I'm currently re-reading Stephen Maitzen's excellent paper, "Divine Hiddenness and the Demographics of Theism" (Religious Studies 42 (2006), pp. 177-191). As the title suggests, Maitzen appeals to the data of the demographics of theism to defend the argument from divine hiddenness. However, in the same paper, he also offers a powerful argument against the existence of a sensus divinitatis (i.e., a natural capacity to form properly basic belief in God in a wide variety of circumstances or "triggering-conditions", such as (e.g.) looking at the starry heavens, reading the Bible, etc.) postulated by reformed epistemologists of the likes of Alvin Plantinga and others. Below is a summary of that portion of Maitzen's article.[1]
The argument summarized: The sensus divinitatis is supposed to be an innate capacity or faculty in all humans. Now innate human faculties tend to be evenly distributed among humans (e.g., hearing, sight, etc.). But the kind of belief that’s supposed to issue from the sensus divinitatis is very unevenly distributed among humans (e.g., Saudia Arabia contains 26 million people, and 95 percent of them are theists. By contrast, Thailand contains 65 million people, and only 5 percent of them are theists). We thus wouldn’t expect this data of “geographic patchiness” with respect to theistic belief if humans were endowed with a sensus divinitatis. However, such data is readily and naturally explained purely in terms of anthropological, sociological, political and economic factors. Therefore, the data of the demographics of theism provides good evidence against the existence of a sensus divinitatis within humans.
Objection: Christian theism entails that the sensus divinitatis was damaged – and perhaps even rendered inoperable – by human sin, whether the sin in question is the original sin from the Fall or the particular sins of humans in their earthly lives. Furthermore, Christian theism entails that it requires the work of the Holy Spirit (e.g., Plantinga’s notion of the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit) to repair and restore the sensus divinitatis in a given individual. Therefore, the fact that some people -- or even very many -- lack belief in the theistic god doesn’t provide good evidence against the existence of a sensus divinitatis within humans.
Reply: This objection misses the point. The problem isn’t the non-universality of theistic belief; the problem is the uneven distribution of theistic belief. As Maitzen puts it, “why has God bestowed this restorative grace so unevenly, contributing to a pattern that, coincidentally, social scientists say they can explain entirely in terms of culture?”[2] Thus, appeal to human sin and divine grace fails to adequately mitigate the criticism.
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[1] To see Maitzen's excellent criticism of a molinist response to problems related to the demographics of theism, see the exchange between Maitzen and Jason Marsh in the following two papers: (i) Marsh, Jason. "Do the Demographics of Theistic Belief Disconfirm Theism? A Reply to Maitzen", Religious Studies 44 (2008), pp. 465-471; (ii) Maitzen, Stephen. "Does Molinism Explain the Demographics of Theism?", Religious Studies 44 (2008), pp. 473-477.
[2] Maitzen, "Divine Hiddenness and the Demographics of Theism", 187.
Plantinga's Reply to Bergmann on the EAAN vs. Plantinga's Reply to Draper's Evidential Argument from Evil: A Tension?
I raise the following worry for Plantinga's views as a means of getting clearer on them. The hope is that someone will straighten me out.
In response to Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturaism (EAAN), Christian philosopher Michael Bergmann argues[1] (roughly) that perceptual, mnemonic, introspective, testimonial, and a priori beliefs are properly warrant-basic, and thus enjoy a very high degree of warrant that is independent from propositional evidence. And since this is so, such beliefs are not defeated by probabilistic inferences against their reliability. Therefore, since Plantinga's EAAN is a probabilistic inference against the reliability of the naturalist's perceptual and other cognitive faculties, the latter does not defeat the naturalist's trust in them. Thus, the EAAN is a failure.
Plantinga's reply[2] is (even more roughly) that, no, the EAAN defeats the warrant enjoyed by the beliefs issuing from the naturalist's cognitive faculties, and thus Bergmann's criticism of the EAAN is unsuccessful.
Here's the thing, though: Plantinga's reply to Bergmann's objection to the EAAN appears to be in tension with his latest reply to Draper's evidential argument from evil.[3] For in "On Being Evidentially Challenged"[4] and in Warranted Christian Belief[5], Plantinga argues the opposite: probabilistic inferences can't undermine warrant-basic beliefs -- at least warrant-basic beliefs held with sufficient firmness.
So it appears that Plantinga wants to have it both ways. On the one hand, he wants to defeat naturalism by arguing that a probabilistic inference can defeat warrant-basic beliefs. But on the other hand, he wants to defend theism by arguing that probabilistic inferences cannot defeat warrant-basic beliefs. But it looks as though something has to give: either probabilistic inferences can undermine warrant-basic beliefs or they can't. If they can, then Plantinga's reply to Draper's evidential argument from evil fails. But if they can't, then it's not clear how Plantinga's EAAN could be an effective defeater for naturalism.
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[1] “Commonsense Naturalism” in James Beilby (ed.), Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), Pp. 61-90.
[2] "Reply to Beilby's Cohorts", in Beilby, Naturalism Defeated?, pp. 230-234.
[3] "Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists", Nous 23 (1989), pp. 331-350.
[4] in Howard-Snyder, ed. The Evidential Argument from Evil (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 244-261.
[5] Oxford: Oxford University Press (2000), pp. 469-481.
In response to Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturaism (EAAN), Christian philosopher Michael Bergmann argues[1] (roughly) that perceptual, mnemonic, introspective, testimonial, and a priori beliefs are properly warrant-basic, and thus enjoy a very high degree of warrant that is independent from propositional evidence. And since this is so, such beliefs are not defeated by probabilistic inferences against their reliability. Therefore, since Plantinga's EAAN is a probabilistic inference against the reliability of the naturalist's perceptual and other cognitive faculties, the latter does not defeat the naturalist's trust in them. Thus, the EAAN is a failure.
Plantinga's reply[2] is (even more roughly) that, no, the EAAN defeats the warrant enjoyed by the beliefs issuing from the naturalist's cognitive faculties, and thus Bergmann's criticism of the EAAN is unsuccessful.
Here's the thing, though: Plantinga's reply to Bergmann's objection to the EAAN appears to be in tension with his latest reply to Draper's evidential argument from evil.[3] For in "On Being Evidentially Challenged"[4] and in Warranted Christian Belief[5], Plantinga argues the opposite: probabilistic inferences can't undermine warrant-basic beliefs -- at least warrant-basic beliefs held with sufficient firmness.
So it appears that Plantinga wants to have it both ways. On the one hand, he wants to defeat naturalism by arguing that a probabilistic inference can defeat warrant-basic beliefs. But on the other hand, he wants to defend theism by arguing that probabilistic inferences cannot defeat warrant-basic beliefs. But it looks as though something has to give: either probabilistic inferences can undermine warrant-basic beliefs or they can't. If they can, then Plantinga's reply to Draper's evidential argument from evil fails. But if they can't, then it's not clear how Plantinga's EAAN could be an effective defeater for naturalism.
--------------
[1] “Commonsense Naturalism” in James Beilby (ed.), Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), Pp. 61-90.
[2] "Reply to Beilby's Cohorts", in Beilby, Naturalism Defeated?, pp. 230-234.
[3] "Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists", Nous 23 (1989), pp. 331-350.
[4] in Howard-Snyder, ed. The Evidential Argument from Evil (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 244-261.
[5] Oxford: Oxford University Press (2000), pp. 469-481.
Notes on Paul Draper's Critique of the Kalam Argument
Plantinga's Curious Reply to Lehrer's "Truetemp" Counterexample
In a previous post, we saw that Keith Lehrer raised a variation of his famous "truetemp" counterexample to the sufficiency of Plantinga's proposed analysis of warrant. Here is Plantinga's reply:
"As I see it, Truetemp has a defeater for his belief in the fact that (as he no doubt thinks) he is constructed like other human beings and none of them has this ability; furthermore, everyone he meets scoffs or smiles at his claim that he does have it. Truetemp's defeater means that his belief does not meet the conditions for warrant; hence (contra Lehrer) he doesn't constitute a counterexample to my analysis of warrant." (Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology, p. 333).
So Plantinga's reply is that Truetemp's warrant-basic belief is defeated by an inference from two other things he knows: that (i) he is like other people and that (ii) these other people don't have a similar ability to form accurate beliefs about their own temperature in the basic way. He also takes the fact that others scoff and smile at him (presumably in a contemptuous or condescending or incredulous way) to constitute, or at least partially constitute, a defeater for his belief.
Now if you're like me, you're having a hard time seeing how this reply fits with other things Plantinga says. But here's the most significant worry I have with Plantinga's reply to Lehrer: how does this reply fit with his account of warranted theistic belief, and with his model of warranted Christian belief? If holding a belief you take to be warranted in the basic way can be defeated merely by becoming aware that most other people lack a belief-forming mechanism or process you took yourself to have, and/or by the fact that others sneer at you or smile condescendingly at you for claiming to have such a faculty, then since most people don't form Christian belief in the basic way, and since most Christians are scoffed at at least some time in their lives, then how are we to avoid concluding that theistic and Christian belief, even if originally warrant-basic, is likewise defeated?
Here's another worry. In "On Being Evidentially Challenged", and in Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga argues against Draper's evidential argument from evil by saying that the independent warrant enjoyed by warrant-basic belief -- and thus warrant-basic theistic and Christian belief -- is sufficient, all by itself, to defeat probabilistic inferences -- e.g., probabilistic arguments from evil -- against it. But he seems to have rejected this sort of response in his reply to Lehrer, as he's allowing there that the probabilistic inference from
(i) I'm like other people.
(ii) Most other people don't have the ability to form reliable beliefs about their temperature in the basic way.
to
(iii) Therefore, I probably don't have the ability to form reliable beliefs about my temperature in the basic way.
defeats a belief that was originally warrant-basic.
So here again, Plantinga's reply to Lehrer appears to be in direct conflict with a key plank in his defense of warranted Christian belief.
"As I see it, Truetemp has a defeater for his belief in the fact that (as he no doubt thinks) he is constructed like other human beings and none of them has this ability; furthermore, everyone he meets scoffs or smiles at his claim that he does have it. Truetemp's defeater means that his belief does not meet the conditions for warrant; hence (contra Lehrer) he doesn't constitute a counterexample to my analysis of warrant." (Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology, p. 333).
So Plantinga's reply is that Truetemp's warrant-basic belief is defeated by an inference from two other things he knows: that (i) he is like other people and that (ii) these other people don't have a similar ability to form accurate beliefs about their own temperature in the basic way. He also takes the fact that others scoff and smile at him (presumably in a contemptuous or condescending or incredulous way) to constitute, or at least partially constitute, a defeater for his belief.
Now if you're like me, you're having a hard time seeing how this reply fits with other things Plantinga says. But here's the most significant worry I have with Plantinga's reply to Lehrer: how does this reply fit with his account of warranted theistic belief, and with his model of warranted Christian belief? If holding a belief you take to be warranted in the basic way can be defeated merely by becoming aware that most other people lack a belief-forming mechanism or process you took yourself to have, and/or by the fact that others sneer at you or smile condescendingly at you for claiming to have such a faculty, then since most people don't form Christian belief in the basic way, and since most Christians are scoffed at at least some time in their lives, then how are we to avoid concluding that theistic and Christian belief, even if originally warrant-basic, is likewise defeated?
Here's another worry. In "On Being Evidentially Challenged", and in Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga argues against Draper's evidential argument from evil by saying that the independent warrant enjoyed by warrant-basic belief -- and thus warrant-basic theistic and Christian belief -- is sufficient, all by itself, to defeat probabilistic inferences -- e.g., probabilistic arguments from evil -- against it. But he seems to have rejected this sort of response in his reply to Lehrer, as he's allowing there that the probabilistic inference from
(i) I'm like other people.
(ii) Most other people don't have the ability to form reliable beliefs about their temperature in the basic way.
to
(iii) Therefore, I probably don't have the ability to form reliable beliefs about my temperature in the basic way.
defeats a belief that was originally warrant-basic.
So here again, Plantinga's reply to Lehrer appears to be in direct conflict with a key plank in his defense of warranted Christian belief.
Fun New Paper
Brian Garvey (Lancaster University), "Absence of Evidence, Evidence of Absence, and the Atheist's Teapot", Ars Disputandi 10 (2010).
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