Sunday, February 08, 2009

Type-F Monism, Russellian Monism, and Conceivability Arguments for Dualism

Here is a nice recent paper by Barbara Montero (CUNY), which defends a line I've gestured to elsewhere. The paper's entitled, "Russellian Physicalism". In this paper, she offers an undercutting defeater for Chalmers' 2D argument for dualism. Briefly, she sketches a Russellian account of physicalism, which is distinct from both strict physicalism and dualism. She then points out (as Chalmers conceded in his The Conscious Mind and some subsequent work) that Chalmers' argument can't rule out this possibility, in which case his argument for dualism is undercut.

This I think this serves as an undercutting defeater for arguments from mental phenomena to God (arguments for dualism, Reppert's argument from reason, Moreland's arguments in this area, etc.).

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