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Announcement: The Epistemology of Atheism

Wednesday, June 26 2013 - Friday, June 28 2013
University of Lorraine



Laboratoire d'Histoire des Sciences et de Philosophie-Archives Poincaré (CNRS, UMR 7117) Université de Lorraine, Nancy (France)
91, Avenue de la Libération, Nancy Salle Internationale de la MSH Lorraine (3rd floor)
Organized by:
Michel Bastit (Laboratoire d’Histoire des Sciences et de Philosophie-Archives Poincaré, Nancy, Université de Lorraine & CNRS, UMR 7117)  Roger Pouivet (Laboratoire d’Histoire des Sciences et de Philosophie-Archives Poincaré, Nancy, Université de Lorraine & CNRS, UMR 7117) Darek Lukasiewicz (Department of Philosophy, University Kazimierz Wielki, Bydgoszcz, Poland)


Wednesday 26 June Morning Session
09:30-10:00 : Welcome
10:00-11h00 Roger Pouivet, Université de Lorraine/LHPS-Archives Poincaré, Nancy : A Short Introduction to the Epistemology of Atheism
11:00-12:00 John Schellenberg, Mount Saint Vincent University, Canada : The Epistemology of Modest Atheism
Wednesday 26 June Afternoon Session
01:30-02:30 Michel Bastit, Université de Dijon/LHPS-Archives Poincaré, Nancy : If Atheism Were a Sort of Ignorance ?
02:30-03:30 Jacek Wojtysiak, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawla II: The Principle of Justice and the Principle of Evidence in the Theism vs. Atheism Debate
03:30-03:50 Break
03h00-04h50 Ireneusz Zieminski, Uniwersytet Szczecinski: Religious Skepticism
Thursday 27 June Morning Session
09:30-10:30 Darek Lukasiewicz, Uniwersytet Kazimierza Wielkiego: God's Hiddenness as an Argument for the Non-existence of God
10:30-11:30 John Greco, Saint Louis University: No-fault Atheism
11:30-12:30 Cyrille Michon, Université de Nantes/Centre Atlantique de Philosophie: On the Very Idea of Atheism
Thursday 27 June Afternoon Session
02:00-03:00   Ewa Odoj, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawla II) Do we Have to Prove Atheism? A Critical Examination of Anthony Flew’s Position
03:00-04:00 Sébastien Réhault, LHPS-Archives Poincaré, Nancy: If God doesn’t exist, why so many people believe in him?
16:20-17:20 Reneta Zieminska, Uniwersytet Szczecinski) Atheism and Skepticism
Friday 28 June Morning Session
09:30-10:30 Ryszard Mordarski, Uniwersytet Kazimierza Wielkiego: How Scientific is The New Atheism? The mutual influence of scientific naturalism and religion
10:30-11:30 Paul Clavier, École Normale Supérieure, Paris: “Beginning to exist without some productive principle”: Hume's Challenge to the cosmological argument
11:30-12:30 Yann Schmitt, Professeur agrégé, Paris : Materialism without Atheism ! Really ? Yes !
Friday 28 June Afternoon Session
02:00-03:00 Piotr Gutowski, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawla II: Is the Phenomenon of Belief in Belief restricted to Religion?
03:00-04:15 General Debate-End of the Conference


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