a "cost-benefit analysis" of the two views, comparing the oddities and problematic features of the two hypotheses, it seems to me to be, at best, a wash.

In any case, it's a mistake to think that one must be a Liberal Naturalist to accept the conclusions here. One could be a Conservative or Moderate Naturalist -- or even a skeptic or agnostic -- and yet still properly accept the crucial claim here, viz., that whether it's the actual explanation of the relevant data or not, it's a better explanation of the data than theism -- or at the very least: as good an explanation of the data as theism --, in which case the data doesn't favor theism over naturalism.

Objection 2: CLN is too complex to be plausible.
Reply: Two points. First, CLN posits two sorts of entities -- abstract and concrete -- and they require separate treatment. As to the former: Since the abstract objects are posited as necessary beings, they need no explanation. That leaves us with the realm of concrete objects, and here we have postulated one type of substance, which in turn gives rise to a multiverse. Is this hypothesis complex?

Well, it's complex in one sense; in another it's not. The objector mistakenly assumes that there is only one kind of theoretical parsimony, viz., *quantitative* parsimony (i.e., the explanation postulates fewer entities). However, as David Lewis has taught us, another type is *qualitative* parsimony (i.e.,the explanation postulates fewer *kinds* of entities). And while the theistic hypothesis is a much more *quantitatively* parsimonious explanation of the data (it explains all of the data in terms of just one entity, viz., a god), the CLN multiverse hypothesis is a more *qualitatively* parsimonious explanation of the data (since it explains all of the data solely in terms of one *kind* of entity, viz., Chalmersian panprotopsychist substance). And it's not clear which type of theoretical parsimony is more important here.

Thoughts?
--------------
[1] Objection: "but I can imagine the fundamental stuff failing to exist. And since conceivability is sufficient evidence for possibility, it's possible for the fundamental stuff posited by CLN to fail to exist, in which case we have reason to doubt that such stuff is metaphysically necessary, in which case it can't explain the data of contingency." Reply: Either conceivability is sufficient evidence of possibility or it isn't. If it isn't, then of course the data of the conceivable non-existence of a Chalmersian multiverse isn't sufficient evidence of its possible non-existence, in which case the objection fails. On the other hand, suppose conceivability is sufficient evidence of possibility. Then since it's conceivable that both God and the Chalmersian multiverse fail to exist, then there's sufficient evidence that it's possble that both God and the Chalmersian multiverse fail to exist, in which case it looks as though no being of the relevant sort could be metaphysically necessary, in which case the jig is up for arguments from contingency, in which case contingency falls out of the range of data that needs explaining. Either way, then, the objection fails.
at 5 comments:

Another Welcome Exploration of Liberal Naturalism

Mario De Caro and David Macarthur offer another volume exploring liberal naturalism: Naturalism and Normativity (Columbia University Press, 2010). Benedict Smith (Durham University) recently reviewed the book for NDPR. Here is the link.

We've noted another recent volume sympathetic to Moderate and Liberal versions of naturalism (though perhaps unintentionally so) here.
at No comments:

Some Varieties of Naturalism

There are several versions of naturalism. Naturalists share in common the view that the natural world is all there is -- there is no supernatural realm of spiritual beings. However, naturalists differ in how they define 'the natural world'. Now there are at least three broad ways of characterizing "the natural world", and so there are at least three kinds of naturalists -- let's call them 'Conservatives', 'Moderates', and 'Liberals'.

Conservative naturalists are straight physicalists -- nothing exists but the physical, and the physical is characterized by all and only the properties listed in physics and chemistry textbooks.

Moderate naturalists differ from Conservative naturalists, in that they expand their conception of natural world so as to include abstracta (e.g., propositions, properties, possible worlds, etc.). Recent proponents include Tyler Burge, Jeff King, W.V.O. Quine, Roderick Chisholm, and Kit Fine.

Finally, Liberal naturalists differ from Moderates and Conservatives, in that they admit into their ontology of the natural world the abstracta of the Moderates, but they also allow for a conception of concreta according to which they have more properties and powers than the Conservatives and Moderates allow. Thus, perhaps they're straight Spinozists, or type-F monists, or panprotopsychists, etc. Liberal naturalists include Benedict Spinoza, Bertrand Russell, Galen Strawson, Donald Davidson, Thomas Nagel, David Chalmers, Daniel Stoljar, and Derk Pereboom.

In light of this sketch of the varieties of naturalism, we see that from the fact that one is a naturalist, it doesn't follow that one is averse to entities that don't belong to the ontology of Conservative naturalism. To put it differently: naturalism doesn't entail Conservative naturalism.
at No comments:

200 (or so) Arguments for Atheism

A popular view in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion is that while there are many arguments[1] for theism -- cosmological, ontological, and teleological arguments; moral arguments; arguments from consciousness; etc. (by Plantinga's lights, two dozen or so), there are only two arguments for atheism[2], viz., the problem of evil and (more recently) the problem of divine hiddenness. Indeed, some argue that the problem of divine hiddenness reduces to a version of the problem of evil, and thus that there is only one argument -- or at most, one category of argument -- for atheism.

This is a misconception. Here are over 200 arguments for atheism, spanning 28 categories:

I. Cosmological-Type Arguments
1. Epicurean cosmological arguments for naturalism 
2. The argument from metaphysical infinitism/coherentism

II. Ontological-Type Arguments
17. Goff's conceivability argument for atheism
18. A minimal modal ontological argument for naturalism
19. Quantum modal realist ontological argument for naturalism

IV. Dysteleological Arguments
30. The argument from suboptimal design

V. Arguments from Religion/Religious Experience
35. The argument from idolatry

VIII. Arguments from Consciousness and Personhood
73. The argument from substance dualism to non-theism

X. Arguments from Reason

XI. Arguments from Logic


XIII. Arguments from the Nature of Causation
XIV. Nomological Arguments

XV. Arguments from General Ontology, Metaphysics, and Metametaphysics (that Don't Fit Neatly Into other Categories)

XVI. Epistemological Arguments
105. The argument from theism to radical skepticism
110, 111. The problem(s) of religious luck
112. The argument from Mandevillian intelligence
113. The argument from secondary qualities against the reliability of perception
114. The argument from Bayesian theories of perception (esp. prediction error minimization theories)
115. The argument from wave function realism against the reliability of perception
116. The problem of theistic evidentialist philosophers

XVII. Arguments from Aesthetics
117. The argument from ugliness
118. The argument from revulsion

XVIII. Normative Arguments (Apart from problems of evil)
119. The argument from the impropriety of worship
120. The argument from autonomy 

XIX. Arguments from Divine Hiddenness and Non-Belief
123. Deductive arguments from divine hiddenness
124. Probabilistic arguments from divine hiddenness
126. Drange's argument from non-belief

XX. Arguments from Incoherence Within/Among the Divine Attributes and Related Matters (Incomplete. These just scratch the surface. For more, see e.g. Oppy's Describing Gods)
127. Omnipotence (see also)
128. Omniscience (see also)
130. Beauty
131. Omnipresence
133. Eternity

XXI. Arguments from Lower Comparative Prior Probability

XXII. Arguments from Explanatory Inferiority 

XXIII. Arguments from Rival Supernaturalisms and/or Worldviews with Equal or Greater Explanatory Power and Related Matters
162. The problem of classical deism
180. The problem of the inclusive disjunction of rival supernaturalisms/worldviews

XXIV. Arguments from the Success of Naturalistic Explanations

XXV. Arguments from Private Evidence
182. Bartolome's argument from private evidence

XXVI. Arguments from Evil 
(See also these collections on problems of evil) 

XXVII. Pragmatic/Prudential Arguments
XVIII. Cumulative case/Combinatorial Arguments
235. Oppy’s abductive cumulative case argument for naturalism
239. Various cumulative IBE arguments from large conjunctive disjuncts of 1-231.

Some things worthy of note. First, there are very many more arguments for atheism than commonly supposed. Second, while categorization is inevitably somewhat arbitrary, there are clearly very many more types of atheistic arguments than commonly supposed -- on my reckoning, 27 other types of atheistic argument besides the problem of evil. Third, the list doesn't include arguments specifically against orthodox Christianity. If it did, the list would be considerably longer. Fourth, roughly 75-80% of atheistic arguments have nothing to do with the problem of evil -- problems of evil are in the minority. 

Fifth, the evidence against theism appears to be systemic -- it provides non-trivial grounds for thinking the data from virtually every major aspect of reality (e.g.: the origin, existence, and structure of the universe; consciousness; agency; morality and moral psychology; reason; logic; abstract objects; the nature of causation; the laws of nature; epistemology; religions, religious practices, and religious experience; aesthetics; the meaning of life; general ontology, metaphysics, and meta-metaphysics; and yes, suffering and hiddenness, too) points away from theism and towards some form of naturalism. One can cull very large subsets of compatible arguments from the list above to generate a variety of large abductive cumulative case arguments. Prima facie, there is very strong promise that when this is done, naturalism will embody the theoretical virtues (e.g., simplicity, scope, conservatism, etc.) better than orthodox theism. I would argue that this remains so even after throwing in all the viable data points standardly appealed to in the case for theism, in which case the relevant data renders a form of naturalism more probable than orthodox theism.  (A similar point applies to taking all these data points to run a comprehensive Bayesian argument for naturalism.)

Sixth, the previous points constitute non-trivial grounds for thinking the case for atheism doesn't essentially depend on the success of the problem of evil and hiddenness, in which case theists have much more work to do besides addressing those arguments. 

Finally, most people who care about arguments for and against theism are adherents of some form of orthodox religious monotheism or other. Among such groups, it's typically thought that the case for their faith must be persuasive, such that no (or almost no) mature, rational, properly functioning human being who appraised the relevant evidence could non-culpably fail to believe after assessing it (on the grounds that (i) God holds people morally responsible for their belief, and (ii) God would be less than perfectly good if he held people morally responsible for their belief if the evidence were less than persuasive). Thus, consider some rational, mature, properly functioning adult agnostic, Joe, who has strongly grasped, internalized, and carefully appraised the above arguments, as well as all the arguments for theism on the other side of the ledger. Suppose further that after long and careful reflection, Joe finds the grounds for atheism to be either stronger than those for theism, or at least, counterbalanced with them. Finally, suppose that Joe thereby either disbelieves or suspends judgement about theism. According to the group of theists specified just above, there can be no one like Joe: The evidence for orthodox monotheism is so good that for any person S, if S is a rational, mature, properly functioning agent, and (after careful reflection and deliberation) S fails to find the evidence to support theism over atheism, or if S merely finds the evidence to be counterbalanced -- or indeed, if S finds themself unable to tell, with any confidence, which way the evidence points -- then S is morally culpable for failing to believe in the relevant version of orthodox monotheism. In light of the case for atheism expressed in the arguments listed above, this looks to be implausible, if not ridiculous. 

-----------------------------------------
Notes:
[1] Here and henceforth, I use the notion of an argument broadly, so as to include deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments. I also follow Richard Swinburne in recognizing the distinction between what he calls C-inductive arguments (which are arguments that raise the probabilities of their conclusions at least to some degree, although not necessarily rendering their conclusions more probable than not) and P-inductive arguments (which are arguments that raise the probabilities of their conclusions above 1/2), and include both C-inductive and P-inductive arguments to count as arguments for theism and for atheism.

[2] Here and henceforth, I follow Jeanine Diller and Paul Draper in distinguishing between global atheism (the denial of all gods) and local atheism (denial of a specific god or type of god). I'm taking the arguments in the list below to be arguments for local atheism with respect to the god of orthodox monotheism (although many arguments on the list provide at least some grounds for rejecting at least some other types of gods).
at
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A Modal Cosmological Argument for Atheism

Consider the following principle:  WEAK PMC: Possibly, every concrete object (and aggregate of such) that has an originating or sustaining e...