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Paul Draper's Plantinga Lecture

A while back, I mentioned that Paul Draper was slated to give the 9th annual Plantinga Lecture at Notre Dame. The paper he delivered is now available online. Required reading!

UPDATE: John Danaher (Philosophical Disquisitions) has since provided an excellent series of expository posts on Draper's paper:

Part 1
Part 2
Part 3


JS Allen said…
Wow, very good. I'm becoming more interested in ST and PoE.
Aaron said…
Good article. Draper is a very cautious here, which I admire. I agree that the theist and the naturalist both need to assess the evidence from evil in light of their overall evidence. This evidence, of course, includes the evidence for competing grand metaphysical stories of what the universe ultimately is. We pretty much never evaluate theories in a vacuum. The most reasonable view is typically the most reasonable of a set of competing views. Unfortunately, it seems to follow that we need to settle all (or perhaps most)of the big questions at once in order to settle any particular question.

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