CORRECTION: I originally stated that there will be one session on Schellenberg's work, and that it was on Saturday, April 2nd, 9AM-noon. As you can see with the corrections below, I was way off. (Sorry, John!)
Thursday, March 31st:
9:00AM-Noon: Group Meeting: Philosophy of Religion Group: The Work of J.L. Schellenberg
Chair: Daniel Howard-Snyder
Speakers: J.L. Schellenberg, Andrew Chignell, and Terence Cuneo
Commentator: J.L. Schellenberg
Saturday, April 2nd:
12:15-2:15PM: Group Meeting: Philosophy of Religion Group: The Work of J.L. Schellenberg (continued)
Chair: Daniel Howard-Snyder
Speakers: Daniel Howard-Snyder, J.L. Schellenberg, and Wes Morriston
Commentator: J.L. Schellenberg
(The APA Central Division meeting will take place from March 30th through April 2, 2011, at the Hilton Minneapolis Hotel in Minneapolis, MN.)
Epistemic Contextualism and Philosophy of Religion
We've noted a few recent applications of current philosophical hot topics to issues in philosophy of religion: (i) the epistemology of disagreement, and (ii) phenomenal conservatism. However, I've been waiting to see work that applies insights from the contextualism vs. invariantism debate to issues in philosophy of religion. In any case, my wait is now over, as Aaron Rizzieri has a paper out in the current issue of the International Journal for Philosophy of Religion: "Pragmatic Encroachment, Stakes, and Religious Knowledge". Here's the abstract:
It is commonly held that epistemic standards for S’s knowledge that p are affected by practical considerations, such as what is at stake in decisions that are guided by that p. I defend a particular view as to why this is, that is referred to as “pragmatic encroachment.” I then discuss a “new argument against miracles” that uses stakes considerations in order to explore the conditions under which stakes affect the level of epistemic support that is required for knowledge. Finally, I generalize my results to include other religiously significant propositions such as “God exists” and “God does not exist.”
My Spidey sense is telling me the paper's worth a read. If the paper should find it's way into my email inbox, I wouldn't mind it a bit. Just sayin'...
UPDATE: Thanks, folks!
It is commonly held that epistemic standards for S’s knowledge that p are affected by practical considerations, such as what is at stake in decisions that are guided by that p. I defend a particular view as to why this is, that is referred to as “pragmatic encroachment.” I then discuss a “new argument against miracles” that uses stakes considerations in order to explore the conditions under which stakes affect the level of epistemic support that is required for knowledge. Finally, I generalize my results to include other religiously significant propositions such as “God exists” and “God does not exist.”
My Spidey sense is telling me the paper's worth a read. If the paper should find it's way into my email inbox, I wouldn't mind it a bit. Just sayin'...
UPDATE: Thanks, folks!
Comic Relief
Philosophy Bro recently posted on conceivability arguments for dualism, and in the process, further confirmed my suspicion that he's a fellow modal epistemologist. Keep fighting the good fight, bro....
He also briefly touches on the dubiousness of "far out" modal claims in reference to the modal ontological argument. Seconded, broseph. On a positive note, I find the brontological argument much more persuasive.
He also briefly touches on the dubiousness of "far out" modal claims in reference to the modal ontological argument. Seconded, broseph. On a positive note, I find the brontological argument much more persuasive.
Halvorson & Kragh's Entry on Theism and Physical Cosmology
Hans Halvorson and Helge Kragh have a nice paper on theism and physical cosmology, which will appear in the forthcoming Routledge Companion to Theism (Taliaferro, Harrison, and Goetz, eds.).
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