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On Deane-Peter Baker's Alvin Plantinga (Again)

I just finished reading Deane-Peter Baker's edited volume, Alvin Plantinga (Cambridge UP, 2007). Verdict: Yeah, you're really going to want to read it. Each chapter exemplifies the following four features: (i) it is written by a philosopher who is a leader in their AOS; (ii) they have a command of the relevant aspect of Plantinga's philosophical corpus; (iii) that aspect falls within one of their own AOSs. Furthermore, each author provides an illuminating overview of that aspect of Plantinga's work, as well as penetrating criticisms of it.

What a treat! Made me feel like a kid in a candy store.


MC said…
I was reading this at the library only two days ago. The Oppy and Sosa essays are especially top-notch; I attended a presentation of the latter when it was a draft called “Is Naturalism Self-Defeating?”. Good stuff.
exapologist said…
Hi MC,

I liked those chapters as well. Beilby's chapter on Plantinga's account of warranted Christian belief was my favorite; it's probably the most insightful exposition and the most penetrating and forceful critique of Plantinga's account that can be found in a single chapter (to date, at any rate).

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